Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

radhana and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world considered as the effect of the pradhana acted upon by the Lord ; for that the world is the effect of the pradhana is a point which the Vedantins do not accept as proved.

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may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedântin ; for that would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord. — For all these reasons the SMkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.

39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the Lord).

The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable hypothesis, for the following reason also. — Those philosophers are obliged to assume that by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhana, &c. just as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be admitted ; for the pradhana, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.

40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhana is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.

Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the pradhana in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the other organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not objects of perception.

This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs). But we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c. caused

438 vedanta-sCtras.

by the pradhâna. If the analogy between the pradhâna and the bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.

Or else the two preceding Sutras may be explained in a different way.

na. If the analogy between the pradhâna and the bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.

Or else the two preceding Sutras may be explained in a different way. Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of countries, are never without some material abode, i. e. a body ; hence, if we wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve as the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid of a material substratum ; for experience teaches us that action requires a material substrate. — Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even previously to creation). — This assumption also will not do ; for if the Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary transmigratory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.

41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).

The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the following reason also.— They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of infinite duration, and likewise that the pradMna, as well as the individual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord either defines the measure of the pradhana, the souls, and himself, or does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of finite duration ; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of definite extent, such as jars and the like, at sometime cease to exist. The numerical measure of pradhâna, souls, and Lord isp. 439 defined by their constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient). The number of the souls is a high one \ From among this limited number of souls some obtain release from the sa^sara, that means their sa^sara comes to an end, and their subjection to the sawsara comes to an end. Gradually all souls obtain release, and so there will finally be an end of the entire sa^sara and the sa/^sara state of all souls.

btain release from the sa^sara, that means their sa^sara comes to an end, and their subjection to the sawsara comes to an end. Gradually all souls obtain release, and so there will finally be an end of the entire sa^sara and the sa/^sara state of all souls. But the pradhana which is ruled by the Lord and which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by sa^sara. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for the Lord to rule, and his omniscience and ruling power have no longer any objects. But if the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, all have an end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general void. — Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions, maintain the second alternative, i. e. that the measure of the Lord himself, the pradhana, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord. — But that also is impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.

For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers, according to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears unacceptable.

42. On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas cannot be accepted).

We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative cause of the world. We are now

1 I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient
Lord knows its measure.

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going to refute the doctrine of those according to whom he is the material as well as the operative cause. — But, it maybe objected, in the previous portions of the present work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i. e. a Lord who is the material, as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on the basis of Scripture, and it is a recognised principle that Smrzti, in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative ; why then should we aim at controverting the doctrine stated ? — It is true, we reply, that a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the Vedanta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy ; another part of the system, however, is open to objection, and that part we intend to attack.