Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

and in need of any instruments of knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa^sarin) indeed, which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge may arise in it ; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions. * There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better ; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge and force.' ' Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows him ; they call him the first, the great person ' (Sv. Up. VI, 8 ; III, 19).

But, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating soul different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge ; for .Sruti expressly declares that ' there is no other seer but he ; there is no other knower but he' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23). How then can it be said that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord ? — True, we reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions and terms as e the hollow (space) of a jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in consequence thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on ; so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are different ; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence, imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like

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which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.

lf is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.

The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of several elements, can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the pradhana not basing on Scripture, That, moreover, it is possible to establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara will set forth in the second Adhyaya (II, i, 4, &c).

Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty started by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground that non-intelligent things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a river-bank about to fall, ' the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),' and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence. So the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined, and formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village, necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhana also acts by the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution ; it may therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent. — But what reason have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word ' thought ' and for taking it in a figurative sense ? —The observation, the Sankhya replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, ' That fire thought ; that water thought ' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4). We therefrom conclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there i adhyAya, i pada, 6. 53 also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense \

To this argumentation of the Sclnkhya the next Sutra replies :

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en in a figurative sense there i adhyAya, i pada, 6. 53 also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense \

To this argumentation of the Sclnkhya the next Sutra replies :

6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of the world).

Your assertion that the term ' Being ' denotes the non-intelligent pradhana, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only, as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so ? On account of the term ' Self.' For the passage Kh. Up. VI, a, which begins ' Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of fire, water, and earth (' it thought/ &c. ; ' it sent forth fire,' &c.), goes on — denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the term ' divinities ' — as follows, ' That divinity thought : Let me now enter those three divinities with this living Self (^iva dtman) and evolve names and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent pradhana is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to assume that the same pradhana — as once constituting the subject-matter of the chapter — is referred to by the term ' that divinity/ But in that case the divinity would not speak of the ^iva as ' Self.' For by the term ' Civa ' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self of the non-intelligent pradhana ? By * Self ' we understand (a being's) own nature, and it is clear that the intelligent Giva cannot constitute the nature of the non-intelligent pradhana. If, on the other hand, we refer the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to

1 In the second Khanda. of the sixth Prapa/^aka of the Kh. Up. ' aikshata ' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.

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which thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the word * Self with reference to the Giva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, ' That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O -SVetaketu 5 (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7, &c).