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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1rishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart ' (Brz. Up. Ill, 8, 9) ; and other similar passages. 31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs ; (we reply that) this has been explained (before). Let this be granted. — Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action1; so, for instance, in the passage, * It is without eyesy without ears, without speech, without mind ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know (from mantras, arthavadas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, ' No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers ? The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands, hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears,' Sve. Up. Ill, 19) declares that Brahman, 1 The Sutra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been disposed of in Sutra 24. Aa2 356 VEDANTA-StjTR AS. although devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible capacities. 32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings engaging in any action) having a motive. Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world. — The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, ' on account of actions having a purpose/ — We know from ordinary ex- perience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own ; much less so in important business.
2purpose/ — We know from ordinary ex- perience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own ; much less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage confirming this result of common experience, ' Verily everything is not dear that you may love everything ; but that you may love the Self therefore every- thing is dear ' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various con- tents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of activity also. — Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intel- gent person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created this world without any motive. — That, we reply, would contradict the omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by Scripture. — Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent Being is untenable. 33, But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life. The word 'but' discards the objection raised. — We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no unfulfilled desires left have no II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 34. 357 reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any- extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature \ without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned 2. — Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might pos- sibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.
3the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might pos- sibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says. ■ — Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person ; for Scripture affirms the fact of the crea- tion on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scrip- tural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality ; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything. 34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of 1 The nature (svabMva) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Maya joined with time and karman. 2 This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with Maya the creation is unavoidable. Go. An. Avidya naturally tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bha. An. Gi. remarks: Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva nivn'tter api dar^anad fovarasyapi mayamayyaw lilayaw tatha- bhave vinapi sawyag^anaw sa/rcsarasamu^ittir iti tatraha na ketu Anirva/fcya khalv avidyst parasye^varasya £a svabhavo lileti £o£yate tatra na pratitikasvabhavay&m anupapattir avataratity artha^. 353 VEDANTA-S^JTR AS. his regarding (merit and demerit) ; for so (Scripture) declares. In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly- planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world. — The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy ; to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person acting similarly ; which attributes would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord affirmed by Svuti and Smrzti.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1rishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart ' (Brz. Up. Ill, 8, 9) ; and other similar passages. 31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs ; (we reply that) this has been explained (before). Let this be granted. — Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action1; so, for instance, in the passage, * It is without eyesy without ears, without speech, without mind ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know (from mantras, arthavadas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, ' No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers ? The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands, hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears,' Sve. Up. Ill, 19) declares that Brahman, 1 The Sutra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been disposed of in Sutra 24. Aa2 356 VEDANTA-StjTR AS. although devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible capacities. 32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings engaging in any action) having a motive. Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world. — The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, ' on account of actions having a purpose/ — We know from ordinary ex- perience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own ; much less so in important business.
2purpose/ — We know from ordinary ex- perience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own ; much less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage confirming this result of common experience, ' Verily everything is not dear that you may love everything ; but that you may love the Self therefore every- thing is dear ' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various con- tents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of activity also. — Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intel- gent person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created this world without any motive. — That, we reply, would contradict the omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by Scripture. — Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent Being is untenable. 33, But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life. The word 'but' discards the objection raised. — We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no unfulfilled desires left have no II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 34. 357 reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any- extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature \ without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned 2. — Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might pos- sibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.
3the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might pos- sibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says. ■ — Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person ; for Scripture affirms the fact of the crea- tion on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scrip- tural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality ; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything. 34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of 1 The nature (svabMva) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Maya joined with time and karman. 2 This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with Maya the creation is unavoidable. Go. An. Avidya naturally tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bha. An. Gi. remarks: Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva nivn'tter api dar^anad fovarasyapi mayamayyaw lilayaw tatha- bhave vinapi sawyag^anaw sa/rcsarasamu^ittir iti tatraha na ketu Anirva/fcya khalv avidyst parasye^varasya £a svabhavo lileti £o£yate tatra na pratitikasvabhavay&m anupapattir avataratity artha^. 353 VEDANTA-S^JTR AS. his regarding (merit and demerit) ; for so (Scripture) declares. In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly- planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world. — The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy ; to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person acting similarly ; which attributes would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord affirmed by Svuti and Smrzti.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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