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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1word i internal ruler' cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as not being seen, &c, it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the Sankhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23) says expressly, ' Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' —And Selfhood also cannot belong to the pradhana. Well, then, if the term ' internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing ; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (indi- vidual) soul, which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows ; which is internal (pratya/?£), and there- fore of the nature of Self; and which is immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not being seen, &c, belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance (Brt. Up. Ill, 4, 2), ' Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.5 The individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler is the embodied soul.— To this reasoning the following Sutra replies. 20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be under- stood by the internal ruler), for both also (i. e. both 1 34 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS. recensions of the Brzhad Ara^yaka) speak of it as different (from the internal ruler). The word ( not ' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c, belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of both .r&kh&s, i. e. the Ka^vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/zvas read (Bri. Up.
2of both .r&kh&s, i. e. the Ka^vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/zvas read (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 33), 'He who dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, ' He who dwells in the Self/ If the latter reading is adopted, the word ' Self ' denotes the individual soul ; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word £ knowledge ; ' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term ' internal ruler.' — But how, it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul different from him? — Why— we ask in return — should that be impossible? — Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural passages, such as, ' There is no other seer but he,' &c, which deny that there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under dis- cussion.— May, we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose of denying the existence of another ruler? — No, the opponent replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in general.) We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's objection. — The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, pre- sented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 1 35 Self within is one only ; two internal Selfs are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if it were two ; just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for per- ception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions.
3ose scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for per- ception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance with this, the scriptural passage, ' Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of Nescience ; while the subsequent passage, * But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge. 21. That which possesses the attributes of invisi- bility and so on (is Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes. Scripture says, ' The higher knowledge is this by which the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is im- perishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, i, 5 ; 6). — Here the doubt arises whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by invisibility, &c. be the pradhana, or the embodied soul, or the highest Lord. We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings the non-intelligent pradhana because (in the passage immediately subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned as parallel in- stances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the Indestructible.5 — But, it 136 vedAnta-s^tras. may be objected, men and spiders which are here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature. — No, the purvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source of the threads ; and so in the case of man also. — While, moreover, in the case of the preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as invisibility which agree with the pradhina, no attribute of a contrary nature being men- tioned.— But the qualities mentioned in the complementary passage (Mu. Up.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1word i internal ruler' cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as not being seen, &c, it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the Sankhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23) says expressly, ' Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' —And Selfhood also cannot belong to the pradhana. Well, then, if the term ' internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing ; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (indi- vidual) soul, which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows ; which is internal (pratya/?£), and there- fore of the nature of Self; and which is immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not being seen, &c, belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance (Brt. Up. Ill, 4, 2), ' Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.5 The individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler is the embodied soul.— To this reasoning the following Sutra replies. 20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be under- stood by the internal ruler), for both also (i. e. both 1 34 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS. recensions of the Brzhad Ara^yaka) speak of it as different (from the internal ruler). The word ( not ' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c, belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of both .r&kh&s, i. e. the Ka^vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/zvas read (Bri. Up.
2of both .r&kh&s, i. e. the Ka^vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/zvas read (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 33), 'He who dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, ' He who dwells in the Self/ If the latter reading is adopted, the word ' Self ' denotes the individual soul ; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word £ knowledge ; ' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term ' internal ruler.' — But how, it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul different from him? — Why— we ask in return — should that be impossible? — Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural passages, such as, ' There is no other seer but he,' &c, which deny that there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under dis- cussion.— May, we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose of denying the existence of another ruler? — No, the opponent replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in general.) We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's objection. — The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, pre- sented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 1 35 Self within is one only ; two internal Selfs are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if it were two ; just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for per- ception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions.
3ose scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for per- ception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance with this, the scriptural passage, ' Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of Nescience ; while the subsequent passage, * But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge. 21. That which possesses the attributes of invisi- bility and so on (is Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes. Scripture says, ' The higher knowledge is this by which the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is im- perishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, i, 5 ; 6). — Here the doubt arises whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by invisibility, &c. be the pradhana, or the embodied soul, or the highest Lord. We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings the non-intelligent pradhana because (in the passage immediately subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned as parallel in- stances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the Indestructible.5 — But, it 136 vedAnta-s^tras. may be objected, men and spiders which are here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature. — No, the purvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source of the threads ; and so in the case of man also. — While, moreover, in the case of the preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as invisibility which agree with the pradhina, no attribute of a contrary nature being men- tioned.— But the qualities mentioned in the complementary passage (Mu. Up.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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