Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1far as it is £iva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bh&mati, pp. 22, 23: '&datmaiva svayampraka\ro*pi buddhyadivi- shayavi^ura^at kathazra&d asmatpratyayavishayo*ha#zkanispadaw giva iti ka. ^antur iti £a kshetra^a iti Mkhyayate.' 4 Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it 6 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. can be superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i. e. in contact with our sense-organs ; for non- discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour. Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable. This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience (avidya), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimi- nation of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge (neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition 1. The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the pre- supposition on which there base all the practical distinc- tions— those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda — between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions), or with final release2. — But how can the means of right may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not mani- fested either by itself or by anything else. — It is known or mani- fest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i. e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different way: asmatpratyayavishayatve^py aparokshatv&d ekantenavishaya- tv&bbavat tasminn ahankar&dyadhyasa ity artha^. Aparokshatvam api kau£id atmano nesh/am ity a^ahkyaha pratyagatmeti. 1 Tatraivaw sati evambhutavastutattvavadhara/ze sati. Bha. Tas- minn adhyase uktaritya*vidyatmake sati. Go. Yatratmani bud- dhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa^ tena buddhyadi- na^tmanl va kmena* ^anayadidoshewa >£aitanyagu/zena Mtmanatmd v& vastuto na svalpenapi yu^yate. Ananda Giri. 2 Whether they belong to the karmakaw^a, i. e.
2se uktaritya*vidyatmake sati. Go. Yatratmani bud- dhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa^ tena buddhyadi- na^tmanl va kmena* ^anayadidoshewa >£aitanyagu/zena Mtmanatmd v& vastuto na svalpenapi yu^yate. Ananda Giri. 2 Whether they belong to the karmakaw^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the ^anaka^^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman. I ADHYAYA, I PADA. knowledge such as perception, inference, &c, and scrip- tural texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience1? — Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing per- sonality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, per- ception and the other means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i. e. the body 2) the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed 3. Nor can, in the absence of all that 4, the Self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is de- pendent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superim position described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away ; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also — who possess a higher intelligence — run away when 1 It being of course the function of the means of right know- ledge to determine Truth and Reality. 2 The Bhamati takes adhish/Mnam in the sense of superintend- ence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a super- intending principle, i. e. the individual soul. 8 If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also. 4 I. e.
3sense of superintend- ence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a super- intending principle, i. e. the individual soul. 8 If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also. 4 I. e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes. 8 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well-known that the procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non- Self) ; we therefore conclude that, as they present the same appearances, men also — although distinguished by superior intelligence — proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same way as animals do ; as long, that is to say, as the mutual superimposition of Self and Non- Self lasts. With reference again to that kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like), it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another world ; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Veddnta- texts, of the true nature of the Self as free from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Br&hma^a and Kshat- triya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory exis- tence. For such knowledge is useless and even contra- dictory to the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, ' A Brahma^a is to sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, out- ward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we have already explained. (The superimpo- sition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1far as it is £iva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bh&mati, pp. 22, 23: '&datmaiva svayampraka\ro*pi buddhyadivi- shayavi^ura^at kathazra&d asmatpratyayavishayo*ha#zkanispadaw giva iti ka. ^antur iti £a kshetra^a iti Mkhyayate.' 4 Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it 6 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. can be superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i. e. in contact with our sense-organs ; for non- discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour. Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable. This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience (avidya), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimi- nation of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge (neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition 1. The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the pre- supposition on which there base all the practical distinc- tions— those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda — between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions), or with final release2. — But how can the means of right may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not mani- fested either by itself or by anything else. — It is known or mani- fest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i. e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different way: asmatpratyayavishayatve^py aparokshatv&d ekantenavishaya- tv&bbavat tasminn ahankar&dyadhyasa ity artha^. Aparokshatvam api kau£id atmano nesh/am ity a^ahkyaha pratyagatmeti. 1 Tatraivaw sati evambhutavastutattvavadhara/ze sati. Bha. Tas- minn adhyase uktaritya*vidyatmake sati. Go. Yatratmani bud- dhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa^ tena buddhyadi- na^tmanl va kmena* ^anayadidoshewa >£aitanyagu/zena Mtmanatmd v& vastuto na svalpenapi yu^yate. Ananda Giri. 2 Whether they belong to the karmakaw^a, i. e.
2se uktaritya*vidyatmake sati. Go. Yatratmani bud- dhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa^ tena buddhyadi- na^tmanl va kmena* ^anayadidoshewa >£aitanyagu/zena Mtmanatmd v& vastuto na svalpenapi yu^yate. Ananda Giri. 2 Whether they belong to the karmakaw^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the ^anaka^^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman. I ADHYAYA, I PADA. knowledge such as perception, inference, &c, and scrip- tural texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience1? — Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing per- sonality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, per- ception and the other means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i. e. the body 2) the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed 3. Nor can, in the absence of all that 4, the Self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is de- pendent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superim position described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away ; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also — who possess a higher intelligence — run away when 1 It being of course the function of the means of right know- ledge to determine Truth and Reality. 2 The Bhamati takes adhish/Mnam in the sense of superintend- ence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a super- intending principle, i. e. the individual soul. 8 If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also. 4 I. e.
3sense of superintend- ence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a super- intending principle, i. e. the individual soul. 8 If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also. 4 I. e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes. 8 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well-known that the procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non- Self) ; we therefore conclude that, as they present the same appearances, men also — although distinguished by superior intelligence — proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same way as animals do ; as long, that is to say, as the mutual superimposition of Self and Non- Self lasts. With reference again to that kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like), it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another world ; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Veddnta- texts, of the true nature of the Self as free from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Br&hma^a and Kshat- triya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory exis- tence. For such knowledge is useless and even contra- dictory to the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, ' A Brahma^a is to sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, out- ward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we have already explained. (The superimpo- sition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.