Fetching
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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1aya to be a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infini- tum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be accounted for. — For this reason also the atomic doctrine is inadmissible. 14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity). Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either 1 Which is inadmissible on Vai^eshika principles, because sa#z- yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by samavaya. 2 Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each other in the way of conjunction. 3 Viz. the absolute difference of samavaya and sawyoga from the terms which they connect. 4 Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavaya relation to their substrates. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 5. 391 essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither ; there being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take place. Their being both is impossible because self-con- tradictory. If they were neither, their activity and non- activity would have to depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the adrzshfe being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result ; or else the adrishfa. and so on not being taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent non-activity on the part of the atoms. — For this reason also the atomic doctrine is untenable. 15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c, the reverse (of the Vai^eshika tenet would take place) ; as thus it is observed. Let us suppose, the Vaueshikas say, all substances com- posed of parts to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached beyond which the process of disin- tegration cannot be continued. What constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c, and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its colour, form, and other qualities.
2continued. What constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c, and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its colour, form, and other qualities. This fundamental assumption of the Vaueshikas we declare to be groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and perma- nency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause, they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to their cause, gross and non- permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non-permanent ; and the threads again are non-permanent and gross com- 392 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. pared to the filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the VaLreshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which Ka/zada gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, i, i, 'that which exists without having a cause is permanent ') does not apply at all to the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be considered as having a cause. — The second reason also which Ka^ada brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, i, 4, 'the special negation implied in the term non- eternal would not be possible1' (if there did not exist some- thing eternal, viz. the atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms ; for supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a negative com- pound such as ' non-eternal ' is impossible. Nor does the existence of the word * non-permanent ' absolutely pre- suppose the permanency of atoms ; for there exists (as we Vedantins maintain) another permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge. — The third reason also given in the Vai^. Sutras (IV, i, 5) for the permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we explain that Sutra to mean ' the non-perception of those actually existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience/ it would follow that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent 2.
3or the permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we explain that Sutra to mean ' the non-perception of those actually existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience/ it would follow that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent 2. And if we tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of the Sutra as given above) the qualification ' there being absence of (originating) sub- 1 Our Vaiseshika-sutras read ' pratishedhabhava^ ; ' but as all MSS. of *Sankara have * pratishedhabhava^ ' I have kept the latter reading and translated according to Anandagiri's explanation: K&ryam anityam iti karye vweshato nityatvanishedho na sy&d yadi Mra«e*py anityatvam ato*;mna#z k&mn&nam nityateti sutrartha^. 2 Because they also are not perceptible ; the ternary aggregates, the so-called trasare/ms, constituting the minima perceptibilia. II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 1 6. 393 stances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sutra IV, 1, 5 would be a useless restatement. — Well, then (the Vaireshika might say), let us understand by * Nescience ' (in the Sutra) the impossibility of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the destruction of the causal substance ; which impossibility involves the permanency of the atoms1. — There is no neces- sity, we reply, for assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of those two reasons. That assumption would indeed have to be made if it were generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the conjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a causal substance may originate a new substance by passing over into a qualified state after having previously existed free from qualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected substance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the hard- ness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire2. — Thus there would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c, the opposite of what the VaiVeshikas mean. For this reason also the atomic doctrine cannot be main- tained. 16. And as there are difficulties in both cases. Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is gross ; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine ; fire has colour and touch, and is finer yet ; air is finest of all, and has the quality of touch only.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1aya to be a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infini- tum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be accounted for. — For this reason also the atomic doctrine is inadmissible. 14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity). Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either 1 Which is inadmissible on Vai^eshika principles, because sa#z- yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by samavaya. 2 Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each other in the way of conjunction. 3 Viz. the absolute difference of samavaya and sawyoga from the terms which they connect. 4 Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavaya relation to their substrates. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 5. 391 essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither ; there being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take place. Their being both is impossible because self-con- tradictory. If they were neither, their activity and non- activity would have to depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the adrzshfe being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result ; or else the adrishfa. and so on not being taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent non-activity on the part of the atoms. — For this reason also the atomic doctrine is untenable. 15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c, the reverse (of the Vai^eshika tenet would take place) ; as thus it is observed. Let us suppose, the Vaueshikas say, all substances com- posed of parts to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached beyond which the process of disin- tegration cannot be continued. What constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c, and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its colour, form, and other qualities.
2continued. What constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c, and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its colour, form, and other qualities. This fundamental assumption of the Vaueshikas we declare to be groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and perma- nency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause, they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to their cause, gross and non- permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non-permanent ; and the threads again are non-permanent and gross com- 392 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. pared to the filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the VaLreshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which Ka/zada gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, i, i, 'that which exists without having a cause is permanent ') does not apply at all to the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be considered as having a cause. — The second reason also which Ka^ada brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, i, 4, 'the special negation implied in the term non- eternal would not be possible1' (if there did not exist some- thing eternal, viz. the atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms ; for supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a negative com- pound such as ' non-eternal ' is impossible. Nor does the existence of the word * non-permanent ' absolutely pre- suppose the permanency of atoms ; for there exists (as we Vedantins maintain) another permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge. — The third reason also given in the Vai^. Sutras (IV, i, 5) for the permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we explain that Sutra to mean ' the non-perception of those actually existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience/ it would follow that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent 2.
3or the permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we explain that Sutra to mean ' the non-perception of those actually existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience/ it would follow that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent 2. And if we tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of the Sutra as given above) the qualification ' there being absence of (originating) sub- 1 Our Vaiseshika-sutras read ' pratishedhabhava^ ; ' but as all MSS. of *Sankara have * pratishedhabhava^ ' I have kept the latter reading and translated according to Anandagiri's explanation: K&ryam anityam iti karye vweshato nityatvanishedho na sy&d yadi Mra«e*py anityatvam ato*;mna#z k&mn&nam nityateti sutrartha^. 2 Because they also are not perceptible ; the ternary aggregates, the so-called trasare/ms, constituting the minima perceptibilia. II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 1 6. 393 stances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sutra IV, 1, 5 would be a useless restatement. — Well, then (the Vaireshika might say), let us understand by * Nescience ' (in the Sutra) the impossibility of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the destruction of the causal substance ; which impossibility involves the permanency of the atoms1. — There is no neces- sity, we reply, for assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of those two reasons. That assumption would indeed have to be made if it were generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the conjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a causal substance may originate a new substance by passing over into a qualified state after having previously existed free from qualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected substance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the hard- ness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire2. — Thus there would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c, the opposite of what the VaiVeshikas mean. For this reason also the atomic doctrine cannot be main- tained. 16. And as there are difficulties in both cases. Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is gross ; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine ; fire has colour and touch, and is finer yet ; air is finest of all, and has the quality of touch only.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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