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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1uestion who they are, declares ' They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 1, 2) ; showing thereby that one and the same divine Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds to show that these thirty- three gods themselves are in reality contained in six, five, &c, and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is the one god ? ' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear in many forms. — Smrzti also has a similar statement, ' A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his rays.5 If such Smrzti pas- sages as the above declare that even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers ? The gods thus being able to assume several shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 28. 201 while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible. The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time enter into subordinate relation to different actions ; one Brahma^a, for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many enter- tainers. But in other cases one individual stands in subor- dinate relation to many actions at the same time ; one Brahma/za, for instance, may constitute the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in sacrificial works. 28.
2ew (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in sacrificial works. 28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the word ; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates from the word, as is shown by perception and inference. Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of sacrificial works. Still a contradic- tion will result in respect of the 'word' (^abda). — How? — - The authoritativeness of the Veda has been proved ' from its independence,5 basing on the original (eternal) connexion of the word with its sense (' the thing signified ,)1. But now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to enjoy at the same time the oblations 1 The reference is to Purva Mima/rcsa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts., III, p. 69), 202 vedanta-s6tras. which form part of several sacrifices, yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritative- ness proved to belong to the word of the Veda. To this we reply that no such contradiction exists. — Why? — ' On account of their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and other beings, originates. — But — an objection will be raised — in Sutra I, i, % ('That whence there is the origin, &c. of this world')it has been proved thatthe world originates from Brah- man ; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word ? And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the VLrvedevas, and the Maruts 1 are non-eternal beings, because produced ; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non- eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them ? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadaita is born, the name Ya^/vadatta is given to him (lit. made for him)2.
3if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non- eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them ? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadaita is born, the name Ya^/vadatta is given to him (lit. made for him)2. Hence we adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the ' word.' This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow have an origin, their species3 does not have an origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although 1 In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised. 2 Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word. 8 Akrz'ti, best translated by efdos. I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28. the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like, since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such as ' Indra ' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some particular place, analogously to terms such as ' army-leader ; ' hence, whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular name. — The origination of the world from the ' word ' is not to be understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does ; but while there exist the ever- lasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their eternal sense (i. e. the akrztis denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origina- tion from those words. How then is it known that the world originates from the word ? — ' From perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1uestion who they are, declares ' They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 1, 2) ; showing thereby that one and the same divine Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds to show that these thirty- three gods themselves are in reality contained in six, five, &c, and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is the one god ? ' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear in many forms. — Smrzti also has a similar statement, ' A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his rays.5 If such Smrzti pas- sages as the above declare that even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers ? The gods thus being able to assume several shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 28. 201 while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible. The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time enter into subordinate relation to different actions ; one Brahma^a, for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many enter- tainers. But in other cases one individual stands in subor- dinate relation to many actions at the same time ; one Brahma/za, for instance, may constitute the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in sacrificial works. 28.
2ew (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in sacrificial works. 28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the word ; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates from the word, as is shown by perception and inference. Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of sacrificial works. Still a contradic- tion will result in respect of the 'word' (^abda). — How? — - The authoritativeness of the Veda has been proved ' from its independence,5 basing on the original (eternal) connexion of the word with its sense (' the thing signified ,)1. But now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to enjoy at the same time the oblations 1 The reference is to Purva Mima/rcsa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts., III, p. 69), 202 vedanta-s6tras. which form part of several sacrifices, yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritative- ness proved to belong to the word of the Veda. To this we reply that no such contradiction exists. — Why? — ' On account of their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and other beings, originates. — But — an objection will be raised — in Sutra I, i, % ('That whence there is the origin, &c. of this world')it has been proved thatthe world originates from Brah- man ; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word ? And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the VLrvedevas, and the Maruts 1 are non-eternal beings, because produced ; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non- eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them ? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadaita is born, the name Ya^/vadatta is given to him (lit. made for him)2.
3if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non- eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them ? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadaita is born, the name Ya^/vadatta is given to him (lit. made for him)2. Hence we adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the ' word.' This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow have an origin, their species3 does not have an origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although 1 In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised. 2 Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word. 8 Akrz'ti, best translated by efdos. I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28. the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like, since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such as ' Indra ' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some particular place, analogously to terms such as ' army-leader ; ' hence, whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular name. — The origination of the world from the ' word ' is not to be understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does ; but while there exist the ever- lasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their eternal sense (i. e. the akrztis denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origina- tion from those words. How then is it known that the world originates from the word ? — ' From perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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