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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1the state of Reality ; while he had, in the pre- ceding Sutra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the ocean, &c, that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet having been refuted (i. e. seen to be unreal). — The view of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations on the qualified (sagu;za) Brahman. 15, And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed. For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads exist. That it is not a gene- ral rule that when one thing exists another is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists ; for in that case non-difference II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 33 I does not exist, although the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its effect1. — But — it maybe objected — even in the case of things other (i. e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly depends on the existence of another ; smoke, for instance, is observed only when fire exists. — We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been ex- tinguished ; as, for instance, in the case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.— Well, then — the objector will say — let us add to smoke a certain qualification enabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind 2 does not exist unless fire exists. — Even thus, we reply, your objection is not valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the non-dif- ference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ (buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly 3. And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke. — Or else we have to read (in the Sutra) 'bhavat,' and to translate, ' and on account of the existence or obser- vation.' The non-difference of cause and effect results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of percep- tion. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not per- ceive a thing called ' cloth/ in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways.
2also from the existence of percep- tion. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not per- ceive a thing called ' cloth/ in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggre- 1 So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference. 2 For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is connected with some object on the surface of the earth. 3 I.e. (as An. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible without the consciousness of the other. — Tad- bhavanuvidhayibhavatvam tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvaw £a kar- yasya karawananyatve hetur dhumavijeshasya /fcagnibhavanuvi- dhayibhavatve*pi na tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya dhumabhanadhinatvat. 332 vedAnta-s6tr as. gate of which is identical with the grosser threads), in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Kk. Up. VI, 4) ; those, again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the world ; not to pra- dhana, &c), we have already explained. 16. And on account of that which is posterior (i. e. the effect) being that which is. For the following reason also the effect is to be con- sidered as non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i. e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For in passages like, * In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which is' [Kk, Up. VI, 2, 1); and, ' Verily, in the beginning this was Self, one only5 (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the word ' this ' appears in grammatical co-ordi- nation with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same substratum).
3ily, in the beginning this was Self, one only5 (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the word ' this ' appears in grammatical co-ordi- nation with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing ; for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different from the cause. As the cause, i. e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore the effect is non-different from the cause. 17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced) ; (we reply) not so, (because II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 7. 333 the term ' that which is not ' denotes) another quality (merely) ; (as appears) from the comple- mentary sentence. But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the effect before its production as that which is not ; so, for instance, ' In the beginning this was that only which is not' (Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1); and ' Non-existent 1 indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its production. This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its production is not meant absolute Non- existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the passage, ' In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that what is there denoted by the word ' Non-existing ' is — in the complementary passage, ' That became existent' — referred to by the word 'that/ and qualified as ' Existent.' The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1the state of Reality ; while he had, in the pre- ceding Sutra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the ocean, &c, that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet having been refuted (i. e. seen to be unreal). — The view of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations on the qualified (sagu;za) Brahman. 15, And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed. For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads exist. That it is not a gene- ral rule that when one thing exists another is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists ; for in that case non-difference II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 33 I does not exist, although the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its effect1. — But — it maybe objected — even in the case of things other (i. e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly depends on the existence of another ; smoke, for instance, is observed only when fire exists. — We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been ex- tinguished ; as, for instance, in the case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.— Well, then — the objector will say — let us add to smoke a certain qualification enabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind 2 does not exist unless fire exists. — Even thus, we reply, your objection is not valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the non-dif- ference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ (buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly 3. And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke. — Or else we have to read (in the Sutra) 'bhavat,' and to translate, ' and on account of the existence or obser- vation.' The non-difference of cause and effect results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of percep- tion. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not per- ceive a thing called ' cloth/ in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways.
2also from the existence of percep- tion. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not per- ceive a thing called ' cloth/ in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggre- 1 So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference. 2 For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is connected with some object on the surface of the earth. 3 I.e. (as An. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible without the consciousness of the other. — Tad- bhavanuvidhayibhavatvam tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvaw £a kar- yasya karawananyatve hetur dhumavijeshasya /fcagnibhavanuvi- dhayibhavatve*pi na tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya dhumabhanadhinatvat. 332 vedAnta-s6tr as. gate of which is identical with the grosser threads), in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Kk. Up. VI, 4) ; those, again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the world ; not to pra- dhana, &c), we have already explained. 16. And on account of that which is posterior (i. e. the effect) being that which is. For the following reason also the effect is to be con- sidered as non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i. e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For in passages like, * In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which is' [Kk, Up. VI, 2, 1); and, ' Verily, in the beginning this was Self, one only5 (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the word ' this ' appears in grammatical co-ordi- nation with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same substratum).
3ily, in the beginning this was Self, one only5 (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the word ' this ' appears in grammatical co-ordi- nation with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing ; for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different from the cause. As the cause, i. e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore the effect is non-different from the cause. 17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced) ; (we reply) not so, (because II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 7. 333 the term ' that which is not ' denotes) another quality (merely) ; (as appears) from the comple- mentary sentence. But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the effect before its production as that which is not ; so, for instance, ' In the beginning this was that only which is not' (Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1); and ' Non-existent 1 indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its production. This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its production is not meant absolute Non- existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the passage, ' In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that what is there denoted by the word ' Non-existing ' is — in the complementary passage, ' That became existent' — referred to by the word 'that/ and qualified as ' Existent.' The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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