Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

he other effects — which would require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the gu/zas — is impossible.

9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pradhâna) being devoid of the power of intelligence.

But — the Sankhya resumes — we draw another inference, so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gu/zas to be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the characteristics of the gu/zas from those of their effects, presuming that their nature must be such as to render the production of the effects possible. Now the gu/zas are admitted to be of an unsteady nature ; hence the gu/zas themselves are able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.

Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, &c, remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sankhya should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c), that the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman. — Moreover, if the gu/zas were capable of entering into the relation of mutual inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of twop. 376 things would happen ; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on account of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in that condition, they would always remain in it ; the absence of an operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine would again be open to the objection stated before 1.

10. And moreover (the Sankhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of its contradictions.

The doctrine of the Sânkhyas, moreover, is full of contradictions. Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven2. In some places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, sometimes of one only 3. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts Sruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and Smriti, based on vSruti, is well known.

t they proceed from self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, sometimes of one only 3. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts Sruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and Smriti, based on vSruti, is well known. — For these reasons also the Sankhya system is objectionable.

Here the Sankhya again brings a countercharge. — The system of the Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable ; for it does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes suffering4 are different classes of things (and thereby renders futile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and suffering beings). Forp. 377 those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of everything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its meaning. For — to adduce a parallel case — a lamp as long as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving heat and light. And if the Vedantin should adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam, &C.1, we remark that there also the waves, &c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently, although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and light. — That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired 2 are understood to be separate existences.

1 Anantaro dosho mahadâdikâryotpadayoga^. An. Gi.

2 In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.

3 Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, ahankara, and manas.

4 Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places. — The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.

and that which suffers constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired 2 are understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would already essentially be established in him (belong to him). The latter state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter never can stand in want of light ; for want or desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.

1 In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential ; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.

2 ' Artha/ a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.

p. 3

(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire and the desiring person were not essentiallyseparate), so the object of desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case ; for the two ideas (and terms), ' object of desire' and ' desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the object of desire are separate. — The same holds good with regard to what is not desired (object of aversion ; anartha)and the non-desiring person (anarthin). An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage ; with both one person enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, ' object of aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term ' causes of suffering/ while by the term ' sufferer ' we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i. e. the objects of desire and the objects of aversion).