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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1This 1 Owing to the importance of the 6ankara-bhashya as the fundamental work of the most influential Hindu school of philosophy, the number of topics which might be discussed in the introduction to its translation is considerable. But Xxiv VEDANTA-SUTRAS. will best be done in connexion with a succinct but full review of the topics discussed in the adhikara^as of the Vedanta-sutras, according to 5ankara; a review which — apart from the side-glances at Ramanu^a's comments- will be useful as a guide through the Sutras and the vSankara-bhashya. Before, however, entering on that task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical systems of 5ankara as well as of Ramanu^a, which may be referred to when, later on, discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted. In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and not enter into any details. Of 5ankara's system we possess as it is more than one trustworthy exposition ; it may suffice to refer to Deussen's System of the Veddnta, in which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be learned from the Sutra-bhashya, are represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid sketch of the Sankara Vedanta, founded on the Sutra- bhashya, the Upanishad bhashyas, and some later writers belonging to Sankara's school. With regard to Ramanu^a's philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Ramanu^a chapter in the Sarvadanra^asa/^graha ; the short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the Sri- bhashya itself. What in .Sarikara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as follows. — Whatever is, is in reality one ; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or Paramatman, the highest Self. This being is of an abso- lutely homogeneous nature ; it is pure ' Being,' or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (^aitanya, the limitation of the space at our disposal necessitates a selection, and it can hardly be doubted that, among the possible tasks of a translator, that of ascertaining how far the teaching of 6ankara agrees with that of Badaraya^a, and, further, how far either of them represents the true doctrine of the Upanishads, is the one first to be taken in hand. — Some other topics, such as a detailed account of Ankara's teaching according to the bhashya, an enquiry as to the books and authors quoted by .Sahkara, &c, have, moreover, been treated not long ago in a very thorough fashion by Dr. Deussen in his l System des Vedanta.' INTRODUCTION.
2as a detailed account of Ankara's teaching according to the bhashya, an enquiry as to the books and authors quoted by .Sahkara, &c, have, moreover, been treated not long ago in a very thorough fashion by Dr. Deussen in his l System des Vedanta.' INTRODUCTION. XXV gn&na). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance ; Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it. — But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and in which we ourselves exist as individual beings? — Brahman, the answer runs, is associated with a certain power called Maya or avidya to which the appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called ' being ' (sat), for ' being ' is only Brahman ; nor can it be called * non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of this world. It is in fact a prin- ciple of illusion ; the undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory ap- pearances of animate and inanimate beings. Maya thus constitutes the upadana, the material cause of the world ; or — if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that Maya belongs to Brahman as a ^akti — we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated with Maya* In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called livara, the Lord. Maya, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive evolution into all the individual existences (bheda), distinguished by special names and forms, of which the world consists ; from it there spring in due succession the different material elements and the whole bodily apparatus belonging to sentient beings. In all those apparently individual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present, but, owing to the particular adjuncts into which Maya has specialised itself, it appears to be broken up — it is broken up, as it were — into a multi- plicity of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called ^ivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each xxvi vedAnta-s6tras. giva.
3nto which Maya has specialised itself, it appears to be broken up — it is broken up, as it were — into a multi- plicity of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called ^ivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each xxvi vedAnta-s6tras. giva. is only the universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and distinguish one £iva from another, is the offspring of Maya and as such unreal. The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (vyavahara) thus consists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which those cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for both are altogether due to MkyL But at the same time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things, although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are. The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond M&ya, which, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its adjuncts (upadhi), the fictitious offspring of Maya, and thus looks for its true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ (manas), i. e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited in extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer. Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future embodied existences, the Lord— as a retributor and dispenser — allotting to each soul that form of embodiment to which it is entitled by its previous actions. At the end of each of the great world periods called kalpas the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world is dissolved and merged into non-distinct Maya, while the individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion with up&dhis, lie in deep slumber as it were. But as the INTRODUCTION.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1This 1 Owing to the importance of the 6ankara-bhashya as the fundamental work of the most influential Hindu school of philosophy, the number of topics which might be discussed in the introduction to its translation is considerable. But Xxiv VEDANTA-SUTRAS. will best be done in connexion with a succinct but full review of the topics discussed in the adhikara^as of the Vedanta-sutras, according to 5ankara; a review which — apart from the side-glances at Ramanu^a's comments- will be useful as a guide through the Sutras and the vSankara-bhashya. Before, however, entering on that task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical systems of 5ankara as well as of Ramanu^a, which may be referred to when, later on, discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted. In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and not enter into any details. Of 5ankara's system we possess as it is more than one trustworthy exposition ; it may suffice to refer to Deussen's System of the Veddnta, in which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be learned from the Sutra-bhashya, are represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid sketch of the Sankara Vedanta, founded on the Sutra- bhashya, the Upanishad bhashyas, and some later writers belonging to Sankara's school. With regard to Ramanu^a's philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Ramanu^a chapter in the Sarvadanra^asa/^graha ; the short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the Sri- bhashya itself. What in .Sarikara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as follows. — Whatever is, is in reality one ; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or Paramatman, the highest Self. This being is of an abso- lutely homogeneous nature ; it is pure ' Being,' or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (^aitanya, the limitation of the space at our disposal necessitates a selection, and it can hardly be doubted that, among the possible tasks of a translator, that of ascertaining how far the teaching of 6ankara agrees with that of Badaraya^a, and, further, how far either of them represents the true doctrine of the Upanishads, is the one first to be taken in hand. — Some other topics, such as a detailed account of Ankara's teaching according to the bhashya, an enquiry as to the books and authors quoted by .Sahkara, &c, have, moreover, been treated not long ago in a very thorough fashion by Dr. Deussen in his l System des Vedanta.' INTRODUCTION.
2as a detailed account of Ankara's teaching according to the bhashya, an enquiry as to the books and authors quoted by .Sahkara, &c, have, moreover, been treated not long ago in a very thorough fashion by Dr. Deussen in his l System des Vedanta.' INTRODUCTION. XXV gn&na). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance ; Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it. — But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and in which we ourselves exist as individual beings? — Brahman, the answer runs, is associated with a certain power called Maya or avidya to which the appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called ' being ' (sat), for ' being ' is only Brahman ; nor can it be called * non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of this world. It is in fact a prin- ciple of illusion ; the undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory ap- pearances of animate and inanimate beings. Maya thus constitutes the upadana, the material cause of the world ; or — if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that Maya belongs to Brahman as a ^akti — we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated with Maya* In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called livara, the Lord. Maya, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive evolution into all the individual existences (bheda), distinguished by special names and forms, of which the world consists ; from it there spring in due succession the different material elements and the whole bodily apparatus belonging to sentient beings. In all those apparently individual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present, but, owing to the particular adjuncts into which Maya has specialised itself, it appears to be broken up — it is broken up, as it were — into a multi- plicity of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called ^ivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each xxvi vedAnta-s6tras. giva.
3nto which Maya has specialised itself, it appears to be broken up — it is broken up, as it were — into a multi- plicity of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called ^ivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each xxvi vedAnta-s6tras. giva. is only the universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and distinguish one £iva from another, is the offspring of Maya and as such unreal. The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (vyavahara) thus consists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which those cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for both are altogether due to MkyL But at the same time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things, although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are. The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond M&ya, which, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its adjuncts (upadhi), the fictitious offspring of Maya, and thus looks for its true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ (manas), i. e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited in extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer. Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future embodied existences, the Lord— as a retributor and dispenser — allotting to each soul that form of embodiment to which it is entitled by its previous actions. At the end of each of the great world periods called kalpas the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world is dissolved and merged into non-distinct Maya, while the individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion with up&dhis, lie in deep slumber as it were. But as the INTRODUCTION.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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