The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

of eternity, but by number, its stable union. What therefore is that one, in which Timaeus says eternity abides ? For it is necessary either to say that it is the one of eternity, or the one which transcends all intelligibles, or the one of the first triad. But if indeed, we say that it is the imparticipable one, how is it possible that any thing can abide in that which is exempt from all things; and which neither admits the habitude nor communion Of secondary natures with itself? For every thing which abides in any thing, is in a certain respect on all sides comprehended by that in which we say it abides. It is however perfectly impossible that the first one should either comprehend any being, or be coarranged with beings. But if any one should suppose that it is the one of eternity, in which Timaeus says eternity abides, in this case, eternity will be in itself. It is necessary however, that it should abide in itself, by having its subsistence in abiding in that which is prior to itself. For to abide in that which is prior to, is better than the establishment of things in themselves, in the same manner as it is more perfect than the collocation of better in less excellent natures. If therefore eternity abides in itself, to what shall we primarily assign permanency in that which is prior to itself? For it is necessary that this being more divine, should have its generation prior to that which is inferior to it. If therefore eternity can neither abide in itself, nor in the one which is prior to beings, it is evident that abiding in one according to Timaeus, it is established in the one of the first triad, or rather in the whole

/

CHAP. XVIII. OF PLATO. IQQ

of that triad. For, as we have before observed, the first triad is the cause of stability to all beings, in the same manner as the middle triad is the cause of their progression, and the third triad of their conversion to their principle.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Again therefore, three orders of intelligibles present themselves to our view, according to the doctrine of Timaeus, viz. animal itself, eternity, and the oue. And through this one, and the firm establishment in it, eternity has fixed the intelligible kingdom. But through eternity, animal itself defines the boundary of the intelligible Gods, according to a perpetual and invariable sameness. And animal itself indeed, having proceeded tetradically, is suspended from the duad in eternity. For eternity is tlu ever in conjunction with being.

, animal itself defines the boundary of the intelligible Gods, according to a perpetual and invariable sameness. And animal itself indeed, having proceeded tetradically, is suspended from the duad in eternity. For eternity is tlu ever in conjunction with being. But the duad in eternity participates of the intelligible monad, which Timams on this account denominates one, as being the monad and principle of all the intelligible breadth. Since otherwise indeed, he very properly calls the first triad one, in consequence of its being especially characterized according to bound, denominating it from bound. But he calls the middle triad dyadically, eternity, connecting the names ; because this triad is defined according to intelligible jiower. And lie denominates the third triad animal itself, transferring the appellation to the whole of it, from the extremity of the triad. The first triad therefore is the union ofull the intelligibles, being in a certain respect coordinated with them. For the union is different from this which is exempt from intelligibles and im participate. It is also the supplier of stable power. For all things are established on account of it. But eternity is primary being, and is that which is primarily established. Hence, with respect to the permanency of the whole of things, we say that the

p. 190

ON THE THEOLOGY

nooK m.

first triad is that on account of which this permanency is effected ; but that the second triad is that by vrhich it is produced. For the firm establishment of beings is indeed according to this second triad, but is on account of the first. But the second triad is the proximate measure of all beings, and is coordinated with the things that are measured. There arc also at one and the same time in it, bound and infinity ; bound indeed, so far as it measures intelligibles ; but infinity, so far as it is the cause of perpetuity, and the ever. For according to the oracle, eternity is the cause of never-failing life, of unwearied power, and unsluggish energy. Nevertheless, eternity is more characterised by infinity [than by bound.] For it comprehends in itself infinite time. And time indeed has bound and infinity in a divided manner. For according to its continuity, it is infinite; but according to the now it is bounded. For the now is a bound. But eternity establishes bound and infinity in the same. For it is a unity and power.

ndeed has bound and infinity in a divided manner. For according to its continuity, it is infinite; but according to the now it is bounded. For the now is a bound. But eternity establishes bound and infinity in the same. For it is a unity and power. And according to the one indeed, it is bound ; but according to power infinite ; which time * also demonstrates as from images ; because the middle triad [of intelligibles] has bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. For whence is the bound of time derived except from eternal bound? For the temporal bound also is impartible, in the same manner as the bound of eternity is one. For the impartible is the image of the one. Whence likewise is the infinity of the continuity of time derived except from the power of the infinite ? For the latter is a stable infinity, but the former an infinity which is moved. And as the latter stands still according to the one, so the former is moved according to number. Since whence i6 the alliance of time with lives, except from the first principle [of life, eternity ?] But time proceeds through all temporal life.

Again, therefore, from these things it is evident, that eternity subsists according to the middle of the intelligible Gods. For here there is infinite life, and the cause of all life, intellectual, psychical, and that which subsists partibly in bodies. But eternity is the father and supplier of infinite life; since eternity is also the cause of all immortality and perpetuity. And Flotinus, exhibiting, in a most divinely inspired manner, the

* • xfovo; U omitted in the original.

chap. xrin.

OF PLATO".

peculiarity ' of eternity, according to the theology of Plato, defines it to be infinite life, at once unfolding into light the whole of itself, and its own being. For establishing its life in the intelligible centre, and through the one indeed measuring its being, and fixing it in that which is prior to itself, but through power causing it to be infinite, it unfolds indeed the uniformtranscendency of the first triad, but defines the termination of the Gods, and extends from the middle on all sides, and to all the intelligible breadth. Moreover the third triad is filled indeed with intelligible life,' and on this account is an intelligible animal, and the first animal.