Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

a causal substance participating in the same characteristics.

Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the preceding adhikara^a is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.

The one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to Sahkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water. — The 6n-bhashya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sutra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Ramanu^a's view, the Sutra runs as follows : ' If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day experience.' That is to say : If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo. — The construction which Ramanu^a puts on the Sutra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears

INTRODUCTION. xlix

from a quotation made by Ramanu^a from the Dramidabhashyakara \

Adhik. VI (14-30) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedanta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the Vaueshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause. — The divergent views of 5ankara and Ramanu^a on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.

Adhik.

ed by its adherents against the Vaueshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause. — The divergent views of 5ankara and Ramanu^a on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.

Adhik. VII (31-33) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutrakara remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i. e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture. — The way in which the three Sutras constituting this adhikara^a are treated by 5ankara on the one hand and Ramanu^-a on the other is characteristic. Ramanu^*a throughout simply follows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formulates the objection based on such texts as ' Thou art that,' while Sutra 33 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. vSankara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sutra 33, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts.

Adhik. VIII (24, 35) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create

1 Lokavat. Yatha loke ra^ajasananuvartinaw ka. ra^anugrahanigrahakrztasukhadukhayoge^pi na sa^ariratvamatrewa jasake ra^-any api jasananuvrz'ttyativ^'ttmimittasukhadukhayor bhokt^tvaprasanga/fc. Yathaha Drami^/abhashyakara^ yatha loke ra^a pra^uradandajuke ghore*narthasawkafe*pi pradere vartamano * pi vya^anadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprwyate abhipretams ka lokan paripipalayishati bhogawj ka gandhadin avirva^anopabhogyan dharayati tathasau lokcyvaro bhramatsvasamarthyaHmaro doshair na spmyate rakshati ka lokan brahmalokadinw Hvii-va^anopabhogyan dharayatiti.

[34] dp. 1 palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.

Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided.

ike, and as milk by itself turns into curds.

Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to 5ankara, because the world is unreal ; according to Ramanu^a, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.

Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.

Adhik. XI (32, ^) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.

Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.

Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman — omniscience and so on — are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.

Pada II.

The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view. — The first adhikara;za (1-10) is directed against the Sankhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhana of the Sankhyas, is unable to create and dispose. — The second adhikara^a (11-17) refutes the

INTRODUCTION.

Vaueshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the adrzsh/a. — The third and fourth adhikara^as are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. Ill (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvastitvavâdins, or bahyârthavadins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world ; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vi^anavddins, according to whom ideas are the only reality. — The last Sutra of this adhikara^a is treated by Râmânu^a as a separate adhikara^a refuting the view of the Madhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e.