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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1be destroyed by knowledge ; the great error which they admonish us to relinquish is rather that things have a separate individual existence, and are not tied together by the bond of being all of them effects CXX VEDANTA-SUTRAS. of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do not say that true knowledge sublates this false world, as vSankara says, but that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the world — the inferior murta rupa of Brahman, to use an expression of the Brzhadara/jyaka — and to become one with Brahman in its highest form. ' We are to see everything in Brahman, and Brahman in everything ;' the natural meaning of this is, ; we are to look upon this whole world as a true manifesta- tion of Brahman, as sprung from it and animated by it.' The mayavadin has indeed appropriated the above saying also, and interpreted it so as to fall in with his theory ; but he is able to do so only by perverting its manifest sense. For him it would be appropriate to say, not that every- thing we see is in Brahman, but rather that everything we see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread over it and hiding it from us. Stress has been laid1 upon certain passages of the Br/hadara^yaka which seem to hint at the unreality of this world by qualifying terms, indicative of duality or plur- ality of existence, by means of an added * iva,' i. e. ' as it were' (yatranyad iva syat ; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati ; atma dhyayativa lelayativa). Those passages no doubt readily lend themselves to Maya interpretations, and it is by no means impossible that in their author's mind there was something like an undeveloped Maya doctrine. I must, how- ever, remark that they, on the other hand, also admit of easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of the unreality of the world. If Ya^avalkya refers to the latter as that * where there is something else as it were, where there is duality as it were,' he may simply mean to indicate that the ordinary opinion, according to which the individual forms of existence of the world are opposed to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all things being one in so far as they spring from — and are parts of — Brahman. This would in no way involve duality or plurality being unreal in Ankara's sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes of Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is only one universal 1 Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 243 fF. INTRODUCTION. CXX1 substance.
2y or plurality being unreal in Ankara's sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes of Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is only one universal 1 Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 243 fF. INTRODUCTION. CXX1 substance. And with regard to the clause * the Self thinks as it were ' it has to be noted that according to the com- mentators the * as it were ' is meant to indicate that truly not the Self is thinking, but the upadhis, i. e. especially the manas with which the Self is connected. But whether these upadhis are the mere offspring of Maya, as 5ankara thinks, or real forms of existence, as Ramanu^a teaches, is an altogether different question. I do not wish, however, to urge these last observations, and am ready to admit that not impossibly those iva's indicate that the thought of the writer who employed them was darkly labouring with a conception akin to — although much less explicit than — the May& of Sankara. But what I object to is, that conclusions drawn from a few passages of, after all, doubtful import should be employed for introducing the Maya doctrine into other passages which do not even hint at it, and are fully intelligible without it 1. The last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads we have to touch upon is the relation of the ^ivas, the in- dividual souls to the highest Self. The special views regarding that point held by Sankara and Ramanu^a have been stated before. Confronting their theories with the texts of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit with- out hesitation, that Sankara's doctrine faithfully represents the prevailing teaching of the Upanishads in one important point at least, viz. therein that the soul or Self of the sage — whatever its original relation to Brahman may be — is in the end completely merged and indistinguishably lost in the universal Self. A distinction, repeatedly alluded to before, has indeed to be kept in view here also. Certain texts of the Upanishads describe the soul's going upwards, on the path of the gods, to the world of Brahman, where it dwells for unnumbered years, i. e. for ever. Those texts, as a type of which we may take the passage Kaushit. Up. I — the fundamental text of the R^manu^as concerning the soul's 1 I cannot discuss in this place the Maya passages of the *SVet£rvatara and the Maitrayaniya Upanishads. Reasons which want of space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when wishing to ascertain the true unmixed doctrine of the Upanishads.
3and the Maitrayaniya Upanishads. Reasons which want of space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when wishing to ascertain the true unmixed doctrine of the Upanishads. CXX11 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. fate after death — belong to an earlier stage of philosophic development ; they manifestly ascribe to the soul a con- tinued individual existence. But mixed with texts of this class there are others in which the final absolute identification of the individual Self with the universal Self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. 'He who knows Brahman and becomes Brahman ;' ' he who knows Brahman becomes all this;' l as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, thus a wise man goes to the divine person.' And if we look to the whole, to the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads, we may call the doctrine embodied in passages of the latter nature the doctrine of the Upanishads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently and clearly stated theory of the individual souls being merged in Brahman in the state of deep dreamless sleep. It is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching of the Upanishads concerning the original relation of the individual soul to the highest Self, although there can be no doubt that it has to be viewed as proceeding from the latter, and somehow forming a part of it. Negatively we are entitled to say that the doctrine, according to which the soul is merely brahma bhrantam or brahma mayopa- dhikam, is in no way countenanced by the majority of the passages bearing on the question. If the emission of the elements, described in the KMndogya, and referred to above, is a real process — of which we saw no reason to doubt— the ^iva atman with which the highest Self enters into the emitted elements is equally real, a true part or emanation of Brahman itself. After having in this way shortly reviewed the chief ele- ments of Vedantic doctrine according to the Upanishads, we may briefly consider Ankara's system and mode of inter- pretation—with whose details we had frequent opportunities of finding fault — as a whole. It has been said before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the Upa- nishads to a system consistent and free from contradic- tions is an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are quite ready to admit that .Sankara's system is most probably the best which can be devised. INTRODUCTION.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1be destroyed by knowledge ; the great error which they admonish us to relinquish is rather that things have a separate individual existence, and are not tied together by the bond of being all of them effects CXX VEDANTA-SUTRAS. of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do not say that true knowledge sublates this false world, as vSankara says, but that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the world — the inferior murta rupa of Brahman, to use an expression of the Brzhadara/jyaka — and to become one with Brahman in its highest form. ' We are to see everything in Brahman, and Brahman in everything ;' the natural meaning of this is, ; we are to look upon this whole world as a true manifesta- tion of Brahman, as sprung from it and animated by it.' The mayavadin has indeed appropriated the above saying also, and interpreted it so as to fall in with his theory ; but he is able to do so only by perverting its manifest sense. For him it would be appropriate to say, not that every- thing we see is in Brahman, but rather that everything we see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread over it and hiding it from us. Stress has been laid1 upon certain passages of the Br/hadara^yaka which seem to hint at the unreality of this world by qualifying terms, indicative of duality or plur- ality of existence, by means of an added * iva,' i. e. ' as it were' (yatranyad iva syat ; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati ; atma dhyayativa lelayativa). Those passages no doubt readily lend themselves to Maya interpretations, and it is by no means impossible that in their author's mind there was something like an undeveloped Maya doctrine. I must, how- ever, remark that they, on the other hand, also admit of easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of the unreality of the world. If Ya^avalkya refers to the latter as that * where there is something else as it were, where there is duality as it were,' he may simply mean to indicate that the ordinary opinion, according to which the individual forms of existence of the world are opposed to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all things being one in so far as they spring from — and are parts of — Brahman. This would in no way involve duality or plurality being unreal in Ankara's sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes of Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is only one universal 1 Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 243 fF. INTRODUCTION. CXX1 substance.
2y or plurality being unreal in Ankara's sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes of Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is only one universal 1 Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 243 fF. INTRODUCTION. CXX1 substance. And with regard to the clause * the Self thinks as it were ' it has to be noted that according to the com- mentators the * as it were ' is meant to indicate that truly not the Self is thinking, but the upadhis, i. e. especially the manas with which the Self is connected. But whether these upadhis are the mere offspring of Maya, as 5ankara thinks, or real forms of existence, as Ramanu^a teaches, is an altogether different question. I do not wish, however, to urge these last observations, and am ready to admit that not impossibly those iva's indicate that the thought of the writer who employed them was darkly labouring with a conception akin to — although much less explicit than — the May& of Sankara. But what I object to is, that conclusions drawn from a few passages of, after all, doubtful import should be employed for introducing the Maya doctrine into other passages which do not even hint at it, and are fully intelligible without it 1. The last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads we have to touch upon is the relation of the ^ivas, the in- dividual souls to the highest Self. The special views regarding that point held by Sankara and Ramanu^a have been stated before. Confronting their theories with the texts of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit with- out hesitation, that Sankara's doctrine faithfully represents the prevailing teaching of the Upanishads in one important point at least, viz. therein that the soul or Self of the sage — whatever its original relation to Brahman may be — is in the end completely merged and indistinguishably lost in the universal Self. A distinction, repeatedly alluded to before, has indeed to be kept in view here also. Certain texts of the Upanishads describe the soul's going upwards, on the path of the gods, to the world of Brahman, where it dwells for unnumbered years, i. e. for ever. Those texts, as a type of which we may take the passage Kaushit. Up. I — the fundamental text of the R^manu^as concerning the soul's 1 I cannot discuss in this place the Maya passages of the *SVet£rvatara and the Maitrayaniya Upanishads. Reasons which want of space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when wishing to ascertain the true unmixed doctrine of the Upanishads.
3and the Maitrayaniya Upanishads. Reasons which want of space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when wishing to ascertain the true unmixed doctrine of the Upanishads. CXX11 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. fate after death — belong to an earlier stage of philosophic development ; they manifestly ascribe to the soul a con- tinued individual existence. But mixed with texts of this class there are others in which the final absolute identification of the individual Self with the universal Self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. 'He who knows Brahman and becomes Brahman ;' ' he who knows Brahman becomes all this;' l as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, thus a wise man goes to the divine person.' And if we look to the whole, to the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads, we may call the doctrine embodied in passages of the latter nature the doctrine of the Upanishads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently and clearly stated theory of the individual souls being merged in Brahman in the state of deep dreamless sleep. It is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching of the Upanishads concerning the original relation of the individual soul to the highest Self, although there can be no doubt that it has to be viewed as proceeding from the latter, and somehow forming a part of it. Negatively we are entitled to say that the doctrine, according to which the soul is merely brahma bhrantam or brahma mayopa- dhikam, is in no way countenanced by the majority of the passages bearing on the question. If the emission of the elements, described in the KMndogya, and referred to above, is a real process — of which we saw no reason to doubt— the ^iva atman with which the highest Self enters into the emitted elements is equally real, a true part or emanation of Brahman itself. After having in this way shortly reviewed the chief ele- ments of Vedantic doctrine according to the Upanishads, we may briefly consider Ankara's system and mode of inter- pretation—with whose details we had frequent opportunities of finding fault — as a whole. It has been said before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the Upa- nishads to a system consistent and free from contradic- tions is an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are quite ready to admit that .Sankara's system is most probably the best which can be devised. INTRODUCTION.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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