The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

things, and establishes them uniformly about it. It is necessary therefore that the theological science should be unfolded conformably to the divine orders, and that our conceptions about it should be transcendent, and unmingled and unconnected with other things. And we should survey indeed all secondary natures, subsisting according to and perfected about it ; but we should establish it as transcending all the monads in beings, according to one excess of simplicity, and as unitfclly arranged prior to the whole orders [of Gods.] Pot as the Gods themselves enact the order Which is in them, thus also it is necessary that the truth concerning them, the precedancoUs causes of beings, and the second artd third progeny of these should be definitely distinguished.

This, therefore, is the one truth concerning the first principle, and which possesses one reason remarkably conformable to the Platonic hypothesis, viz. that this principle subsists prior to the whole orders in the Gods, that it gives subsistence to the boniform essence of the Gods, that it is the fountain of superessential goodness, and that all things posterior to it being extended towards it, are filled with good, after an ineffable manner are united to it, and subsist uniformly about it. For its unical nature is not Uftprolific, but it is by so much the more generative of other things, as it pre-eftablishes a union exempt from the things which have a subsistence- Nor does its fecundity tend to multitude and division ; but it abides with undented purity concealed in inaccessible places. For in the natures also which are posterior to it, we every where see that what is perfect desires to generate, and that what is full hastens to impart to other things its plenitude. In a much greater degree therefore it is necessary that the nature which contains in one all perfections, and which is not a certain good, but good itself, and super-full, (if it be lawful so to speak) should be generative of the Whole of things, and give subsistence to them ; producing all things by being exempt from all things, and by beitig imparticipable, similarly generating the first and the last of beings.

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You must not, however, suppose that tlus generation and progression is emitted in consequence of the good either being moved, or multiplied, or possessing a generative power, or energizing; since all these are secondary to the singleness of the first.

OOK ,11.

You must not, however, suppose that tlus generation and progression is emitted in consequence of the good either being moved, or multiplied, or possessing a generative power, or energizing; since all these are secondary to the singleness of the first. For whether the good is moved, it will not be the good; since the good itself, and which is nothing else, if it were moved would depart from goodness. How, therefore, can that which is the source of goodness to beings, produce other things when deprived of good ? Or whether the good is multiplied through imbecility, there will be a progression of the whole of things through a diminution, but not through an abundance of goodness. For that which in generating departs from its proper transcendency, hastens to adorn inferior natures, not through prolific perfection, but through a diminution and want of its own power. But if the good produces all things by employing power, there will be a diminution of goodness about it. For it will be two things and not one, viz. it will be good and power. And if indeed it is in want of power, that which is primarily good will be indigent. But if to be the good ittelf is sufficient to the perfection of the things produced, and to the plenitude of all things, why do we assume power as an addition? For additions in the Gods are ablations of transcendent unions. Let the good therefore alone be prior to power, and prior to energy. For all energy is the progeny of power. Neither, therefore, does the good energizing give subsistence to all things through energy, nor being in want of power docs it fill all thiugs with powers, nor being multiplied do all things participate of good, nor being moved do all beings' enjoy the first principle. For the good precedes all powers, and all energies, and every multitude and motion ; since each of these is referred to the good as to its end. The good therefore is the most final of all ends, and the centre of all desirable natures. All desirable natures, indeed, impart an end to secondary beings ; but that which pre-subsisls uncircumscribed by all things is the first good.

' For tmtix rufevr*, I read wmrrm t« sit*.

CUAP. VIII. OF PLATO.

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CHAPTER V11L

After these things, however, let us direct our attention to the conceptions about the first principle in the epistle [of Plato] to Dionysius, and survey the manner in which he considers its ineffable and immense transcendency.

. OF PLATO.

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CHAPTER V11L

After these things, however, let us direct our attention to the conceptions about the first principle in the epistle [of Plato] to Dionysius, and survey the manner in which he considers its ineffable and immense transcendency. But perhaps some one may be indignant with us for rashly drawing to our own hypotheses the assertions of Plato, and may say that the three kings of which he speaks are all of them intellectual Gods ; but that Plato docs not think fit to co-arrange or connumerate the good with secondary natures. For such a connumeration ought not to be considered as adapted to the exempt transcendency of the good with respect to other things, nor in short, must it be said that the good contributes as the first with reference to another second or third cause to the completion of a triad in conjunction with other natures ; but that it in a greater degree precedes every triad and every number, than the intelligible precede the intellectual Gods. How, therefore, can we connumerate with other kings the good which is at once exempt from all the divine numbers, and coarrange one as the first [king,] another as the second, and another as the third ? Some one may also adduce many other things, indicating the transcendency of the first principle with respect to every thing divine. Such a one, however, in thus interpreting the words of Plato will remarkably accord with us who assert the good to be im participate, to transcend all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and to be established above all the divine monads.

That Plato, indeed, admits the first God to be the king of all things, and says that all things arc for his sake, and that he is the cause of all beautiful things, does not I think require much proof to those who consider his words by themselves apart from their own conjectures, by introducing which they violently endeavour to accord with Plato. But that we do not assert these things connumeratiug [the first God with secondary Proc. Vol. I. R

-p. 1 jgQ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II, natures,] Plato himself manifests, neither calling the first king the first,, but alone the king of all things, nor asserting that some things are about him, as he says that second things are about that which is second, and third things about that which is third, but* he says, in short, that alt things are about him.