Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ng part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without sus- pecting the perception to be a merely apparent one. — But how (to restate an objection raised above) can theVedanta- texts if untrue convey information about the true being of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake (i. e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing 1. — This objection, we reply, is with- out force (because as a matter of fact wre do see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,) 1 Le. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects spring from unreal causes, II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 325 and effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a river take place with regard to a dreaming person. — But, it will be said, these effects themselves are unreal ! — These effects themselves, we reply, are unreal indeed ; but not so the consciousness which the dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result ; for it is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal, but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of them to be unreal likewise. — (We remark in passing that) by this fact of the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be con- sidered as refuted *. — Scripture also (in the passage, ' If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer there- from success in his work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained.
2assage, ' If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer there- from success in his work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage, after having declared that from the observation of certain un- favourable omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues ' if somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man kills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, viz. death, is notified. — It is, moreover, known from the ex- perience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the 1 Svapna^agraddehayor vyabhi£are*pi pratyabhi^-Mnat tadanu- gatatmaikyasiddhe^ ^aitanyasya ka, dehadharmatve rupadivat tadanu- palabdhiprasahgad avagator Mbadhat tadrupasyatmano dehadvayati- rekasiddher dehamatratmavado na yukta ity artha^. An. Gi. 326 VEDANTA-sftTRAS. Self are altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required for full satisfaction1. An injunction as, for instance, ' He is to sacrifice ' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected ; but passages such as, 'Thou art that/ ' I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else remains a desire is possible ; but there is nothing else which could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brah- man. Nor can it be maintained that such states of con- sciousness do not actually arise ; for scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said ' (Kh. Up. VII, 18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated.
3such consciousness be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any oppor- tunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various elements. But — it may be said — (that would not be a mere assump- tion, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman 1 As long as the 'vyavahara' presents itself to our mind, we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness whereby to account for the vyavahara ; but as soon as we arrive at true knowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 327 capable of modification ; for we know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo modifications. — This objection — we reply — is without force, because a number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brah- man, teach it to be absolutely changeless (ku/astha). Such passages are, ' This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 25) ; ' That Self is to be described by No, no' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26); ' It is neither coarse nor fine' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the quali- fication, 'absolutely changeless' (ku/astha), precludes this. For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ng part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without sus- pecting the perception to be a merely apparent one. — But how (to restate an objection raised above) can theVedanta- texts if untrue convey information about the true being of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake (i. e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing 1. — This objection, we reply, is with- out force (because as a matter of fact wre do see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,) 1 Le. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects spring from unreal causes, II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 325 and effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a river take place with regard to a dreaming person. — But, it will be said, these effects themselves are unreal ! — These effects themselves, we reply, are unreal indeed ; but not so the consciousness which the dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result ; for it is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal, but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of them to be unreal likewise. — (We remark in passing that) by this fact of the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be con- sidered as refuted *. — Scripture also (in the passage, ' If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer there- from success in his work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained.
2assage, ' If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer there- from success in his work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage, after having declared that from the observation of certain un- favourable omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues ' if somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man kills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, viz. death, is notified. — It is, moreover, known from the ex- perience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the 1 Svapna^agraddehayor vyabhi£are*pi pratyabhi^-Mnat tadanu- gatatmaikyasiddhe^ ^aitanyasya ka, dehadharmatve rupadivat tadanu- palabdhiprasahgad avagator Mbadhat tadrupasyatmano dehadvayati- rekasiddher dehamatratmavado na yukta ity artha^. An. Gi. 326 VEDANTA-sftTRAS. Self are altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required for full satisfaction1. An injunction as, for instance, ' He is to sacrifice ' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected ; but passages such as, 'Thou art that/ ' I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else remains a desire is possible ; but there is nothing else which could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brah- man. Nor can it be maintained that such states of con- sciousness do not actually arise ; for scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said ' (Kh. Up. VII, 18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated.
3such consciousness be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any oppor- tunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various elements. But — it may be said — (that would not be a mere assump- tion, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman 1 As long as the 'vyavahara' presents itself to our mind, we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness whereby to account for the vyavahara ; but as soon as we arrive at true knowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 327 capable of modification ; for we know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo modifications. — This objection — we reply — is without force, because a number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brah- man, teach it to be absolutely changeless (ku/astha). Such passages are, ' This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 25) ; ' That Self is to be described by No, no' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26); ' It is neither coarse nor fine' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the quali- fication, 'absolutely changeless' (ku/astha), precludes this. For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.