The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

efore Parmenides defines the second order of intelligible* to be a wholeness. For as existence is derived to all things from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an nil-perfect division from the third. This however will be considered by us hereafter. Wholeness therefore is triple, being either prior to parts, or consisting of parts, or .subsisting in a part, according to the doctrine of Plato. For in the Politico* indeed, he calls genus a whole, but species a part, not that genus derives its completion from species, but exists prior to it. And in the Timseus he says that the world is a whole of wholes. And all the world indeed derives its completion from parts that are wholes ; but each of the parts is n whole, not as the universe is, but partially. Wholeness therefore, being triple as we have said, according to Plato, the unity, and the intelligible and occult cause of these is now delivered, unically comprehending and constituting three wholenesses ; according to the hyparxis indeed of itself, the wholeness prior to parts ; but according to its power, x

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK III.

the wholeness which is from parts ; and according to its being the wholeness which is in a part. For the one is prior to all multitude ; but power communicates in a certain respect with both the extremes, and comprehends in itself the peculiarities of them ; and being in a certain respect participates of the one. Hence the first of the wholenesses, or that which is prior to parts is derived from a unical hyparxis. For it is a monad, and is itself constitutive of parts, and of the multitude which is in them. But the second wholeness is from power. For it derives its completion from parts, just as in the power which is collective of the one and being, the extremes in a certain respect shiue forth to the view. And the third wholeness is from being. For being is a part, and is the progeny both of power and the one,' and possesses each of these partially. After the intelligible therefore, three wholenesses are divided according to the different orders of beings. But the intelligible wholeness comprehends the three unically, and is the intelligibly connective monad of this triad, every way extending the powers of itself from the middle of the intelligible and occult order.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Immediately after this triad we may sec another proceeding, in which all intelligible multitude shines forth, and which Parmenides indeed constitutes a wholeness, but a wholeness consisting of many parts.

middle of the intelligible and occult order.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Immediately after this triad we may sec another proceeding, in which all intelligible multitude shines forth, and which Parmenides indeed constitutes a wholeness, but a wholeness consisting of many parts. For after the occult union of the first triad, and the dyadic separation of the second, the progression of the third is generated, which has indeed its subsistence from parts, but the parts are many, with the multitude of which the triad prior to it is parturient. For in this triad there is a unity, and power, and being. But the one is multiplied, and also being and

' Instead of «vro; it is necessary to read m;.

CHAP. XXVI.

OF PLATO.

p. 213

power. And thus all the triad indeed is a wholeness; but each of its extremes, viz. the one and being, as it is multitude conjoined through collective power, is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining unical multitude to the multitude of beings, of some of these it causes each through progression to be being characterized by the one, but of others each according to participation to be the one characterized by being. For here indeed there are two parts of the wholeness, the one and being ; but the one participates of being, for it is conjoined with it ; and being participates of the one. The one of being therefore, is again divided, so that the one and being generate a second unity conjoined with the part of being. But being participating of the one, is again separated into being and the one. For it generates a more partial being suspended from a more partial unity. And being consists of more partial deified beings, and is a more specific monad. The cause however of this progression is power. For power is effective of two things, and is the operator of multitude. For the one indeed calls forth into multitude, but being converts to the participation of the divine unities. Whence therefore does Parmenides begin to teach us -concerning this triad? And where docs he conclude his discourse about it? The beginning, therefore, of what he says on this subject is as follows : " What then ? Can each of these parts of the one being, viz. the one and being, desert each other, so that the one shall not be a part of being, or being shall not be a part of the one t It cannot be.'" But he ends thus : " Will not, therefore, the one being after this manner be an infinite multitude ? It seems so."

In the first place, therefore, it is proper to understand the manner of the progression of the divine genera;

of the one t It cannot be.'" But he ends thus : " Will not, therefore, the one being after this manner be an infinite multitude ? It seems so."

In the first place, therefore, it is proper to understand the manner of the progression of the divine genera; and that conformably to the intelligible monad, which we arrange according to the one being, the duad posterior to it which we call a wholeness [proceeds.] But we say that it consists of two parts which are separated by power, and that intelligible multitude presents itself to the view from the monad and the duad. For when all things are said to be parts of the one being, viz. secondary things, and such as become apparent through the separating cause of power, then

1 It U necessary to cornet the text here, and to read as follow* : tuw; raw p*pun immpn rov» raw tow »»$• orr»{ to, ti it x«i ts oy ap* (nroXfnrraim, q to it. ». r. K.

p. 214

p. 4

ON the ti]j:olo<;y

HOOK lit.

Parmenides delivers the union which pervades from the monad to the third triad. But when power separating and conjoining the unities and beings gives completion to multitude, then the participation of the duad becomes perfectly apparent, as 1 think Parmenides demonstrates when he says, " so that it is necessary two things should always he generated, and that there should never be one thing (only.)" This triad, therefore, proceeds according to both the preexistent triads, flowing according to the Oracle, and proceeding to all intelligible multitude. For infinite multitude is indicative of this flux, and of the incomprehensible nature of power. Hence, in the first place, I have said that the hypostasis of this triad is through these things demonstrated to l>e suspended from the triads prior to it. And in the next place, I say, that this triad, according to Parmenides, is primogenial. For this first imparts the power of being generated; and Parmenides calls the multitude which is in it in generation, [i.e. becoming to be, or rising into existence^] For he says : " And the part w ill be generated from two parts at least." And again : " Whatever part is generated, will always have these parts." And in what follows : •* So that it is necessary it should always be generated two things, and should never be* one."' Does not he, therefore, who frequently uses the word ge- • Deration in teaching concerning the progression of the intelligible multitude, proclaim that the natures prior to this order are more united to each other? But this order proceeds to a greater extent, unfolds the occult nature of