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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1to the Mayd doctrine one impor- tant Sutra has yet to be considered, the only one in which the term 'maya' itself occurs, viz. Ill, 2, 3. According to vSahkara the Sutra signifies that the environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Maya, i. e. unsub- stantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Ramanu^a (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a different explanation of the term ' maya/ but in judging of .Sankara's views we may for the time accept 5ankara's own interpretation. Now, from the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams are to be called Maya, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the characteristics of reality, the objective world surround- ing the waking soul must not be called Maya\ But that the world perceived by waking men is Maya, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming con- sciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the Sankara Vedanta ; and the Sutra therefore proves either that Badaraya/za did not hold the doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term ' maya ' in a sense altogether different from that INTRODUCTION. XCV11 in which Sankara employs it. — If, on the other hand, we, with R&manug-a, understand the word ' mkyk ' to denote a wonderful thing, the Sutra of course has no bearing what- ever on the doctrine of Mayd in its later technical sense. We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Do the Sutras indicate any- where that their author held vSarikara's doctrine, according to which the ^iva is in reality identical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a false surmise due to avidya, or do they rather favour the view that the souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual exist- ence apart from it ? This question is in fact only another aspect of the Maya question, but yet requires a short separate treatment. In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sutras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in vSankara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Rama- nu£*a, that the soul is of minute size.
2ectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sutras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in vSankara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Rama- nu£*a, that the soul is of minute size. We have further seen that Sutra 1 8 of the third p&da of the second adhyaya, which describes the soul as '^Tza,' is more appropriately under- stood in the sense assigned to it by Ramanu^a ; and, again, that the Sutras which treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with Sankara's views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to authorise. — We next have the important Sutra II, 3, 43 in which the soul is distinctly said to be a part (aw^a) of Brahman, and which, as we have already noticed, can be made to fall in with vSankara's views only if a^j-a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by fa^a iva,' while Ramanu^a is able to take the Sutra as it stands. — We also have already referred to Sutra 50,'abMsa eva £a/ which vSankara interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavada according to which the indi- vidual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self. But almost every Sutra — and Sutra 50 forms no exception — being so obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in view, in the case of each ambiguous [34] g xcviii vedanta-sAtras. aphorism, the general drift and spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no means favour- able to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sutra 5°* if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sutra 43, which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman ? For that 43 contains, as iankara and his commentators aver, a statement of the ava^Medavctda, can itself be ac- cepted only if we interpret amsa, by antss. iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever. I confess that Ramanu^a's interpretation of the Sutra (which however is accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me particularly convincing; and the Sutras unfortunately offer us no other passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the term abhasa, which may mean ' reflection/ but may mean hetvabhasa, i. e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this one Sutra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the pratibimbavcida which, in its turn, pre- supposes the miyavada, is the teaching of the Sutras.
3' reflection/ but may mean hetvabhasa, i. e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this one Sutra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the pratibimbavcida which, in its turn, pre- supposes the miyavada, is the teaching of the Sutras. To the conclusion that the Sutrakara did not hold the doctrine of the absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of vSankara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with here and there in the Sutras. In the conspectus of contents we have had occasion to direct attention to the important Sutra II, 1,23, which distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i. e. additional to, or different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to be different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the ^arira is not the antaryamin, because the Madhyandinas, as well as the Ka/zvas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena enam adhiyate), and in 32 the ^arira and the pradhana are referred to as the two ' others ' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word ' itara ' (the other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16 ; I, 3, 16; II, 1, 31) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in con- tradistinction from the Lord. The 5ankaras indeed main- tain that all those passages refer to an unreal distinction INTRODUCTION. XC1X due to avidya. But this is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands that the Sutras should be thus understood. If we accept the inter- pretations of the school of 5ankara,it remains altogether un- intelligible why the Sutrakara should never hint even at what vSankara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that the greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only, ever tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its nature is. If other reasons should make it probable that the Sutrakara was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept vSankara's mode of interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming ; nowhere among the avowed followers of the vSankara system is there any tendency to treat the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and hidden.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1to the Mayd doctrine one impor- tant Sutra has yet to be considered, the only one in which the term 'maya' itself occurs, viz. Ill, 2, 3. According to vSahkara the Sutra signifies that the environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Maya, i. e. unsub- stantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Ramanu^a (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a different explanation of the term ' maya/ but in judging of .Sankara's views we may for the time accept 5ankara's own interpretation. Now, from the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams are to be called Maya, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the characteristics of reality, the objective world surround- ing the waking soul must not be called Maya\ But that the world perceived by waking men is Maya, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming con- sciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the Sankara Vedanta ; and the Sutra therefore proves either that Badaraya/za did not hold the doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term ' maya ' in a sense altogether different from that INTRODUCTION. XCV11 in which Sankara employs it. — If, on the other hand, we, with R&manug-a, understand the word ' mkyk ' to denote a wonderful thing, the Sutra of course has no bearing what- ever on the doctrine of Mayd in its later technical sense. We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Do the Sutras indicate any- where that their author held vSarikara's doctrine, according to which the ^iva is in reality identical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a false surmise due to avidya, or do they rather favour the view that the souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual exist- ence apart from it ? This question is in fact only another aspect of the Maya question, but yet requires a short separate treatment. In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sutras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in vSankara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Rama- nu£*a, that the soul is of minute size.
2ectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sutras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in vSankara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Rama- nu£*a, that the soul is of minute size. We have further seen that Sutra 1 8 of the third p&da of the second adhyaya, which describes the soul as '^Tza,' is more appropriately under- stood in the sense assigned to it by Ramanu^a ; and, again, that the Sutras which treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with Sankara's views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to authorise. — We next have the important Sutra II, 3, 43 in which the soul is distinctly said to be a part (aw^a) of Brahman, and which, as we have already noticed, can be made to fall in with vSankara's views only if a^j-a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by fa^a iva,' while Ramanu^a is able to take the Sutra as it stands. — We also have already referred to Sutra 50,'abMsa eva £a/ which vSankara interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavada according to which the indi- vidual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self. But almost every Sutra — and Sutra 50 forms no exception — being so obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in view, in the case of each ambiguous [34] g xcviii vedanta-sAtras. aphorism, the general drift and spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no means favour- able to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sutra 5°* if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sutra 43, which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman ? For that 43 contains, as iankara and his commentators aver, a statement of the ava^Medavctda, can itself be ac- cepted only if we interpret amsa, by antss. iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever. I confess that Ramanu^a's interpretation of the Sutra (which however is accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me particularly convincing; and the Sutras unfortunately offer us no other passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the term abhasa, which may mean ' reflection/ but may mean hetvabhasa, i. e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this one Sutra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the pratibimbavcida which, in its turn, pre- supposes the miyavada, is the teaching of the Sutras.
3' reflection/ but may mean hetvabhasa, i. e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this one Sutra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the pratibimbavcida which, in its turn, pre- supposes the miyavada, is the teaching of the Sutras. To the conclusion that the Sutrakara did not hold the doctrine of the absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of vSankara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with here and there in the Sutras. In the conspectus of contents we have had occasion to direct attention to the important Sutra II, 1,23, which distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i. e. additional to, or different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to be different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the ^arira is not the antaryamin, because the Madhyandinas, as well as the Ka/zvas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena enam adhiyate), and in 32 the ^arira and the pradhana are referred to as the two ' others ' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word ' itara ' (the other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16 ; I, 3, 16; II, 1, 31) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in con- tradistinction from the Lord. The 5ankaras indeed main- tain that all those passages refer to an unreal distinction INTRODUCTION. XC1X due to avidya. But this is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands that the Sutras should be thus understood. If we accept the inter- pretations of the school of 5ankara,it remains altogether un- intelligible why the Sutrakara should never hint even at what vSankara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that the greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only, ever tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its nature is. If other reasons should make it probable that the Sutrakara was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept vSankara's mode of interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming ; nowhere among the avowed followers of the vSankara system is there any tendency to treat the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and hidden.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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