Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1nd so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you declare your alayavi^/zana to be something permanent, you thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavi^Tzana as well as everything else being momentary. — Or (to explain the Sutra in a different way) as the tenet of general momen- tariness is characteristic of the systems of the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the latter. We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which maintains the (momentary) reality of the ex- ternal world, and the doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i. e. that absolutely nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all the means of know- ledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence) — for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances. 32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability. No further special discussion is in fact required. From latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent ideas of the former class. 1 Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself to consciousness is not non-existent. 428 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. whatever new points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foun- dation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly. — Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused. — So that — and this the Sutra means to indicate — Buddha's doctrine has to be entirely dis- regarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness. 33.
2eings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused. — So that — and this the Sutra means to indicate — Buddha's doctrine has to be entirely dis- regarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness. 33. On account of the impossibility (of contra- dictory attributes) in one thing, (the Gaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted). Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the Gymnosophists (Gainas). The Gainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (^iva), non-soul (a^iva), the issuing outward (asrava), restraint (sawvara), destruction (nir^-ara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)1. Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under these two. — They also set forth a set of categories different from the two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called 1 Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of their enjoyment; asrava is the forward movement of the senses towards their objects ; sazrcvara is the restraint of the activity of the senses; nirg-ara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works constitute bondage ; and release is the ascending of the soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest regions. — For the details, see Professor Cowell's translation of the Arhata chapter of the Sarvadar,ra7zasa#zgraha. II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 33. 429 astikayas (' existing bodies,' i. e. categories), viz. the cate- gories of soul (^iva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space (alcana). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful ways1. — To all things they apply the following method of reasoning, which they call the saptabhangtnaya : somehow it is; somehow it is not ; somehow it is and is not ; somehow it is indescrib- able ; somehow it is and is indescribable ; somehow it is not and is indescribable ; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable. To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions as that of unity and eternity2. This doctrine we meet as follows. — Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible ' on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing ; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment.
3bility in one thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing ; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such ; the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such or not such ' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself some- thing, falls as such under the alternative predications ' some- how it is/ ' somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion ; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthakara (Cina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether 1 Cp. translation of Sarvadanra#asa#zgraha, p. 59. 2 And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman. 430 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. indeterminate ? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doc- trine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman. — Again, if we apply the Caina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five ; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described ; but, as a matter of fact, they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite;
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1nd so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you declare your alayavi^/zana to be something permanent, you thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavi^Tzana as well as everything else being momentary. — Or (to explain the Sutra in a different way) as the tenet of general momen- tariness is characteristic of the systems of the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the latter. We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which maintains the (momentary) reality of the ex- ternal world, and the doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i. e. that absolutely nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all the means of know- ledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence) — for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances. 32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability. No further special discussion is in fact required. From latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent ideas of the former class. 1 Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself to consciousness is not non-existent. 428 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. whatever new points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foun- dation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly. — Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused. — So that — and this the Sutra means to indicate — Buddha's doctrine has to be entirely dis- regarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness. 33.
2eings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused. — So that — and this the Sutra means to indicate — Buddha's doctrine has to be entirely dis- regarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness. 33. On account of the impossibility (of contra- dictory attributes) in one thing, (the Gaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted). Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the Gymnosophists (Gainas). The Gainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (^iva), non-soul (a^iva), the issuing outward (asrava), restraint (sawvara), destruction (nir^-ara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)1. Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under these two. — They also set forth a set of categories different from the two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called 1 Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of their enjoyment; asrava is the forward movement of the senses towards their objects ; sazrcvara is the restraint of the activity of the senses; nirg-ara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works constitute bondage ; and release is the ascending of the soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest regions. — For the details, see Professor Cowell's translation of the Arhata chapter of the Sarvadar,ra7zasa#zgraha. II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 33. 429 astikayas (' existing bodies,' i. e. categories), viz. the cate- gories of soul (^iva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space (alcana). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful ways1. — To all things they apply the following method of reasoning, which they call the saptabhangtnaya : somehow it is; somehow it is not ; somehow it is and is not ; somehow it is indescrib- able ; somehow it is and is indescribable ; somehow it is not and is indescribable ; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable. To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions as that of unity and eternity2. This doctrine we meet as follows. — Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible ' on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing ; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment.
3bility in one thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing ; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such ; the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such or not such ' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself some- thing, falls as such under the alternative predications ' some- how it is/ ' somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion ; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthakara (Cina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether 1 Cp. translation of Sarvadanra#asa#zgraha, p. 59. 2 And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman. 430 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. indeterminate ? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doc- trine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman. — Again, if we apply the Caina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five ; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described ; but, as a matter of fact, they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite;
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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