Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

and form, which is there denoted by the word 'this/ was before its origination identical with the Self of that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or ' that which is ') sent forth fire and the other elements after having thought. The following passage also (' Verily in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait. Ar. II, 49 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the person of sixteen parts, ' He thought, &c. He sent forth Pra/za.' By ' seeing ' (i. e. the verb ' seeing ' exhibited in the Sutra) is not meant that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense ; just as the verb ' to sacrifice ' is used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name and form and food.'

The argumentation of the Sahkhyas that the pradhana may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the gu/za Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhana-condition the three gu^as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only is not possible1. Nor can we admit the explanation that the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the guTzas, we term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkp. 49ness. Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhâna lis destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhâna all-knowingness.

1 Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.

er a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhâna lis destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhâna all-knowingness. The case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under consideration ; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience1.— Well then (say those Sankhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradhâna possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is imparted to an iron ball by fire.— No, we reply; for if this were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the pradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is the cause of the world.

The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sankhya, is Brahman's all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's knowledge to be permanent. — But, it may be objected, on this latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with reference to the act of knowing.— Why not ? we reply ; the sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent

1 The excess of Sattva in theYogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle independent of Sattva.

[34] Ep. 50 when we say, ' he burns, he gives light1/ — But, it will again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated ; Brahman, on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel.

at the sun burns or gives light when he stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated ; Brahman, on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel. — This objection too, we reply, is not valid ; for as a matter of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines/ even without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as ' it thought,' &c, even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an object is supposed to be required (' knowing ' being a transitive verb while e shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman will fit all the better.— What then is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the world ? — Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to. be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-^astra assume, the Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through the favour of the Lord ; in what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world ! The objection that Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply ; for Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition— as the sun's nature is eternal luminous-

1 Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapattim nirasitum iprtkkAati idam iti. Prakn'tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad va brahma«o sarva^^ateti pra^nam eva praka/ayati katham iti. Prathama/rc pratyaha yasyeti. Uktanz vyatirekadvâra vivrinoti anityatve hiti. Dvitfyanz jarikate ^Mneti. Svato nityasyapi ^Tzanasya tattadarthava^^innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam pratyayartho brahma»a^ sidhyatity dha. — The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge ; the verbal affix in '^anati ' indicating the particularity of the act.

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ness — can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa^sarin) indeed, which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge may arise in it ; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge.