The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

ce, and by the addition of this participation becoming more redundant than that which is primarily one. This however is a superesscntial hyparxis, and the hyparxis of the first intelligible triad. As there are therefore these two things in the first triad, viz. the one and being, and the former generates, but the latter is generated, and the former perfects, but the latter is perfected, it is necessary that the middle of both should be power, through which and together with which the one constitutes and is perfective of being. For the progression of being from the me, and its conversion to the one, is through power. For what else conjoins being to the one, or causes the one to be participated by being except power? For it is the progression of the one, and its extension to being. Hence, in all the divine genera powers precede progressions and generations. This triad therefore, the one, power and being, is the summit of intelhgibles. The first of these indeed producing ; the third being produced ; and the second being suspended from the one, but coalescing with

CHAP. XXtV.

OF PLATO.

p. 209

CHAPTER XXIV.

This triad therefore, Parmenides delivers immediately in the beginning of the second hypothesis, adjoining to the one the most simple participation of essence. But he calls it the one being, and says that being participates of the one, and the one of being. The participation however of these is different. For the one ' indeed so participates of being, as illuminating and filling, and deifying being ; but being so participates of the one, as suspended from the one, and deified by it. But the habitude which is the middle of both, is not with them void of essence. For neither is the habitude which is among sensibles in no respect being, and much more is this the case with the habitude which is there. But this habitude is biformed. For it is of the one, and is connascent with being. For it is the motion of the one, and its progression into being. Parmenides delivers this triad, beginning what he says about it as follows : " See therefore from the beginning if the one is. Is it possible then for it to be, and yet not to participate of essence ? It is not possible." But he ends speaking about it in the following words : " Will therefore that which is said be any thing else than this, that the.

the beginning if the one is. Is it possible then for it to be, and yet not to participate of essence ? It is not possible." But he ends speaking about it in the following words : " Will therefore that which is said be any thing else than this, that the. one participates of essence, when it is summarily asserted by any one that the one is ? It will not." This therefore is the first intelligible triad, the one, being, and the habitude of both, through which being is of the one and the one of being, in a manner perfectly admirable ; Plato indicating through these things, that the father is the father of intellect, and that intellect is the intellect of the father, anil that power is concealed between the extremes. For deity is the father of the triad, and bein*; is the intellect of this deity. Yet it is not intellect in the same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect of essence. For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the Elean guest says.

• In the original n o», but the true reading is eridemlf r» alone. Proc. Vol. I. *2 D

*10 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOKIH.

But that which is primarily being, neither stands still, nor is moved, as he also teaches. The first triad therefore is called one being ; since power is here occultly. For the triad docs not proceed from itself ; but subsists without separation and uniformly, being primarily defined according to divine union. Hence, this is the first participation of essence, which participates of the one through power as the middle, which collects together and separates both the one and being. And it is supcressential indeed, but is conjoined with essence. We must never think therefore that all power is the progeny of essence. For the powers of the Gods are superessential, and are consubsistent with the unities themselves of the Gods. And through this power the Gods are generative of beings. Rightly therefore, does poetry every where assert that the Gods are able to do all things. For essential powers indeed are not capable of effecting all things ; since they are not constitutive of supcrcssential natures. The first triad therefore, is through these things unfolded to us by Parinenides.

CHAPTER XXV.

But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression, which Parmenides characterises by intelligible wholeness, as we have shown in the Sophista, For the first triad being uniform, and possessing all things intelligibly and occultly, viz.

ER XXV.

But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression, which Parmenides characterises by intelligible wholeness, as we have shown in the Sophista, For the first triad being uniform, and possessing all things intelligibly and occultly, viz. hyparxis, power and being, so that power which is the cause of division, subsisting between the one and being, is concealed, and becomes apparent through the communion of the extremes with each other,— the second triad proceeds, being characterized by the first intelligible power, and having the monads in itself distinguished from each other. For all things being uuited and without distinction in the first triad, distinction and separation shine forth in this triad. Being also and power arc more divided from each other. And that which con-

CHAP. XXV-

OF PLATO.

p. 211

sists of these is no longer one being [or being characterized by the one,] but is a whole, so that it has the one and being in itself as parts. For above indeed [i. e. in the first triad] all things are prior to parts and wholeness. But ip this triad there are both parts and a whole, power unfolding itself into light. For as there is separation here, there are parts and the w hole consisting of these. The second triad therefore is called intelligible wholeness. But the parts of it, the one and being, I call the extremes. And power being here the middle, connects the one and being, and does not cause them to be one, in the same manner as in the first triad. Since also it is the middle of both, through its communion indeed with being, it renders the one one being ; but through its communion with the vnc, it perfectly causes being to be one. And thus the one being consists of two parts, viz. of being which is characterised by the one, and of the one which is characterized by being, as Parmenides himself says. He begins therefore to speak about this triad as follows : " Again therefore, let us say if the one is what will happen. Consider then if it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify the one to be a thing of such a kind as to have parts f But- he ends in the following words : •* That which is one therefore is a whole, and has a part."

Through these things therefore Parmenides defines the second order of intelligible* to be a wholeness. For as existence is derived to all things from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an nil-perfect division from the third. This however will be considered by us hereafter.