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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1pas. Smrz'ti also declares the world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its beginning, nor its support ' (Bha. Gi. XV, 3). And the Purd«a also declares that there is no measure of the past and the future Kalpas. 37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman). The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world. Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teach- ers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which 362 vedanta-sOtras. it was to show why his view should be accepted. — Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present — Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Maya, — on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 363 SECOND PADA. Reverence to the highest Self ! 1. That which is inferred (by the Sankhyas, viz. the pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis). Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of the Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocin- ation, still it is incumbent on thorough students of the Vedanta to refute the Sankhya and other systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the Vedanta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the Ved&nta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of such a determination, established our own position, since this is a task more important than the refutation of the views entertained by others. Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refuta- tion of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger. — There is a use, we reply.
2ish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refuta- tion of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger. — There is a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sankhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appear- ance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might therefore think that those systems with their abstruse argu- 3 64 VEDANTA-sfiTR AS. merits were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness. But, it might be said, the Sankhya and similar systems have already been impugned in several Sutras of the first adhyaya (I, i, 5, 18 ; I, 4, 38) ; why, then, controvert them again ? — The task — we reply — which we are now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished. As the Sankhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an independent manner, without any reference to the Vedanta- texts. The Sankhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows. — Just as jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general ; so we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and ani- mate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, and dulness 1 have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together constitute the threefold pradhana. This pradhana which is non-intelligent evolves itself spon- taneously into multiform modifications2, in order thus to effect the purposes (i. e. enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul. — The existence of the pradhana is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limita- tion of all effects and the like 3. Against this doctrine we argue as follows. — If you San- khyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point 1 The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the three constituent elements (gu«a) of the pradhana. Sa. Ka.
3ects and the like 3. Against this doctrine we argue as follows. — If you San- khyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point 1 The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the three constituent elements (gu«a) of the pradhana. Sa. Ka. 12, 13. 2 Viz. the great principle (mahat), aharikara, &c. Sa\ Ka. 3. 8 The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sa\ Ka\ 15 ; Sa. Sutras I, 129 ff. II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, I. 365 out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like — things which according to circumstances afe con- ducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain — are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external (i. e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition ; look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent principle like the pradhana is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhana also (when modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as clay, &c, and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such as potters, &c. 1 Nor (if remem- bering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any means of right knowledge ; we, on the contrary, are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1pas. Smrz'ti also declares the world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its beginning, nor its support ' (Bha. Gi. XV, 3). And the Purd«a also declares that there is no measure of the past and the future Kalpas. 37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman). The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world. Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teach- ers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which 362 vedanta-sOtras. it was to show why his view should be accepted. — Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present — Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Maya, — on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 363 SECOND PADA. Reverence to the highest Self ! 1. That which is inferred (by the Sankhyas, viz. the pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis). Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of the Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocin- ation, still it is incumbent on thorough students of the Vedanta to refute the Sankhya and other systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the Vedanta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the Ved&nta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of such a determination, established our own position, since this is a task more important than the refutation of the views entertained by others. Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refuta- tion of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger. — There is a use, we reply.
2ish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refuta- tion of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger. — There is a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sankhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appear- ance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might therefore think that those systems with their abstruse argu- 3 64 VEDANTA-sfiTR AS. merits were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness. But, it might be said, the Sankhya and similar systems have already been impugned in several Sutras of the first adhyaya (I, i, 5, 18 ; I, 4, 38) ; why, then, controvert them again ? — The task — we reply — which we are now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished. As the Sankhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an independent manner, without any reference to the Vedanta- texts. The Sankhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows. — Just as jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general ; so we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and ani- mate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, and dulness 1 have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together constitute the threefold pradhana. This pradhana which is non-intelligent evolves itself spon- taneously into multiform modifications2, in order thus to effect the purposes (i. e. enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul. — The existence of the pradhana is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limita- tion of all effects and the like 3. Against this doctrine we argue as follows. — If you San- khyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point 1 The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the three constituent elements (gu«a) of the pradhana. Sa. Ka.
3ects and the like 3. Against this doctrine we argue as follows. — If you San- khyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point 1 The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the three constituent elements (gu«a) of the pradhana. Sa. Ka. 12, 13. 2 Viz. the great principle (mahat), aharikara, &c. Sa\ Ka. 3. 8 The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sa\ Ka\ 15 ; Sa. Sutras I, 129 ff. II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, I. 365 out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like — things which according to circumstances afe con- ducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain — are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external (i. e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition ; look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent principle like the pradhana is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhana also (when modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as clay, &c, and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such as potters, &c. 1 Nor (if remem- bering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any means of right knowledge ; we, on the contrary, are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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