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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ich the text of the Upanishad exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishad s are dis- cussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special reason why a certain KMndogya, passage is followed by INTRODUCTION. xlv a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a num- ber of cases although not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily ac- counted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision of the Sutras into adhikara/zas adopted by Ramanu^a, a subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sutras. The fourth pada of the first adhyaya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sankhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also — as is brought out much more clearly in the vSri-bhashya than by vSankara — in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world. Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sutrakara of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the pas- sages referred to in the first adhyaya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima^s^-sutras are throughout Mi- mams&, i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a primd facie view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their mean- ing. Here and there we meet with Sutras which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutras to assume that a whole adhyaya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is suf- ficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikara/zas ; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/zas of the xlvi VEDANTA-SUTRAS. first adhyaya are occupied.
2know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/zas of the xlvi VEDANTA-SUTRAS. first adhyaya are occupied. That the Vedanta - sutras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sankhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 33J. The fifth adhikara^a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhana, and the fourth pada of the first adhyaya returns to an express polemic against Sahkhya interpretations of cer- tain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhy&ya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sutrakara, to guard his own doctrine against Sahkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sahkhya system is the only one whose adherents were anxious — and actually attempted — to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural pas- sages. The S&nkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedantin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhana or some product of the pradhana, or else to the purusha in the Sankhya sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the Vedantin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first adhyaya of the Vedanta-sutras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations ; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sutrakara ; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is — or can possibly be — sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sutras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the in- tricacies of the Mima/^sa, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not. INTRODUCTION. xlvii SECOND ADHYAYA. The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz.
3he Mima/^sa, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not. INTRODUCTION. xlvii SECOND ADHYAYA. The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more especially the Sankhya system. The task of the two first p&das of the second adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Vedanta doctrine on purely specula- tive grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the sys- tems irreconcilable with the Ved&nta can be satisfactorily established. Pada I. Adhikara^a I refutes the Sankhya objection that the acceptation of the Vedanta system involves the rejection of the S&nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Smrzti, and as such has claims on consideration. — To accept the Scinkhya-smrzti, the Vedantin replies, would compel us to reject other Smrztis, such as the Manu-smr/ti, which are opposed to the Sankhya doctrine. The con- flicting claims of Smrztis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sankhya-smrzti, but rather those Smrztis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause. Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-smrzti. Adhik. Ill (4-1 1) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non- intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes — as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted xlvill VEDANTA-SUTRAS. and thereby become simple gold again — do not continue to exist in those causes. — Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the Sankhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal sub- stance participating in the same characteristics. Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning fol- lowed in the preceding adhikara^a is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine. The one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1ich the text of the Upanishad exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishad s are dis- cussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special reason why a certain KMndogya, passage is followed by INTRODUCTION. xlv a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a num- ber of cases although not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily ac- counted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision of the Sutras into adhikara/zas adopted by Ramanu^a, a subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sutras. The fourth pada of the first adhyaya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sankhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also — as is brought out much more clearly in the vSri-bhashya than by vSankara — in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world. Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sutrakara of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the pas- sages referred to in the first adhyaya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima^s^-sutras are throughout Mi- mams&, i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a primd facie view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their mean- ing. Here and there we meet with Sutras which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutras to assume that a whole adhyaya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is suf- ficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikara/zas ; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/zas of the xlvi VEDANTA-SUTRAS. first adhyaya are occupied.
2know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/zas of the xlvi VEDANTA-SUTRAS. first adhyaya are occupied. That the Vedanta - sutras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sankhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 33J. The fifth adhikara^a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhana, and the fourth pada of the first adhyaya returns to an express polemic against Sahkhya interpretations of cer- tain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhy&ya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sutrakara, to guard his own doctrine against Sahkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sahkhya system is the only one whose adherents were anxious — and actually attempted — to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural pas- sages. The S&nkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedantin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhana or some product of the pradhana, or else to the purusha in the Sankhya sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the Vedantin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first adhyaya of the Vedanta-sutras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations ; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sutrakara ; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is — or can possibly be — sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sutras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the in- tricacies of the Mima/^sa, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not. INTRODUCTION. xlvii SECOND ADHYAYA. The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz.
3he Mima/^sa, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not. INTRODUCTION. xlvii SECOND ADHYAYA. The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more especially the Sankhya system. The task of the two first p&das of the second adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Vedanta doctrine on purely specula- tive grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the sys- tems irreconcilable with the Ved&nta can be satisfactorily established. Pada I. Adhikara^a I refutes the Sankhya objection that the acceptation of the Vedanta system involves the rejection of the S&nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Smrzti, and as such has claims on consideration. — To accept the Scinkhya-smrzti, the Vedantin replies, would compel us to reject other Smrztis, such as the Manu-smr/ti, which are opposed to the Sankhya doctrine. The con- flicting claims of Smrztis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sankhya-smrzti, but rather those Smrztis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause. Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-smrzti. Adhik. Ill (4-1 1) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non- intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes — as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted xlvill VEDANTA-SUTRAS. and thereby become simple gold again — do not continue to exist in those causes. — Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the Sankhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal sub- stance participating in the same characteristics. Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning fol- lowed in the preceding adhikara^a is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine. The one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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