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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1asoning of some person of recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or any- body else ; since we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Ka^ada, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one another. But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our reasoning otherwise, i. e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the charge of having no proper foun- dation. You cannot, after all, maintain that no reasoning whatever is well-founded ; for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and the future are uniform. — Further, in the case of passages of Scripture (apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense, can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also expresses himself : ' Perception, inference, and the jastra according to the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring clearness in regard to right. — He who applies reasoning not contradicted by the Veda to the Veda and the (Smrz'ti) doctrine of law, he, and no other, knows the law' (Manu Smrz'ti XII, 105, 106). And that ' want of foundation,' to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjection- able arguments by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments \ (No fear that because the 1 The whole style of argumentation of the Mima^sa would be 3 1 6 vedanta-sOtras. purvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhanta should be ill- founded too ;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid. — For all these reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against reasoning. Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results ' want of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will result ' want of release,5 viz.
2inst reasoning. Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results ' want of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will result ' want of release,5 viz. of the reasoning from this very fault of ill— foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts ; for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception, because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge. — Or else (if we adopt another explanation of the word ' avimoksha ') all those who teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the cha- racteristic mark of uniformity, because it depends on accom- plished actually existing things ; for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is called perfect knowledge ; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in the proposition, 'fire is hot.5 Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known ; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge ?— Nor can it be said that he who maintains the impossible, if all reasoning were sound ; for then no purvapaksha view could be maintained. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12. 317 pradhana to be the cause of the world (i. e. the Sankhya) is the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philoso- phers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge. — Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge.
3s perfect knowledge. — Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of this our know- ledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to ' absence of final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scrip- ture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelli- gent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world. 12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained. Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedanta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the pradh&na being the cause of the world ; (which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda. — But now some dull- witted persons might think that another objection founded on reasoning might be raised against the Vedanta, viz. on the ground of the atomic doctrine. The Sutrakara, therefore, extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by 3 1 8 vedanta-sAtras. either Manu or Vyasa or other authorities, are to be con- sidered as ; explained,' i. e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhana doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same, there is no room for further doubt. Such common argu- ments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped ' otherwise ' (see the preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on. 13.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1asoning of some person of recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or any- body else ; since we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Ka^ada, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one another. But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our reasoning otherwise, i. e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the charge of having no proper foun- dation. You cannot, after all, maintain that no reasoning whatever is well-founded ; for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and the future are uniform. — Further, in the case of passages of Scripture (apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense, can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also expresses himself : ' Perception, inference, and the jastra according to the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring clearness in regard to right. — He who applies reasoning not contradicted by the Veda to the Veda and the (Smrz'ti) doctrine of law, he, and no other, knows the law' (Manu Smrz'ti XII, 105, 106). And that ' want of foundation,' to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjection- able arguments by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments \ (No fear that because the 1 The whole style of argumentation of the Mima^sa would be 3 1 6 vedanta-sOtras. purvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhanta should be ill- founded too ;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid. — For all these reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against reasoning. Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results ' want of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will result ' want of release,5 viz.
2inst reasoning. Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results ' want of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will result ' want of release,5 viz. of the reasoning from this very fault of ill— foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts ; for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception, because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge. — Or else (if we adopt another explanation of the word ' avimoksha ') all those who teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the cha- racteristic mark of uniformity, because it depends on accom- plished actually existing things ; for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is called perfect knowledge ; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in the proposition, 'fire is hot.5 Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known ; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge ?— Nor can it be said that he who maintains the impossible, if all reasoning were sound ; for then no purvapaksha view could be maintained. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12. 317 pradhana to be the cause of the world (i. e. the Sankhya) is the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philoso- phers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge. — Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge.
3s perfect knowledge. — Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of this our know- ledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to ' absence of final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scrip- ture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelli- gent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world. 12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained. Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedanta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the pradh&na being the cause of the world ; (which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda. — But now some dull- witted persons might think that another objection founded on reasoning might be raised against the Vedanta, viz. on the ground of the atomic doctrine. The Sutrakara, therefore, extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by 3 1 8 vedanta-sAtras. either Manu or Vyasa or other authorities, are to be con- sidered as ; explained,' i. e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhana doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same, there is no room for further doubt. Such common argu- ments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped ' otherwise ' (see the preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on. 13.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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