Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

to be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i. e. men knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration : —

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' When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the knowledge, " I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the (imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an end1; how should then the effect2 (of that wrong imagination) exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing subject ; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz. (the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self is ascertained.'

(Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is finished3.)

So far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages, whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions. And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now the Sankhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer different causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and thereupon interpret the Vedânta-passages as referring to the latter. All the Vedanta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the effect by inference ; and the cause which is to be inferred is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha). The followers of Kaz^ada again infer from the very samep. 46 passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its material cause.

1 The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife, children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i. e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.

2 I. e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.

3 The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.

ers, enjoys, &c.

2 I. e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.

3 The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.

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passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious arguments raise various objections. For this reason the teacher (Vyasa) — thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, passages, and means of proof — proceeds to state as p r i m a f a c i e views, and afterwards to refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedantatexts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.

The Sankhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pradhana consisting of three constituent elements (guna) is the cause of the world argue as follows. The Vedanta-passages which you have declared to intimate that the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pradhana being the general cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the pradhana in so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All-knowingness also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in reality an attribute of the guna. of Goodness1, according to the Smrzti passage ' from Goodness springs knowledge ' (Bha. Gita XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhana) are known as all-knowing Yogins ; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with the very highest degree of ' Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which is isolated,, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited knowledge ; the pradhana, on the other hand, because consisting of the three gu/zas, comprises also in its pradhana state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The Vedanta-passages therefore inp. 47 a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the pradhana, although it is in itself non-intelligent.

1 The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.

ges therefore in

1 The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.

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a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the pradhana, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedantin) also who assume an all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of everything ; for from this there would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as consisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

To these conclusions he (Vyfisa) replies in the following
Sutra.

5. On account of seeing (i. e. thinking being attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the world ; the pradhana) is not (to be identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads ; for) it is not founded on Scripture.

It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sankhyas ; because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i. e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Kh. Up. VI, 2, (which begins : ' Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second/ and goes on, ' It thought (saw),

48 vedanta-sCtras.

may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by the word 'this/ was before its origination identical with the Self of that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or ' that which is ') sent forth fire and the other elements after having thought.