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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1refore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and some- how non-different. — The technical name of the doctrine here represented by Ajmarathya is bhedabhedav&da. 2 78 vedanta-s6tras. the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8). I. e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the latter half of the passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two members of the comparison \ 22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in the condition (of the individual soul) ; so Klrakrztsna thinks. Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual soul, therefore, the teacher Klrakrz'tsna thinks, the initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is possible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the individual soul, is evident from the Brahma/za- passage, ' Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms/ and similar passages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, ' The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, is, y)2. 1 Bhamati : The individual soul is absolutely different from the highest Self ; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa^aratrikas : ' Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference/ — The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au^ulomi is satyabhedavada. 2 Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, i, ii. I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2.
2onger different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference/ — The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au^ulomi is satyabhedavada. 2 Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, i, ii. I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2. 279 And where Scripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does not at the same time relate a sepa- rate creation of the individual soul ; we have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self, different from the latter. — In the opinion of the teacher Karakr/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. Aj'marathya, although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression, ' On account of the fulfilment of the promise ' — which de- clares a certain mutual dependence — that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul 1. The opinion of Au^ulomi again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition2. Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by KcUa- krztsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all the Vedanta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, ' That art thou ') aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Kaiakr/tsna immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul ; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its exist- ence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul. The last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish replies to the second of the purvapakshin's argu- ments, viz. that the BrzhadaraTzyaka passage represents as 1 And not the relation of absolute identity. 2 I. e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence. 2 80 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements.
3nd not the relation of absolute identity. 2 I. e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence. 2 80 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements. * There is an indication of the fulfilment of the promise ; so A^marathya thinks.5 The promise is made in the two passages, ' When the Self is known, all this is known,' and ' All this is that Self.' That the Self is every- thing, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is merged in one being x ; and by its being demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is, then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements ; thus the teacher Aj-marathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment. — £ Because the soul when it will depart is such ; thus Au^/ulomi thinks.' The statement as to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the soul when — after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on — it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self. This is Au^ulomi's opinion, — 'Because it exists in the con- dition of the soul ; thus Kayakrztsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself is that which appears as the indivi- dual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the teacher Kajakn'tsna. But, an objection may be raised, the passage, ' Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge/ intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its identity with the highest Self! — By no means, we reply. The passage means to say 1 Upapaditazra £eti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti ^esha^. Upapa- danaprakaraw su^ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner ityadinai- kaprasavatvam, yatha sarvasam apam ityadina ^aikapralayatvaw sarvasyoktam. An. Gi. I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 2 2. 28 I only that on the soul departing from the body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1refore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and some- how non-different. — The technical name of the doctrine here represented by Ajmarathya is bhedabhedav&da. 2 78 vedanta-s6tras. the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8). I. e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the latter half of the passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two members of the comparison \ 22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in the condition (of the individual soul) ; so Klrakrztsna thinks. Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual soul, therefore, the teacher Klrakrz'tsna thinks, the initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is possible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the individual soul, is evident from the Brahma/za- passage, ' Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms/ and similar passages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, ' The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, is, y)2. 1 Bhamati : The individual soul is absolutely different from the highest Self ; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa^aratrikas : ' Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference/ — The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au^ulomi is satyabhedavada. 2 Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, i, ii. I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2.
2onger different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference/ — The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au^ulomi is satyabhedavada. 2 Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, i, ii. I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2. 279 And where Scripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does not at the same time relate a sepa- rate creation of the individual soul ; we have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self, different from the latter. — In the opinion of the teacher Karakr/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. Aj'marathya, although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression, ' On account of the fulfilment of the promise ' — which de- clares a certain mutual dependence — that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul 1. The opinion of Au^ulomi again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition2. Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by KcUa- krztsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all the Vedanta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, ' That art thou ') aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Kaiakr/tsna immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul ; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its exist- ence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul. The last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish replies to the second of the purvapakshin's argu- ments, viz. that the BrzhadaraTzyaka passage represents as 1 And not the relation of absolute identity. 2 I. e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence. 2 80 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements.
3nd not the relation of absolute identity. 2 I. e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence. 2 80 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements. * There is an indication of the fulfilment of the promise ; so A^marathya thinks.5 The promise is made in the two passages, ' When the Self is known, all this is known,' and ' All this is that Self.' That the Self is every- thing, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is merged in one being x ; and by its being demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is, then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements ; thus the teacher Aj-marathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment. — £ Because the soul when it will depart is such ; thus Au^/ulomi thinks.' The statement as to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the soul when — after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on — it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self. This is Au^ulomi's opinion, — 'Because it exists in the con- dition of the soul ; thus Kayakrztsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself is that which appears as the indivi- dual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the teacher Kajakn'tsna. But, an objection may be raised, the passage, ' Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge/ intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its identity with the highest Self! — By no means, we reply. The passage means to say 1 Upapaditazra £eti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti ^esha^. Upapa- danaprakaraw su^ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner ityadinai- kaprasavatvam, yatha sarvasam apam ityadina ^aikapralayatvaw sarvasyoktam. An. Gi. I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 2 2. 28 I only that on the soul departing from the body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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