Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term ' causes of suffering/ while by the term ' sufferer ' we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i. e. the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is im- possible.— But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed. All this reasoning — we, the Vedantins, reply — is futile, because on account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the suf- ferer cannot exist (in the Self). — Our doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and sub- ject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it is one only; how can the II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO. 379 one unchangeable Brahman enter with reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer? — Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed (which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist ? — That, we reply, is not difficult to see1. The living body which is the object of the action of burning is the sufferer ; the sun, for instance, is a cause of suffering (burning). — But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent body ; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for means to make it cease. — But it is likewise not observed, we reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and suffers pain. — Nor would you (the Sankhya) also assume that the affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit2 a real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the soul3. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer.
2ffection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit2 a real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the soul3. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer and the causes of suffering ? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain that the sattva-gu^a is that which suffers, and the gu?za called passion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the intelligent principle (the soul) can- not be really connected with these two 4. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because it leans towards 5 the sattva-gu/za, we point out that the employment of the phrase, ' as it were,' shows that the soul does not really suffer. 1 In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world. * In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain. 3 And that would be against the Sankhya dogma of the soul's essential purity. 4 So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained. 5 Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti jarikate sattveti. An. Gi. 380 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS. If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to the phrase ' as it were V For the amphisbena also does not become venomous because it is ' a serpent as it were ' (' like a serpent '), nor does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.5 You must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit that, then my (the Ved&ntic) doctrine also is free from objections 2. But perhaps you (the Sankhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on the part of the soul) is real3. In that case, however, the impossibility of release is all the more unde- niable 4, especially as the cause of suffering (viz. the pra- dhana) is admitted to be eternal. — And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that, although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two — which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz.
3ntialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two — which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul — and that hence, when that reason no longer exists, the con- junction of the two comes to an absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes possible ; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu^a, called Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal. 1 For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance. 2 The Sankhya Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering. — The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sankhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience. 3 Not only ' suffering as it were/ as it had been called above. 4 For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which — according to the Sankhya also — release depends. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. 38 1 And as1 there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and sinking of the influence of the particular gu/zas, there is also no fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the conjunction of soul and pradhana (i. e. non-dis- crimination) ; hence the disjunction of the two is uncer- tain, and so the Sankhyas cannot escape the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine. To the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being impossible cannot occur in his dreams even ; for the Self he acknowledges to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it. Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhana to be the cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory. We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the upholders of Brahman.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term ' causes of suffering/ while by the term ' sufferer ' we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i. e. the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is im- possible.— But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed. All this reasoning — we, the Vedantins, reply — is futile, because on account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the suf- ferer cannot exist (in the Self). — Our doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and sub- ject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it is one only; how can the II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO. 379 one unchangeable Brahman enter with reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer? — Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed (which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist ? — That, we reply, is not difficult to see1. The living body which is the object of the action of burning is the sufferer ; the sun, for instance, is a cause of suffering (burning). — But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent body ; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for means to make it cease. — But it is likewise not observed, we reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and suffers pain. — Nor would you (the Sankhya) also assume that the affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit2 a real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the soul3. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer.
2ffection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit2 a real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the soul3. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer and the causes of suffering ? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain that the sattva-gu^a is that which suffers, and the gu?za called passion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the intelligent principle (the soul) can- not be really connected with these two 4. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because it leans towards 5 the sattva-gu/za, we point out that the employment of the phrase, ' as it were,' shows that the soul does not really suffer. 1 In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world. * In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain. 3 And that would be against the Sankhya dogma of the soul's essential purity. 4 So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained. 5 Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti jarikate sattveti. An. Gi. 380 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS. If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to the phrase ' as it were V For the amphisbena also does not become venomous because it is ' a serpent as it were ' (' like a serpent '), nor does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.5 You must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit that, then my (the Ved&ntic) doctrine also is free from objections 2. But perhaps you (the Sankhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on the part of the soul) is real3. In that case, however, the impossibility of release is all the more unde- niable 4, especially as the cause of suffering (viz. the pra- dhana) is admitted to be eternal. — And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that, although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two — which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz.
3ntialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two — which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul — and that hence, when that reason no longer exists, the con- junction of the two comes to an absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes possible ; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu^a, called Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal. 1 For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance. 2 The Sankhya Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering. — The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sankhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience. 3 Not only ' suffering as it were/ as it had been called above. 4 For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which — according to the Sankhya also — release depends. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. 38 1 And as1 there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and sinking of the influence of the particular gu/zas, there is also no fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the conjunction of soul and pradhana (i. e. non-dis- crimination) ; hence the disjunction of the two is uncer- tain, and so the Sankhyas cannot escape the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine. To the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being impossible cannot occur in his dreams even ; for the Self he acknowledges to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it. Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhana to be the cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory. We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the upholders of Brahman.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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