Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Govindananda (the former of which is unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati. My best thanks are due to Vandits Rama Misra vS&strin and Gangadhara Gastrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have consulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my obligations to Vandit Ke^ava vSastrin, of the same institution, who most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more than one passage more definite or correct. VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH SANKARA BHASHYA [34] ^ANKARA'S INTRODUCTION. FIRST ADHYAYA. FIRST PADA. Reverence to the August Vasudeva! It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject 1 whose respective spheres are the notion of the ' Thou ' (the Non-Ego2) and the ' Ego/ and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to superimpose 3 upon the subject — whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego — the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and vice versa to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural4 procedure — 1 The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence (£it) ; the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense-organs, internal organs, and the objects of the senses, i. e. the external material world. 2 The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the ' thou ' (yushmat), not the notion of the ' this ' or ' that ' (idam), in order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Lan- guage allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third person (' It is 1/ ' I am he who,' &c. ; ete vayam, ime vayam asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second person. 3 Adhyasa, literally ' superimposition ' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on. 4 Natural, i. e. original, beginningless ; for the modes of speech B 2 VEDANTA-stfTRAS.
2, literally ' superimposition ' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on. 4 Natural, i. e. original, beginningless ; for the modes of speech B 2 VEDANTA-stfTRAS. which has its cause in wrong knowledge — not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal1, to make use of expressions such as 'That am 1/ ' That is mine2.' — But what have we to understand by the term ' superimposition ? ' — The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing 3. Some indeed define the term ' superimposition ' as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing 4. Others, again, define superimposition as the error and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity. 1 I. e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong knowledge. 2 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children, wealth, &c, belong to my Self.' 3 Literally ' in some other place/ The clause ' in the form of remembrance ' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Deva- datta whom we first saw in Pa/aliputra again appears before us in M&hishmati. These are cases of recognition where the object pre- viously observed again presents itself to our senses ; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only. 4 The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are super- imposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother- of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver).
3thing, silver for instance, are super- imposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother- of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The dtmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ I ADHYAYA, I PADA. founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is super- imposed1. Others2, again, define it as the fictitious as- sumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the following : ' Mother-of-pearl appears like silver/ ' The moon although one only appears as if she were double.' But how is it possible that on the interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes ? For every one superimposes an object only on such other objects as are placed before him (i. e. in contact with his sense organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the Ego3, and the interior Self is well-known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation4. Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects is superimposed on the external thing mother-of-pearl and thus itself appears external. Both views fall under the above definition. 1 This is the definition of the akhyativMns. 2 Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to Ananda Giri. 3 The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayam- praka\ya, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Ne- science, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i. e. in so far as it is £iva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bh&mati, pp. 22, 23: '&datmaiva svayampraka\ro*pi buddhyadivi- shayavi^ura^at kathazra&d asmatpratyayavishayo*ha#zkanispadaw giva iti ka. ^antur iti £a kshetra^a iti Mkhyayate.' 4 Translated according to the Bhamati.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Govindananda (the former of which is unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati. My best thanks are due to Vandits Rama Misra vS&strin and Gangadhara Gastrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have consulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my obligations to Vandit Ke^ava vSastrin, of the same institution, who most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more than one passage more definite or correct. VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH SANKARA BHASHYA [34] ^ANKARA'S INTRODUCTION. FIRST ADHYAYA. FIRST PADA. Reverence to the August Vasudeva! It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject 1 whose respective spheres are the notion of the ' Thou ' (the Non-Ego2) and the ' Ego/ and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to superimpose 3 upon the subject — whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego — the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and vice versa to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural4 procedure — 1 The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence (£it) ; the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense-organs, internal organs, and the objects of the senses, i. e. the external material world. 2 The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the ' thou ' (yushmat), not the notion of the ' this ' or ' that ' (idam), in order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Lan- guage allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third person (' It is 1/ ' I am he who,' &c. ; ete vayam, ime vayam asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second person. 3 Adhyasa, literally ' superimposition ' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on. 4 Natural, i. e. original, beginningless ; for the modes of speech B 2 VEDANTA-stfTRAS.
2, literally ' superimposition ' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on. 4 Natural, i. e. original, beginningless ; for the modes of speech B 2 VEDANTA-stfTRAS. which has its cause in wrong knowledge — not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal1, to make use of expressions such as 'That am 1/ ' That is mine2.' — But what have we to understand by the term ' superimposition ? ' — The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing 3. Some indeed define the term ' superimposition ' as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing 4. Others, again, define superimposition as the error and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity. 1 I. e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong knowledge. 2 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children, wealth, &c, belong to my Self.' 3 Literally ' in some other place/ The clause ' in the form of remembrance ' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Deva- datta whom we first saw in Pa/aliputra again appears before us in M&hishmati. These are cases of recognition where the object pre- viously observed again presents itself to our senses ; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only. 4 The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are super- imposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother- of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver).
3thing, silver for instance, are super- imposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother- of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The dtmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ I ADHYAYA, I PADA. founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is super- imposed1. Others2, again, define it as the fictitious as- sumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the following : ' Mother-of-pearl appears like silver/ ' The moon although one only appears as if she were double.' But how is it possible that on the interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes ? For every one superimposes an object only on such other objects as are placed before him (i. e. in contact with his sense organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the Ego3, and the interior Self is well-known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation4. Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects is superimposed on the external thing mother-of-pearl and thus itself appears external. Both views fall under the above definition. 1 This is the definition of the akhyativMns. 2 Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to Ananda Giri. 3 The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayam- praka\ya, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Ne- science, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i. e. in so far as it is £iva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bh&mati, pp. 22, 23: '&datmaiva svayampraka\ro*pi buddhyadivi- shayavi^ura^at kathazra&d asmatpratyayavishayo*ha#zkanispadaw giva iti ka. ^antur iti £a kshetra^a iti Mkhyayate.' 4 Translated according to the Bhamati.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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