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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1o more.' This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is con- sequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised Vedanta tenet. — There is another passage also warning men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, ' What is here the same is there ; and what is there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death to death.' — The fol- lowing circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When Na&ketas has asked the question relating to the existence or non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of desire. But Na&ketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignor- ance, praises Na&ketas, ' I believe Na&ketas to be one who desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away ' (I, 2, 4) ; and later on praises the question I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 25 I asked by Na^iketas, ' The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind ' (I, 3, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if Na^iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly. Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 3, 14, ' That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ merely resumes the topic to which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred. — Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c. ; the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to sa^sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c.
2first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c. ; the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to sa^sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c. ; but as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts as ' Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell him, ' Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake ; ' and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subse- quent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in the passage, ' It is not born, it dies not/ is also to be con- sidered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20. — The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which 252 VEDANTA-S#TRAS. results from Nescience. Although the question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, 1, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific marks of the sawsara-state, such as activity, &c. are not denied ; while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest Self. — For these reasons the Sutra is right in assuming three topics of question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the pradhana constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own. 7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat. While the Sankhyas employ the term ' the Great one,' to denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence 1 (? viz.
3nswer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own. 7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat. While the Sankhyas employ the term ' the Great one,' to denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence 1 (? viz. the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its being connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following, ' The great Self is beyond the Intellect ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10) ; ' The great omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, %%) ; ' I know that great person ' (6Ve. Up. Ill, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradhina. — The pradhana is therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture. 8. (It cannot be maintained that a^a means the 1 The commentators give different explanations of the Satta- matra of the text. — Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprakrz'ter adya- paritfame. Go. An. — Bhogapavargapurusharthasya maha^abdi- tabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakara/zazrc sad u^yate tatra bhavapratyayo * pi svarupartho na samanyava^i karyanumeyaw mahan na pratyaksham iti matra^abda^. Ananda Giri. I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 8. 253 pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated ; as in the case of the cup. Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhana is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the following mantra (6Ve. Up. IV, 5), ' There is one ag& \ red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one a^a who loves her and lies by her ; there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.' — - In this mantra the words ' red/ * white/ and ' black ' denote the three constituent elements of the pradhana. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i. e. influencing pro- perty ; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature of Light ; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent elements, i. e. the pradhana, is denoted by the at- tributes of its parts, and is therefore called red — white — black. It is further called a^a, i. e. unborn, because it is acknow- ledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything springs, not a mere effect. — But has not the word a^u the settled meaning of she-goat ? — True ; but the ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1o more.' This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is con- sequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised Vedanta tenet. — There is another passage also warning men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, ' What is here the same is there ; and what is there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death to death.' — The fol- lowing circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When Na&ketas has asked the question relating to the existence or non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of desire. But Na&ketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignor- ance, praises Na&ketas, ' I believe Na&ketas to be one who desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away ' (I, 2, 4) ; and later on praises the question I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 25 I asked by Na^iketas, ' The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind ' (I, 3, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if Na^iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly. Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 3, 14, ' That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ merely resumes the topic to which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred. — Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c. ; the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to sa^sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c.
2first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c. ; the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to sa^sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c. ; but as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts as ' Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell him, ' Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake ; ' and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subse- quent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in the passage, ' It is not born, it dies not/ is also to be con- sidered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20. — The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which 252 VEDANTA-S#TRAS. results from Nescience. Although the question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, 1, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific marks of the sawsara-state, such as activity, &c. are not denied ; while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest Self. — For these reasons the Sutra is right in assuming three topics of question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the pradhana constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own. 7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat. While the Sankhyas employ the term ' the Great one,' to denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence 1 (? viz.
3nswer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own. 7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat. While the Sankhyas employ the term ' the Great one,' to denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence 1 (? viz. the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its being connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following, ' The great Self is beyond the Intellect ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10) ; ' The great omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, %%) ; ' I know that great person ' (6Ve. Up. Ill, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradhina. — The pradhana is therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture. 8. (It cannot be maintained that a^a means the 1 The commentators give different explanations of the Satta- matra of the text. — Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprakrz'ter adya- paritfame. Go. An. — Bhogapavargapurusharthasya maha^abdi- tabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakara/zazrc sad u^yate tatra bhavapratyayo * pi svarupartho na samanyava^i karyanumeyaw mahan na pratyaksham iti matra^abda^. Ananda Giri. I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 8. 253 pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated ; as in the case of the cup. Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhana is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the following mantra (6Ve. Up. IV, 5), ' There is one ag& \ red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one a^a who loves her and lies by her ; there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.' — - In this mantra the words ' red/ * white/ and ' black ' denote the three constituent elements of the pradhana. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i. e. influencing pro- perty ; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature of Light ; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent elements, i. e. the pradhana, is denoted by the at- tributes of its parts, and is therefore called red — white — black. It is further called a^a, i. e. unborn, because it is acknow- ledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything springs, not a mere effect. — But has not the word a^u the settled meaning of she-goat ? — True ; but the ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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