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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1en remove the first-named difference ; as is declared in the latter part of the Sutra, ' And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of the in- tellectuality of the entire world — which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c. — must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause ; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature/ i. e. of a nature different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage, ' It became that which is know- ledge and that which is devoid of knowledge ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6)y which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intel- ligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman. — But — somebody might again object — the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. ' The earth spoke ; ' 'The waters spoke' (5at. Br. VI, 1, 3, 3; 4); and, again, ' Fire thought ; ' ' Water thought ' {Kk. Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, ' These pra^as when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to Brahman' (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, ' They said to Speech : Do thou sing out for us ' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 2). — To this objection the purvapakshin replies in the following Sutra. 5. But (there takes place) denotation of the super- intending (deities), on account of the difference and the connexion. The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are 304 vedanta-sOtras. not entitled to base the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an intellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke/ &c. because ' there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c, on the one hand, and Speech, &c, on the other hand.
2ions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c, on the one hand, and Speech, &c, on the other hand. And why so? ' On account of the difference and the connexion/ The difference is the one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand, and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings ; that difference would not be possible if all beings were intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushitakins in their account of the dispute of the pra/zas make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order to include the super- intending intelligent beings. They say, ' The deities con- tending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these deities having recognised the pre-eminence in pra^a ' (Kau. Up. II, J 4). — And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavadas, Itihasas, Pura/zas, &c. all declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as ' Agni having become Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the passages supplementary to the quarrel of the pra^as we read in one place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they went to Pra^apati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence and absence, each of them, as Pra^apati had advised, de- parting from the body for some time (' They went to their father Pra^apati and said,' & c. ; Kh. Up. V, 1, 7) ; and in another place it is said that they made an offering to pr^a (Brz. Up. VI, 1,13), &c. ; all of them proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c, and therefore strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 305 deities. In the case of such passages as, ' Fire thought,' we must assume that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is connected with its effects as a superintending principle. — From all this it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence cannot have it for its material cause. To this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next Sutra replies. 6. But it is seen. The word ( but ' discards the purvapaksha.
3— From all this it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence cannot have it for its material cause. To this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next Sutra replies. 6. But it is seen. The word ( but ' discards the purvapaksha. Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on account of the difference of its character is not founded on an absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to be intelligent, non- intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are pro- duced.— But — to state an objection — the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent bodies only of scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung. — Even thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of nature — due to the cause passing over into the effect — between the bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is, on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c, very considerable after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two) would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and [34] x 306 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. cow-dung there is one characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature ; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1en remove the first-named difference ; as is declared in the latter part of the Sutra, ' And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of the in- tellectuality of the entire world — which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c. — must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause ; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature/ i. e. of a nature different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage, ' It became that which is know- ledge and that which is devoid of knowledge ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6)y which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intel- ligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman. — But — somebody might again object — the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. ' The earth spoke ; ' 'The waters spoke' (5at. Br. VI, 1, 3, 3; 4); and, again, ' Fire thought ; ' ' Water thought ' {Kk. Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, ' These pra^as when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to Brahman' (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, ' They said to Speech : Do thou sing out for us ' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 2). — To this objection the purvapakshin replies in the following Sutra. 5. But (there takes place) denotation of the super- intending (deities), on account of the difference and the connexion. The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are 304 vedanta-sOtras. not entitled to base the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an intellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke/ &c. because ' there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c, on the one hand, and Speech, &c, on the other hand.
2ions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c, on the one hand, and Speech, &c, on the other hand. And why so? ' On account of the difference and the connexion/ The difference is the one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand, and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings ; that difference would not be possible if all beings were intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushitakins in their account of the dispute of the pra/zas make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order to include the super- intending intelligent beings. They say, ' The deities con- tending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these deities having recognised the pre-eminence in pra^a ' (Kau. Up. II, J 4). — And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavadas, Itihasas, Pura/zas, &c. all declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as ' Agni having become Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the passages supplementary to the quarrel of the pra^as we read in one place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they went to Pra^apati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence and absence, each of them, as Pra^apati had advised, de- parting from the body for some time (' They went to their father Pra^apati and said,' & c. ; Kh. Up. V, 1, 7) ; and in another place it is said that they made an offering to pr^a (Brz. Up. VI, 1,13), &c. ; all of them proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c, and therefore strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 305 deities. In the case of such passages as, ' Fire thought,' we must assume that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is connected with its effects as a superintending principle. — From all this it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence cannot have it for its material cause. To this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next Sutra replies. 6. But it is seen. The word ( but ' discards the purvapaksha.
3— From all this it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence cannot have it for its material cause. To this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next Sutra replies. 6. But it is seen. The word ( but ' discards the purvapaksha. Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on account of the difference of its character is not founded on an absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to be intelligent, non- intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are pro- duced.— But — to state an objection — the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent bodies only of scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung. — Even thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of nature — due to the cause passing over into the effect — between the bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is, on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c, very considerable after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two) would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and [34] x 306 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. cow-dung there is one characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature ; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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