Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1are endless, and he thereby gains the endless world ' (Br/. Up. Ill, i, g)2 ; nor is it an (in reality unfounded) ascription (superimposition) 3, as in the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as Brahman,' and ' Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Kk. Up. Ill, 18, i ; 19, i), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the mind, Aditya and so on ; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception of identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed as identical) with some special activity, as in the passage, 'Air is indeed the absorber ; breath is indeed the absorber 4 ' (Kh. Up. IV, 3, 1 ; 3) ; nor is it a mere (ceremonial) purifi- cation of (the Self constituting a subordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c, Brahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the sacri- 1 Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena kena&n mahato vastuna^ sampadanam. Ananda Giri. 2 In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is identified with the VLrvedevas, which thereby constitute the chief object of the meditation ; the fruit of the meditation being immor- tality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence being common to both. 8 Adhyasa^ jastrato^tasmi^s taddhi^. Sampadi sampadyama- nasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti vLresha^. Ananda Giri. 4 Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, designated by the same term ' absorber/ Seyaw sawvargadrzsh/ir vayau prawe £a da^a^agataw ^agad danayati yatha ^ivatmani brim- hawakriyaya brahmad/Ysh/ir amr/'tatvayaphalaya kalpataiti. Bhamatt. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 3 1 ficial butter 1. For if the knowledge of the identity of the Self and Brahman were understood in the way of combina- tion and the like, violence would be done thereby to the connection of the words whose object, in certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of Brahman and the Self being really identical ; so, for instance, in the following passages, * That art thou ' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; < I am Brahman5 (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10) ; ' This Self is Brahman ' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19). And other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby ; so, for instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).
2hman ' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19). And other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby ; so, for instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, would it be possible, in that case, satisfactorily to explain the passages which speak of the individual Self becoming Brahman : such as *He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 3,9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the Self cannot be of the nature of figurative combination and the like. The knowledge of Brahman does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of man, but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends on the object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions. Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by repre- senting it as the object of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is expressly declared in two passages, viz. Mt is different from the known and again above (i.e. different from) the unknown * (Ken. Up. I, 3) ; and l How should he know him by whom he knows all this ? ' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 13.) In the same way Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of the act of devout meditation, viz. in the second half of the verse, Ken. Up. I, 5, whose first half 1 The butter used in the upaffwuyag-a is ceremonially purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it ; so, it might be said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as kart/Y — agent — stands in a subordinate ahga-relation to the karman of meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with Brahman. 32 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. declares it not to be an object (of speech, mind, and so on), ' That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which speech is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that on which people devoutly meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the .rastra can impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that the aim of the ^astra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously created by Nescience.
3is.' If it should be objected that if Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the .rastra can impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that the aim of the ^astra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously created by Nescience. The Astra's purport is not to represent Brahman definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that Brahman as the eternal subject (pratyagatman, the inward Self) is never an object, and thereby to remove the dis- tinction of objects known, knowers, acts of knowledge, &c, which is fictitiously created by Nescience. Accordingly the .sastra says, ' By whom it is not thought by him it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it ; un- known by those who know it, it is known by those who do not know it' (Ken. Up. II, 3) ; and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the perceiver of perception, nor know the knower of knowledge' (Bn. Up. Ill, 4, 2). As thereby (i. e. by the knowledge derived from the sastra) the imagination of the transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, and Release is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free Self, it cannot be charged with the im- perfection of non-eternality. Those, on the other hand, who consider Release to be something to be effected properly maintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech, or body. So, likewise, those who consider it to be a mere modification. Non-eternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two opinions; for we observe in common life that things which are modifications, such as sour milk and the like, and things which are effects, such as jars, &c, are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said that there is a dependance on action in consequence of (Brahman or Release) being something which is to be obtained * ; for as Brahman constitutes a person's Self it is 1 An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 33 not something to be attained by that person. And even if Brahman were altogether different from a person's Self still it would not be something to be obtained ; for as it is omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to every one, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be maintained that Release is something to be cere- monially purified, and as such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sawskara) results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal of some blemish.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1are endless, and he thereby gains the endless world ' (Br/. Up. Ill, i, g)2 ; nor is it an (in reality unfounded) ascription (superimposition) 3, as in the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as Brahman,' and ' Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Kk. Up. Ill, 18, i ; 19, i), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the mind, Aditya and so on ; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception of identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed as identical) with some special activity, as in the passage, 'Air is indeed the absorber ; breath is indeed the absorber 4 ' (Kh. Up. IV, 3, 1 ; 3) ; nor is it a mere (ceremonial) purifi- cation of (the Self constituting a subordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c, Brahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the sacri- 1 Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena kena&n mahato vastuna^ sampadanam. Ananda Giri. 2 In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is identified with the VLrvedevas, which thereby constitute the chief object of the meditation ; the fruit of the meditation being immor- tality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence being common to both. 8 Adhyasa^ jastrato^tasmi^s taddhi^. Sampadi sampadyama- nasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti vLresha^. Ananda Giri. 4 Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, designated by the same term ' absorber/ Seyaw sawvargadrzsh/ir vayau prawe £a da^a^agataw ^agad danayati yatha ^ivatmani brim- hawakriyaya brahmad/Ysh/ir amr/'tatvayaphalaya kalpataiti. Bhamatt. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 3 1 ficial butter 1. For if the knowledge of the identity of the Self and Brahman were understood in the way of combina- tion and the like, violence would be done thereby to the connection of the words whose object, in certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of Brahman and the Self being really identical ; so, for instance, in the following passages, * That art thou ' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; < I am Brahman5 (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10) ; ' This Self is Brahman ' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19). And other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby ; so, for instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).
2hman ' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19). And other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby ; so, for instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, would it be possible, in that case, satisfactorily to explain the passages which speak of the individual Self becoming Brahman : such as *He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 3,9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the Self cannot be of the nature of figurative combination and the like. The knowledge of Brahman does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of man, but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends on the object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions. Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by repre- senting it as the object of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is expressly declared in two passages, viz. Mt is different from the known and again above (i.e. different from) the unknown * (Ken. Up. I, 3) ; and l How should he know him by whom he knows all this ? ' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 13.) In the same way Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of the act of devout meditation, viz. in the second half of the verse, Ken. Up. I, 5, whose first half 1 The butter used in the upaffwuyag-a is ceremonially purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it ; so, it might be said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as kart/Y — agent — stands in a subordinate ahga-relation to the karman of meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with Brahman. 32 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. declares it not to be an object (of speech, mind, and so on), ' That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which speech is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that on which people devoutly meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the .rastra can impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that the aim of the ^astra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously created by Nescience.
3is.' If it should be objected that if Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the .rastra can impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that the aim of the ^astra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously created by Nescience. The Astra's purport is not to represent Brahman definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that Brahman as the eternal subject (pratyagatman, the inward Self) is never an object, and thereby to remove the dis- tinction of objects known, knowers, acts of knowledge, &c, which is fictitiously created by Nescience. Accordingly the .sastra says, ' By whom it is not thought by him it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it ; un- known by those who know it, it is known by those who do not know it' (Ken. Up. II, 3) ; and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the perceiver of perception, nor know the knower of knowledge' (Bn. Up. Ill, 4, 2). As thereby (i. e. by the knowledge derived from the sastra) the imagination of the transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, and Release is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free Self, it cannot be charged with the im- perfection of non-eternality. Those, on the other hand, who consider Release to be something to be effected properly maintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech, or body. So, likewise, those who consider it to be a mere modification. Non-eternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two opinions; for we observe in common life that things which are modifications, such as sour milk and the like, and things which are effects, such as jars, &c, are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said that there is a dependance on action in consequence of (Brahman or Release) being something which is to be obtained * ; for as Brahman constitutes a person's Self it is 1 An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 33 not something to be attained by that person. And even if Brahman were altogether different from a person's Self still it would not be something to be obtained ; for as it is omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to every one, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be maintained that Release is something to be cere- monially purified, and as such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sawskara) results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal of some blemish.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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