The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

the amatory mania, others through divine philosophy, and others through theurgic power, which is more excellent than all human wisdom, and which comprehends prophetic good, the purifying powers of perfective good, and in short, alt such things as are the effects of divine possession. Concerning these things therefore, we may perhaps again speak more opportunely.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Again, let us, if you are willing, from other dialogues investigate the common dogmas of Plato about divine natures. Whence therefore, and what dogmas shall we assume, while we proceed in our search according to nature? Are you willing that we should in the next place recall to our memory what is written in the Phsedo ? Socrates therefore says in the demonstrations of the immortality of the soul which are derived from its similitude to divinity, that the essence which is superior to the soul, Proc. Vol. I. L

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BOOK I.

(and to which the soul is naturally similar, and being similar participates of an immortal allotment) is divine and immortal, intelligible and uniform, indissoluble and possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence; but that the essence which is inferior to the soul, is entirely the contrary, to which also it pertains to be corrupted and to be passive. For a thing of this kind is sensible and multiform, and is dissoluble because it is a composite ; and he predicates among these all such things as pertain to a corporeal subsistence. Let us therefore direct our attention to these common dogmas, and examine after what, manner each of them pertains to the Gods.

In the first place then what is that which we look to when we speak of that which is said to be divine ? From what has been said therefore, it is evident that every God subsists according to the highest union of beings. For to us ascending from bodies, the Gods have appeared to be sujxi essential unities, the generators, perfectors and measurers of essences, and who bind all first essences to themselves. But that which is divine, is not only hyparxis and the one in each order of being, but at the same time is that which participates and that which is participated ; of which the latter is a God, but the former is divine. Whether however, prior to the participated unities, there is something which is separate and participated will he evident in what follows. But at present we shall define that which is divine to be a thing of this kind, viz. being* which participates of the one, or the one subsisting contractedly together with being.

something which is separate and participated will he evident in what follows. But at present we shall define that which is divine to be a thing of this kind, viz. being* which participates of the one, or the one subsisting contractedly together with being. For we assume all things in the Gods except the one, as suspended from them and secondary, viz. essence, life and intellect. For the Gods do not subsist in, but prior to these, and they produce and contain these in themselves, but are not defined in them. But it is necessary not to be ignorant that these are in reality thus distinguished from each other. In many places, however, Plato magnificently celebrates the participants of the Gods by the same names, and denominates them Gods. For not only the Athenian guest in the Laws calls a divine soul a God, but also Socrates in the Phsedrus. For he says " that all the horses and charioteers of the Gods are good and consist of things good ;" and afterwards still more clearly, " and this is the life of the Gods." But this is not yet wonderful. For is it not admirable that he should denominate those beings Gods who

CHAP. XXVI.

OF PLATO.

S3

arc always conjoined with the Gods, and who together with them give completion to one series ? For in many places he calls daemons Gods, though they are essentially posterior to, and subsist about the Gods. For in the Phaidrus and Timrcus, and in other dialogues, you will find him extending the appellation of the Gods even as far as to daemons. But what is still more paradoxical than these things, he does not refuse to call certain men Gods; for in the Sophista he thus denominates the Elean guest.

From all that has been said therefore, this must be assumed, that with respect to a God, one thing is simply a God, another according to union, another according to participation, another according to contact, and another according to similitude. For of super-essential natures indeed, each is primarily a God ; of intellectual natures, each is a God according to union; and of divine souls, each is a God according to participation. But divine daemons are Gods according to contact with the Gods ; and the souls of men are allotted this appellation through similitude. Each of these however is, as we have said, rather divine than a God.

ivine souls, each is a God according to participation. But divine daemons are Gods according to contact with the Gods ; and the souls of men are allotted this appellation through similitude. Each of these however is, as we have said, rather divine than a God. Since the Athenian guest calls intellect itself divine ; but that which is divine is posterior to the first deity, in the same manner as that which is united is posterior to the one, that which is intellectual, to intellect, and that which is animated, to soul. And always those natures that are more uniform and simple have the precedency ; but the series of beings ends in the one itself. Let this, therefore, be the definition and distinction of that which is divine.

In the next place, let us survey the immortal. For with Plato there are many orders of immortality, pervading from on high as titr as to the last of things ; and the last echo, as it were, of immortality, is in those visible natures that are perpetual ; which the Elean guest, in his discourse about the circulation of the universe, says, are allotted from the fatlier a renovated immortality. For every body is allotted a being and a life dependent on another cause ; but is not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself. The immortality of partial souls is, I tlrink, more manifest and more perfect than this ; which Plato evinces by many demonstrations in the Phacdo, and in the 10th book of the Republic.

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BOOK I.

But I mean by the immortality of partial souls, that which has a more principal subsistence, as containing in itself the cause of eternal permanency. Wc shall not, however, err if prior to both these we establish the immortality of daemons. For the genera of these through which they subsist aie incorruptible, and they neither verge to mortality, nor are filled with the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. But I infer that the immortality of divine souls is still more venerable and essentially more transcendent than that of daemons; which divine souls we say are primarily self-motive, and are the fountains and principles of the life divided about bodies, and through which bodies obtain a renovated immortality.