Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped ' otherwise ' (see the preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on. 13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versa) there would result non-distinction (of the two) ; we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows. Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world. — Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of right knowledge ; just as mantras and arthavadas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge1). Ana- logously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere ; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposite2. — Hence Scripture cannot be acknow- ledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge. And if you ask, * Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?'' we give you the fol- 1 The following arthavada-passage, for instance, 'the sacrificial post is the sun/ is to be taken in a metaphorical sense ; because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its literal meaning, 2 Which are to be known from the Veda only. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 319 lowing instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoy- ment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versa. Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doc- trine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinc- tion is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred.
2ng non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinc- tion is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established dis- tinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment. To the preceding objection we reply, ' It may exist as in ordinary experience.' Even on our philosophic view the dis- tinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other ; and, again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, « Having created he entered into it/ Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting 3 20 vedAnta-sOtras. adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non- different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates. 14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as * origin ' and the like. The1 refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of en- joyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i. e.
3here is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i. e. has no existence apart from the cause. — How so? — ' On account of the scriptural word " origin " and others.' The word 'origin' is used in connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thing everything is known ; viz. Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4, 'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i. e. the effect ; the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely ; thus,' &c. — The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay2, there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual effects distinguished by names) they are untrue ; in so far 1 Pari^amavadam avalambyapatato virodha/rc samadhaya vivar- tavadam a\n*itya paramasamadhanam aha. An. Gi. 2 Ananda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, paramarthato vi£-#atam iti sambandha^. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 32 I as they are clay they are true. — This parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman ; applying the phrase ' having its origin in speech ' to the case illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman. — Later on again the text, after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart from them, ' Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Kk. Up. VI, 4, 1). — Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the ' and others' of the Sutra. Such texts are, ' In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that ' (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; < This everything, all is that Self (Brz. Up. II, 4, 6) ; ' Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped ' otherwise ' (see the preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on. 13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versa) there would result non-distinction (of the two) ; we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows. Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world. — Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of right knowledge ; just as mantras and arthavadas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge1). Ana- logously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere ; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposite2. — Hence Scripture cannot be acknow- ledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge. And if you ask, * Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?'' we give you the fol- 1 The following arthavada-passage, for instance, 'the sacrificial post is the sun/ is to be taken in a metaphorical sense ; because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its literal meaning, 2 Which are to be known from the Veda only. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 319 lowing instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoy- ment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versa. Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doc- trine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinc- tion is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred.
2ng non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinc- tion is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established dis- tinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment. To the preceding objection we reply, ' It may exist as in ordinary experience.' Even on our philosophic view the dis- tinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other ; and, again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, « Having created he entered into it/ Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting 3 20 vedAnta-sOtras. adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non- different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates. 14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as * origin ' and the like. The1 refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of en- joyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i. e.
3here is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i. e. has no existence apart from the cause. — How so? — ' On account of the scriptural word " origin " and others.' The word 'origin' is used in connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thing everything is known ; viz. Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4, 'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i. e. the effect ; the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely ; thus,' &c. — The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay2, there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual effects distinguished by names) they are untrue ; in so far 1 Pari^amavadam avalambyapatato virodha/rc samadhaya vivar- tavadam a\n*itya paramasamadhanam aha. An. Gi. 2 Ananda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, paramarthato vi£-#atam iti sambandha^. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 32 I as they are clay they are true. — This parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman ; applying the phrase ' having its origin in speech ' to the case illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman. — Later on again the text, after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart from them, ' Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Kk. Up. VI, 4, 1). — Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the ' and others' of the Sutra. Such texts are, ' In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that ' (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; < This everything, all is that Self (Brz. Up. II, 4, 6) ; ' Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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