Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1which of course is absurd and not maintained by anybody. — Thus the doctrine of the origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile. 28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them). There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting for the existence of aggregates, &c, we are now confronted by those Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vign&na) exist. — The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things ; but it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions alone are real. According to this latter doctrine the process, whose con- stituting members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the result of knowledge \ is an altogether internal one, existing in so far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from consciousness, we reply that we base our 1 According to the vigTzanav&din the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge ; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhasa) is the result of knowledge ; the cognition in so far as it is power is m&na, knowledge ; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is pramatr/, knowing subject. II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 28. 419 doctrine on the impossibility of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-different from the atoms1.
2it being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-different from the atoms1. — In the same way we can show that the external things are not universals and so on 2, Moreover, the cognitions — which are of a uniform nature only in so far as they are states of consciousness — undergo, according to their objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external things becomes altogether gratuit- ous. From the fact, moreover, of our always being con- scious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other also ; and that would not happen if the two were essentially distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain that there are no outward things. — 1 If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms ; if they are non- different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies. 2 Avayavavayavirupo vahyo*rtho n&sti ken ma, bhud ^tivyaktya- dirupas tu syad ity a\yankyaha evam iti. GatyMin&m vyaktyadinam Mtyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasangad atyantabhinnatve tadvade- vatadbhsivad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhe- dava^* gativyaktyadibhedo^pi nastity artha^. e e 2 420 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although there is all the while no external object ; hence we conclude that the ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are like- wise independent of external objects ; for they also are simply ideas.
3the twofold form of subject and object, although there is all the while no external object ; hence we conclude that the ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are like- wise independent of external objects ; for they also are simply ideas. — If we be asked how, in the absence of ex- ternal things, we account for the actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained from the impressions left by previous ideas *. In the beginningless sawsara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows, moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments : we both (the Vedantins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental im- pressions, without any external object ; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental impressions. — Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things exist. To all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply. — The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing cor- responding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists, 1 V&san&, above translated by mental impression, strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the present actual idea. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 28. 42 1 any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied? — If the Bauddha should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1which of course is absurd and not maintained by anybody. — Thus the doctrine of the origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile. 28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them). There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting for the existence of aggregates, &c, we are now confronted by those Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vign&na) exist. — The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things ; but it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions alone are real. According to this latter doctrine the process, whose con- stituting members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the result of knowledge \ is an altogether internal one, existing in so far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from consciousness, we reply that we base our 1 According to the vigTzanav&din the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge ; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhasa) is the result of knowledge ; the cognition in so far as it is power is m&na, knowledge ; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is pramatr/, knowing subject. II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 28. 419 doctrine on the impossibility of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-different from the atoms1.
2it being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-different from the atoms1. — In the same way we can show that the external things are not universals and so on 2, Moreover, the cognitions — which are of a uniform nature only in so far as they are states of consciousness — undergo, according to their objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external things becomes altogether gratuit- ous. From the fact, moreover, of our always being con- scious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other also ; and that would not happen if the two were essentially distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain that there are no outward things. — 1 If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms ; if they are non- different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies. 2 Avayavavayavirupo vahyo*rtho n&sti ken ma, bhud ^tivyaktya- dirupas tu syad ity a\yankyaha evam iti. GatyMin&m vyaktyadinam Mtyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasangad atyantabhinnatve tadvade- vatadbhsivad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhe- dava^* gativyaktyadibhedo^pi nastity artha^. e e 2 420 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although there is all the while no external object ; hence we conclude that the ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are like- wise independent of external objects ; for they also are simply ideas.
3the twofold form of subject and object, although there is all the while no external object ; hence we conclude that the ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are like- wise independent of external objects ; for they also are simply ideas. — If we be asked how, in the absence of ex- ternal things, we account for the actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained from the impressions left by previous ideas *. In the beginningless sawsara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows, moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments : we both (the Vedantins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental im- pressions, without any external object ; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental impressions. — Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things exist. To all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply. — The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing cor- responding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists, 1 V&san&, above translated by mental impression, strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the present actual idea. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 28. 42 1 any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied? — If the Bauddha should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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