Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

hara exists ! Very truly vSankara's commentator here remarks, 'atra ke£in muhyanti skhanda- ^inmatra^anan muktasya^anabhavat kuta a^Tzanikadharmayoga^,' and the way in which thereupon he himself attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not improve matters.

In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth adhyaya with another passage> which indeed has no direct bearing on the distinction of apara and para vidya, but may yet be shortly referred to in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of vSankara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the Sutras. The Sutras 7-16 of the third pada state the opinions of three different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the vidvan repairs on death, or — according to Ramanu^a — the worshippers of which Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman. Ramanu^a treats the views of Badari and (Jaimini as two purvapakshas, and the opinion of Badaraya^a — which is stated last — as the siddhanta. vSankara, on the other hand, detaching the Sutras in which Badaraya/za's view is set forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/za (a proceeding which, although not

INTRODUCTION. XC1

plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether illegitimate), maintains that Badari's view, which is expounded first, represents the siddhanta, while Caimini's view, set forth subsequently, is to be considered a mere purvapaksha. This, of course, is altogether inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima;/zsa-sutras to conclude the discussion of contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted as the authoritative one. This is so patent that vSarikara feels himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any arguments but such as are valid only if .Sankara's system itself is already accepted.

The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice but to side with Ramanu^a as to the general subject-matter of the fourth adhyaya of the Sutras. We need not accept him as our guide in all particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the Sutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate of one and the same vidvan, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman in Sankara's sense.

If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman is likewise not valid.

basis for the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman in Sankara's sense.

If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on the negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding which the entire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be consulted. And intimately connected with this investigation— in fact, one with it from a certain point of view — is the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of their author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle of illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or l^vara. That Ramanu^a denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the doctrine of Maya we have seen above ; we shall, however, in the subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and inter-

XC11 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

pretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras themselves.

Placing myself at the point of view of a vSankara, I am startled at the outset by the second Sutra of the first adhyaya, which undertakes to give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination and so on (i. e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sutra meant to define? — That Brahman, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sutra declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedanta ; that Brahman whose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact which 5ankara calls the highest. — But, here we must object to ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from which the world originates. In later Vedantic writings, whose authors were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman and the lower Brahman related to Mayd or the world, we meet with definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as sa£-£id-ananda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the introductory ^lokas of the Pa#£ada.ri dilating on the samvid svayamprabha, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time, past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P. D. I, 7).

nanda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the introductory ^lokas of the Pa#£ada.ri dilating on the samvid svayamprabha, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time, past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P. D. I, 7). ' That from which the world proceeds ' can by a 5ankara be accepted only as a definition of l^vara, of Brahman which by its association with Maya is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and it certainly is as improbable that the Sutras should open with a definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is unlikely that they should conclude with a description of the state of those who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brah^ man as one only, as the all-enfolding being which sometimes emits the world from its own substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining one in all its

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various manifestations— -a conception which need not by any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the Ramanu^as — the definition of Brahman given in the second Sutra becomes altogether unobjectionable.

We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in which Badaraya^a defines Brahman, viz. that he does not distinguish between an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Mayd, is confirmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sutras being throughout far from direct in their enunciations, we shall have to look less to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines of reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the Sutrakara against the Sankhya doctrine, which maintains that the world has originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the non-intelligent pradhana. The most important Sutras relative to this point are to be met with in the first pada of the second adhyaya. Those Sutras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by themselves, but the unanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investigation. The sixth Sutra of the pâda mentioned replies to the Sankhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that c it is thus seen/ i. e.