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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1eters of the two last Sutras give a somewhat different explanation1. — There are, they say, two kinds of body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which is perceived ; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on. (Ved. Su. Ill, I, i.) Both these bodies together were in the simile compared to the chariot ; but here (in the passage under discussion) only the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i. e. just as the objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the latter depends on the objects. — But how — we ask those interpreters— is it possible that the word ' Undeveloped ' should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the ^ 1 Sutradvayasya vr/ttikrz'dvyakhyanam uttMpayati. Go. An, A&iryade,riyamatam utthapayati. An. Gi. I ADHYAYA, \ PADA, 4. 245 passage under discussion)? — If you should rejoin that you are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body which is vyakta, i. e. developed or manifest ; we invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determin- ation of the sense depends on the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text.
2t the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loath- someness. For the passage does not by any means refer to such a distinction — as we conclude from the circumstance of there being no verb enjoining it — but has for its only subject the highest place of Vishnu, which had been men- tioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is beyond the Person. — We might, however, accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging our general argumentation ; for whichever explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the Kanaka passage does not refer to the pradhana. 4. And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because 246 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised. The Sankhyas, moreover, represent the pradh&na as some- thing to be cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements of the pradhana and of the soul there results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise the difference of the soul from them. And some- where they teach that the pradh&na is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special powers. — Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge ; we there meet with the mere word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage to man. — For this reason also we maintain that the word avyakta cannot denote the pradh&na. — Our interpretation, on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of know- ledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Vishnu, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot. 5.
3jectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of know- ledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Vishnu, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot. 5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradh&na as an object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant, on account of the general subject-matter. Here the Sankhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since the text later on speaks of the pradhana — which had been referred to as the Undeveloped — as an object of knowledge. ' He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death ' (Ka. Up. II, 3, 1 5). For here the text speaks of the pradh&na, I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 247 which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the Sankhya-smr/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of perception. Hence we con- clude that the pradhana is denoted by the term avyakta. To this we reply that the passage last quoted does repre- sent as the object of perception not the pradhana but the intelligent, i. e. the highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the fol- lowing reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage, 'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest Road ; ' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the passage, ' The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,5 because it is there spoken of as difficult to know ; after that the restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the passage, ' A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and, finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sarikhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelli- gent Self. — The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1eters of the two last Sutras give a somewhat different explanation1. — There are, they say, two kinds of body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which is perceived ; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on. (Ved. Su. Ill, I, i.) Both these bodies together were in the simile compared to the chariot ; but here (in the passage under discussion) only the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i. e. just as the objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the latter depends on the objects. — But how — we ask those interpreters— is it possible that the word ' Undeveloped ' should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the ^ 1 Sutradvayasya vr/ttikrz'dvyakhyanam uttMpayati. Go. An, A&iryade,riyamatam utthapayati. An. Gi. I ADHYAYA, \ PADA, 4. 245 passage under discussion)? — If you should rejoin that you are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body which is vyakta, i. e. developed or manifest ; we invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determin- ation of the sense depends on the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text.
2t the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loath- someness. For the passage does not by any means refer to such a distinction — as we conclude from the circumstance of there being no verb enjoining it — but has for its only subject the highest place of Vishnu, which had been men- tioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is beyond the Person. — We might, however, accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging our general argumentation ; for whichever explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the Kanaka passage does not refer to the pradhana. 4. And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because 246 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised. The Sankhyas, moreover, represent the pradh&na as some- thing to be cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements of the pradhana and of the soul there results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise the difference of the soul from them. And some- where they teach that the pradh&na is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special powers. — Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge ; we there meet with the mere word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage to man. — For this reason also we maintain that the word avyakta cannot denote the pradh&na. — Our interpretation, on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of know- ledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Vishnu, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot. 5.
3jectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of know- ledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Vishnu, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot. 5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradh&na as an object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant, on account of the general subject-matter. Here the Sankhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since the text later on speaks of the pradhana — which had been referred to as the Undeveloped — as an object of knowledge. ' He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death ' (Ka. Up. II, 3, 1 5). For here the text speaks of the pradh&na, I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 247 which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the Sankhya-smr/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of perception. Hence we con- clude that the pradhana is denoted by the term avyakta. To this we reply that the passage last quoted does repre- sent as the object of perception not the pradhana but the intelligent, i. e. the highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the fol- lowing reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage, 'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest Road ; ' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the passage, ' The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,5 because it is there spoken of as difficult to know ; after that the restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the passage, ' A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and, finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sarikhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelli- gent Self. — The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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