Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non- entity). We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-sa/^khyavirodha and aprati0) cannot be shown to be such ; we now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, aklra). With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of space no less than in the case of the two so- called non-entities treated of in the preceding Sutras. That space is a real thing follows in the first place from certain scriptural passages, such as ' space sprang from the Self.' — To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the other qualities. — Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow that while one bird is flying — whereby space is occupied — there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering bodies *. — Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, ' On what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following 1 What does enable us to declare that there is avara^abhava in one place and not in another ? Space ; which therefore is some- thing real. II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 25. 413 question occurs, ' On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the sup- position of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation. — Further, there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of nega- tive entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal.
2y, not a mere negation. — Further, there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of nega- tive entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non- eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and the like are. not a mere undefinable negation. 25. And on account of remembrance. The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdhrz) also ; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance which is con- sequent on the original perception. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who pre- viously made the perception ; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences, ' I saw that thing, and now I see this thing/ if the seeing person were not in both cases the same ? That the consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every one ; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be, '/ remember ; another person made the observation.' But no such state of consciousness does arise. — When, on the other hand, such a state of consciousness does arise, then every- body knows that the person who made the original observa- tion, and the person who remembers, are different persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, i I remember that that other person saw that and that' — 4 1 4 vedanta-sOtras. In the case under discussion, however, the Vaina^ika him- self— whose state of consciousness is, ' I saw that and that ' — knows that there is one thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is hot and gives light. As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vainlsika has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentari- ness.
3n belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is hot and gives light. As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vainlsika has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentari- ness. And if he further recognises all his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the similarity (of the different self-cognitions ; each, however, being momentary only), wTe reply that the cognition of similarity is based on two things, and that for that reason the advo- cate of universal momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity of two successive momen- tary existences, he would thereby admit that one entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of universal momentariness. — Should it be said that the cog- nition 'this is similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark that the fact of different terms — viz. ' this ' and ' that ' — being used points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to that' II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 26. 415 would be devoid of meaning ; we should in that case rather speak of 'similarity' only. — Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must also be represented as such and such ; attempts to represent it as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those attempts.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non- entity). We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-sa/^khyavirodha and aprati0) cannot be shown to be such ; we now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, aklra). With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of space no less than in the case of the two so- called non-entities treated of in the preceding Sutras. That space is a real thing follows in the first place from certain scriptural passages, such as ' space sprang from the Self.' — To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the other qualities. — Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow that while one bird is flying — whereby space is occupied — there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering bodies *. — Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, ' On what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following 1 What does enable us to declare that there is avara^abhava in one place and not in another ? Space ; which therefore is some- thing real. II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 25. 413 question occurs, ' On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the sup- position of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation. — Further, there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of nega- tive entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal.
2y, not a mere negation. — Further, there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of nega- tive entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non- eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and the like are. not a mere undefinable negation. 25. And on account of remembrance. The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdhrz) also ; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance which is con- sequent on the original perception. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who pre- viously made the perception ; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences, ' I saw that thing, and now I see this thing/ if the seeing person were not in both cases the same ? That the consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every one ; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be, '/ remember ; another person made the observation.' But no such state of consciousness does arise. — When, on the other hand, such a state of consciousness does arise, then every- body knows that the person who made the original observa- tion, and the person who remembers, are different persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, i I remember that that other person saw that and that' — 4 1 4 vedanta-sOtras. In the case under discussion, however, the Vaina^ika him- self— whose state of consciousness is, ' I saw that and that ' — knows that there is one thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is hot and gives light. As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vainlsika has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentari- ness.
3n belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is hot and gives light. As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vainlsika has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentari- ness. And if he further recognises all his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the similarity (of the different self-cognitions ; each, however, being momentary only), wTe reply that the cognition of similarity is based on two things, and that for that reason the advo- cate of universal momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity of two successive momen- tary existences, he would thereby admit that one entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of universal momentariness. — Should it be said that the cog- nition 'this is similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark that the fact of different terms — viz. ' this ' and ' that ' — being used points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to that' II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 26. 415 would be devoid of meaning ; we should in that case rather speak of 'similarity' only. — Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must also be represented as such and such ; attempts to represent it as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those attempts.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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