Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1t thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty. 1 Prakn'tibhya iti, pratyakshadr/sh/apadarthasvabhavebhyo yat parazrc vilaksha^am a^dryadyupade^agamyaw tad a&ntyam ity artha^. An. Gi. 352 VEDANTA-sftTRAS. No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one ; as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts. — Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change ; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world ; that being an in- struction which we know to have a result of its own. For in the scriptural passage beginning ' He can only be described by No, no' (which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in the words ' O kanaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness ' (Br/. Up. IV, 2, 4). — Hence our view does not involve any real difficulties. 28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods \ &c). Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self 1 This is the way in which *Sankara divides the Sutra ; An. Gi. remarks to 'loke*pi, &c. : atmani £eti vyakhyaya vi&tnu ka, hiti vya^ash/e/ II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 29. 353 of a dreaming person, ' There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' (Brt. Up. IV, 3, 10).
2rks to 'loke*pi, &c. : atmani £eti vyakhyaya vi&tnu ka, hiti vya^ash/e/ II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 29. 353 of a dreaming person, ' There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' (Brt. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without in- terfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity. 29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise. Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhana implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities — viz. the pradMna — is the cause of an effect — viz. the world — which is made up of parts, is limited and is characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that doctrine also either that the pradhana as not consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be abandoned. — But — it might be pleaded in favour of the Sankhyas — they do not maintain their pradhana to be with- out parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the three gunas, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhana forms a whole containing the three gu;zas as its parts. — We reply that such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without parts 1. And each guna. by itself assisted merely by the two other gu/zas constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature2. — So that the objection lies against the Sankhya 1 So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in its entirety, or else — against the assumption — consist of parts. 2 The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu«as in combination only to undergo modification ; if this were so the inequality of the different effects could not be accounted for. [34] A a 354 VED ANTA-SUTR AS. view likewise. — Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists of parts. — If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal, and so on.
3— Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists of parts. — If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal, and so on. — Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhana to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts. — Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman. The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do not get beyond the first atom1. If, on the other hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the com- bination with a part only, you offend against the assumption of the atoms having no parts. As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objec- tions raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine. 30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture). We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various powers. — How then — it may be asked—do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed with various powers ? — He is, we reply, endowed with all powers, c because that is seen.' For various scriptural pas- sages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers, ( He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is 1 As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is entire interpenetration ; in consequence of which the compound of two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom. II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 31. 355 never surprised ' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4) ; ' He who desires what is true and imagines what is true ' {Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1) ; s He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail ') (Mu. Up. 1, 1, 9) ; ' By the command of that Im- perishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart ' (Brz. Up. Ill, 8, 9) ; and other similar passages. 31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs ; (we reply that) this has been explained (before). Let this be granted.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1t thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty. 1 Prakn'tibhya iti, pratyakshadr/sh/apadarthasvabhavebhyo yat parazrc vilaksha^am a^dryadyupade^agamyaw tad a&ntyam ity artha^. An. Gi. 352 VEDANTA-sftTRAS. No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one ; as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts. — Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change ; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world ; that being an in- struction which we know to have a result of its own. For in the scriptural passage beginning ' He can only be described by No, no' (which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in the words ' O kanaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness ' (Br/. Up. IV, 2, 4). — Hence our view does not involve any real difficulties. 28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods \ &c). Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self 1 This is the way in which *Sankara divides the Sutra ; An. Gi. remarks to 'loke*pi, &c. : atmani £eti vyakhyaya vi&tnu ka, hiti vya^ash/e/ II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 29. 353 of a dreaming person, ' There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' (Brt. Up. IV, 3, 10).
2rks to 'loke*pi, &c. : atmani £eti vyakhyaya vi&tnu ka, hiti vya^ash/e/ II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 29. 353 of a dreaming person, ' There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' (Brt. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without in- terfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity. 29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise. Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhana implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities — viz. the pradMna — is the cause of an effect — viz. the world — which is made up of parts, is limited and is characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that doctrine also either that the pradhana as not consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be abandoned. — But — it might be pleaded in favour of the Sankhyas — they do not maintain their pradhana to be with- out parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the three gunas, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhana forms a whole containing the three gu;zas as its parts. — We reply that such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without parts 1. And each guna. by itself assisted merely by the two other gu/zas constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature2. — So that the objection lies against the Sankhya 1 So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in its entirety, or else — against the assumption — consist of parts. 2 The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu«as in combination only to undergo modification ; if this were so the inequality of the different effects could not be accounted for. [34] A a 354 VED ANTA-SUTR AS. view likewise. — Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists of parts. — If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal, and so on.
3— Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists of parts. — If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal, and so on. — Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhana to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts. — Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman. The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do not get beyond the first atom1. If, on the other hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the com- bination with a part only, you offend against the assumption of the atoms having no parts. As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objec- tions raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine. 30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture). We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various powers. — How then — it may be asked—do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed with various powers ? — He is, we reply, endowed with all powers, c because that is seen.' For various scriptural pas- sages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers, ( He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is 1 As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is entire interpenetration ; in consequence of which the compound of two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom. II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 31. 355 never surprised ' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4) ; ' He who desires what is true and imagines what is true ' {Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1) ; s He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail ') (Mu. Up. 1, 1, 9) ; ' By the command of that Im- perishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart ' (Brz. Up. Ill, 8, 9) ; and other similar passages. 31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs ; (we reply that) this has been explained (before). Let this be granted.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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