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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1itute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge ; not intelligent, but intelligence. — Ramanu^*a, on the other hand, explains ' gna.' by 'gn&tri,9 i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the VaLreshikas, but also against those philo- sophers who — like the Scinkhyas and the Vedantins of 6ankara's school — maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure ^aitanya. — The wording of the Sutra cer- tainly seems to favour Ramanu^a's interpretation ; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of .Sankara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term gna. of which the most obvious interpretation is gnatrt, not ^anam. Adhik. XIII (19-33) treats the question whether the individual soul is a;m, i. e. of very minute size, or omni- present, all-pervading (sarvagata, vy&pin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views. — In .Sankara's opinion the Sutras 19-28 represent the purvapaksha view, according to which the ^*iva is ami, while Sutra 29 formu- lates the siddhanta, viz. that the ^iva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as ami in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ — which itself is ami — constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sawsara. — According to Ramanu^a, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhi- kara/za gives utterance to the siddh&nta view, according to which the soul is of minute size ; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it ; while the INTRODUCTION. lv Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under* Sutra 1 8, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (gna.tr i) stands to knowledge (gna.na). — In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details. — Sankara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima facie view is carried ; in no other place the Sutras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be re- jected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bond fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system.
2d an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bond fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with 5ankara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and thus im- plicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that Sankara's interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word * pra^avat ') the Sutra runs as follows : ' But on account of that quality (or "those qualities ; " or else " on account of the quality — or qualities— of that ") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or " the designation of that").' This An- kara maintains to mean, ' Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa;/zsara state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/2u.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first ' tat ' by buddhi. And — which is more important — in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on Sahkara's own system the qualities of the buddhi — such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c. — can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the sawsara state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to Sankara's sys- tem, is knowledge or intelligence ; whatever is due to its lvi VEDANTA-stjTRAS. association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false. There are no similar difficulties in the way of R^manu^a's interpretation of the adhikara^a. He agrees with 5ankara in the explanation of Sutras 19-25, with-this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddh&nta. Sutras 26-2,8 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from Sankara's, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the sub- stratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vignana. when meaning the indi- vidual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, ' The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence/ i. e.
3y gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vignana. when meaning the indi- vidual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, ' The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence/ i. e. because knowledge is the essential character- istic quality of the soul, therefore the term ' knowledge ' is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sutra which, according to ^Sankara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha, serves on Rctmanu^a's view to set aside a previously-raised objection ; an altogether legitimate assumption. Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/za (30-32), 30 explains, according to 6ankara, that the soul may be called a/zu, since, as long as it exists in the sa/^sara con- dition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to Ramanu^a the Sutra teaches that the soul may be called wignkna. because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists. — Sutra 31 intimates, according to 5ankara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is poten- tially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same Sutra3 according to Ram^nu^-a, teaches that gnatritva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only. — In Sutra 32, finally, 5ankara sees a statement of the INTRODUCTION. lvil doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or perma- nently non-cognizing; while, according to R&m&nu^a, the Sutra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being gndXri and a^u, as it is in reality). — The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi. Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39 ; 40) refer to the kartn'tva of the ^Iva, i. e. the question whether the soul is an agent. Sutras 33-39 clearly say that it is such.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1itute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge ; not intelligent, but intelligence. — Ramanu^*a, on the other hand, explains ' gna.' by 'gn&tri,9 i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the VaLreshikas, but also against those philo- sophers who — like the Scinkhyas and the Vedantins of 6ankara's school — maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure ^aitanya. — The wording of the Sutra cer- tainly seems to favour Ramanu^a's interpretation ; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of .Sankara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term gna. of which the most obvious interpretation is gnatrt, not ^anam. Adhik. XIII (19-33) treats the question whether the individual soul is a;m, i. e. of very minute size, or omni- present, all-pervading (sarvagata, vy&pin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views. — In .Sankara's opinion the Sutras 19-28 represent the purvapaksha view, according to which the ^*iva is ami, while Sutra 29 formu- lates the siddhanta, viz. that the ^iva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as ami in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ — which itself is ami — constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sawsara. — According to Ramanu^a, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhi- kara/za gives utterance to the siddh&nta view, according to which the soul is of minute size ; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it ; while the INTRODUCTION. lv Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under* Sutra 1 8, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (gna.tr i) stands to knowledge (gna.na). — In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details. — Sankara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima facie view is carried ; in no other place the Sutras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be re- jected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bond fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system.
2d an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bond fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with 5ankara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and thus im- plicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that Sankara's interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word * pra^avat ') the Sutra runs as follows : ' But on account of that quality (or "those qualities ; " or else " on account of the quality — or qualities— of that ") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or " the designation of that").' This An- kara maintains to mean, ' Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa;/zsara state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/2u.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first ' tat ' by buddhi. And — which is more important — in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on Sahkara's own system the qualities of the buddhi — such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c. — can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the sawsara state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to Sankara's sys- tem, is knowledge or intelligence ; whatever is due to its lvi VEDANTA-stjTRAS. association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false. There are no similar difficulties in the way of R^manu^a's interpretation of the adhikara^a. He agrees with 5ankara in the explanation of Sutras 19-25, with-this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddh&nta. Sutras 26-2,8 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from Sankara's, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the sub- stratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vignana. when meaning the indi- vidual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, ' The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence/ i. e.
3y gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vignana. when meaning the indi- vidual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, ' The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence/ i. e. because knowledge is the essential character- istic quality of the soul, therefore the term ' knowledge ' is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sutra which, according to ^Sankara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha, serves on Rctmanu^a's view to set aside a previously-raised objection ; an altogether legitimate assumption. Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/za (30-32), 30 explains, according to 6ankara, that the soul may be called a/zu, since, as long as it exists in the sa/^sara con- dition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to Ramanu^a the Sutra teaches that the soul may be called wignkna. because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists. — Sutra 31 intimates, according to 5ankara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is poten- tially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same Sutra3 according to Ram^nu^-a, teaches that gnatritva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only. — In Sutra 32, finally, 5ankara sees a statement of the INTRODUCTION. lvil doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or perma- nently non-cognizing; while, according to R&m&nu^a, the Sutra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being gndXri and a^u, as it is in reality). — The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi. Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39 ; 40) refer to the kartn'tva of the ^Iva, i. e. the question whether the soul is an agent. Sutras 33-39 clearly say that it is such.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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