Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1more ready to accept vSankara's mode of interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming ; nowhere among the avowed followers of the vSankara system is there any tendency to treat the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau- rfapada down to the most modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to inculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but this one knowledge is without true value. There remains one more important passage concern- ing the relation of the individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early divergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedanta. I mean I, 4, 20-32, which three Sutras state the views of A^ma- rathya, Au^/ulomi, and Kajakrztsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the Brzhadara/zyaka, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed to the highest Self. The siddhanta view is enounced in Sutra 22/ avasthiter iti Ka^a- krztsna^,' i.e. Klrakrz'tsna (accounts for the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or abode.' By this ' permanent abiding' vSankara understands the Lord's abiding as, i. e. existing as — or in the condition of — the individual soul, and thus sees in the Sutra an enuncia- g2 vedanta-s6tras. tion of his own view that the individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avikrzta^ parame^varo £*ivo nanya^.' Rama- nu^a, on the other hand, likewise accepting Ka^akrztsna's opinion as the siddhanta view, explains ' avasthiti ' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul, as de- scribed in the antaryamin-brahma^a. — We can hardly main- tain that the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by 5ankara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged in favour of Rarnanu^a's interpreta- tion that in the five other places where avasthiti (or ana- vasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4 ; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent abiding or permanent abode within something.
2favour of Rarnanu^a's interpreta- tion that in the five other places where avasthiti (or ana- vasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4 ; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent abiding or permanent abode within something. If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the pre- ceding enquiry as to the teaching of the Sutras, I must give it as my opinion that they do not set forth the distinc- tion of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman ; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and f .svara in vSankara's sense ; that they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world ; and that they do not, with 5ankara, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I do not wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results. Upon Ramanu^-a's mode of interpretation — although I accept it without reserve in some important details — I look on the whole as more useful in providing us with a powerful means of criticising vSankara's explanations than in guiding us throughout to the right understanding of the text. The author of the Sutras may have held views about the nature of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of 6ankara, and yet not agreeing in all points with those of Ramdnu^a. If, however, the negative conclusions stated above should be well founded, it would follow even from them that the system of Badaraya/za had greater affinities with that of the Bhagavatas and Ramanu^a than with the one of which the 6ankara-bhashya is the classical exponent. It appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sutras that only a comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling us to form a judgment INTRODUCTION. CI as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine advocated by Badariya^a. The reason of this is that the greater part of the work is taken up with matters which, according to .Sarikara's terminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge, and throw no light upon philosophical questions in the stricter sense of the word. This circumstance is not without significance. In later works belonging to .Sankara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower vidycl is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are treated with great shortness ; and rightly so, for they are unable to accomplish the highest aim of man, i. e. final release.
3to .Sankara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower vidycl is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are treated with great shortness ; and rightly so, for they are unable to accomplish the highest aim of man, i. e. final release. When we therefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called lower vidycl are treated very fully in the Vedanta-sutras, when we observe, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the investigation of the unity of vidyas (most of which are so-called sagu/za, i. e. lower vidyas) is carried in the third adhyaya, or the fact of almost the whole fourth adhyaya being devoted to the ultimate fate of the possessor of the lower vidya ; we cer- tainly feel ourselves confirmed in our conclusion that what 6ankara looked upon as comparatively unimportant formed in Bcldarciya^a's opinion part of that knowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is entitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition. The question as to what kind of system is represented by the Vedcinta-sutras may be approached in another way also. While hitherto we have attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the Sutras by means of the different com- mentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the first place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sutras what doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teach- ing the Sutras doubtless aim at systematising. If, it might be urged, the Upanishads can be convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must consider it at the least highly probable that that very same doctrine — of whatever special nature it may be — is hidden in the enig- matical aphorisms of Badaraya^a 1. I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation 1 Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff. cii vedanta-s^tras. a safe one. Even if it could be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads agrees in all essential points (a subject to which some attention will be paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled unhesitatingly to assume that the Sutras set forth the same doctrine. What- ever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there remains the undeniable fact that there exist and have existed since very ancient times not one but several essen- tially differing systems, all of which lay claim to the dis- tinction of being the true representatives of the teaching of the Upanishads as well as of the Sutras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1more ready to accept vSankara's mode of interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming ; nowhere among the avowed followers of the vSankara system is there any tendency to treat the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau- rfapada down to the most modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to inculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but this one knowledge is without true value. There remains one more important passage concern- ing the relation of the individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early divergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedanta. I mean I, 4, 20-32, which three Sutras state the views of A^ma- rathya, Au^/ulomi, and Kajakrztsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the Brzhadara/zyaka, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed to the highest Self. The siddhanta view is enounced in Sutra 22/ avasthiter iti Ka^a- krztsna^,' i.e. Klrakrz'tsna (accounts for the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or abode.' By this ' permanent abiding' vSankara understands the Lord's abiding as, i. e. existing as — or in the condition of — the individual soul, and thus sees in the Sutra an enuncia- g2 vedanta-s6tras. tion of his own view that the individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avikrzta^ parame^varo £*ivo nanya^.' Rama- nu^a, on the other hand, likewise accepting Ka^akrztsna's opinion as the siddhanta view, explains ' avasthiti ' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul, as de- scribed in the antaryamin-brahma^a. — We can hardly main- tain that the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by 5ankara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged in favour of Rarnanu^a's interpreta- tion that in the five other places where avasthiti (or ana- vasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4 ; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent abiding or permanent abode within something.
2favour of Rarnanu^a's interpreta- tion that in the five other places where avasthiti (or ana- vasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4 ; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent abiding or permanent abode within something. If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the pre- ceding enquiry as to the teaching of the Sutras, I must give it as my opinion that they do not set forth the distinc- tion of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman ; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and f .svara in vSankara's sense ; that they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world ; and that they do not, with 5ankara, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I do not wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results. Upon Ramanu^-a's mode of interpretation — although I accept it without reserve in some important details — I look on the whole as more useful in providing us with a powerful means of criticising vSankara's explanations than in guiding us throughout to the right understanding of the text. The author of the Sutras may have held views about the nature of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of 6ankara, and yet not agreeing in all points with those of Ramdnu^a. If, however, the negative conclusions stated above should be well founded, it would follow even from them that the system of Badaraya/za had greater affinities with that of the Bhagavatas and Ramanu^a than with the one of which the 6ankara-bhashya is the classical exponent. It appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sutras that only a comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling us to form a judgment INTRODUCTION. CI as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine advocated by Badariya^a. The reason of this is that the greater part of the work is taken up with matters which, according to .Sarikara's terminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge, and throw no light upon philosophical questions in the stricter sense of the word. This circumstance is not without significance. In later works belonging to .Sankara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower vidycl is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are treated with great shortness ; and rightly so, for they are unable to accomplish the highest aim of man, i. e. final release.
3to .Sankara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower vidycl is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are treated with great shortness ; and rightly so, for they are unable to accomplish the highest aim of man, i. e. final release. When we therefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called lower vidycl are treated very fully in the Vedanta-sutras, when we observe, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the investigation of the unity of vidyas (most of which are so-called sagu/za, i. e. lower vidyas) is carried in the third adhyaya, or the fact of almost the whole fourth adhyaya being devoted to the ultimate fate of the possessor of the lower vidya ; we cer- tainly feel ourselves confirmed in our conclusion that what 6ankara looked upon as comparatively unimportant formed in Bcldarciya^a's opinion part of that knowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is entitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition. The question as to what kind of system is represented by the Vedcinta-sutras may be approached in another way also. While hitherto we have attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the Sutras by means of the different com- mentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the first place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sutras what doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teach- ing the Sutras doubtless aim at systematising. If, it might be urged, the Upanishads can be convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must consider it at the least highly probable that that very same doctrine — of whatever special nature it may be — is hidden in the enig- matical aphorisms of Badaraya^a 1. I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation 1 Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff. cii vedanta-s^tras. a safe one. Even if it could be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads agrees in all essential points (a subject to which some attention will be paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled unhesitatingly to assume that the Sutras set forth the same doctrine. What- ever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there remains the undeniable fact that there exist and have existed since very ancient times not one but several essen- tially differing systems, all of which lay claim to the dis- tinction of being the true representatives of the teaching of the Upanishads as well as of the Sutras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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