The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

body. For whence is the whole of this heaven either spherical or moved in a circle, and whence does it revolve with a sameness of circulation according to one definite order? For how could it always be allotted the same idea and power immutably according to. nature, if it did not participate of specific formation accordiug to intellect? For soul, indeed, is the supplier of motion; but the cause of a firm establishment, and that which reduces the unstable mutation of things that are moved, into sameness, and also a life which is bounded by one reason, and a circulation which subsists with invariable sameness, will evidently be superior to soul.

Body, therefore, and the whole of this sensible nature belong to things

which are alter-motive. But soul is self-motive, binding ro itself all corporeal motions ; and prior to this is intellect which is immoveable. Let ho one, however, suppose that I assert this immobility of intellect to resemble that which is sluggish, destitute of life,' and without respiration, but that it is the leading eause of all motion, and the fountain, if you are willing so to denominate it, of all life, both of that which is- converted to itself, and of that which has its hypostasis in other things. Through these causes also, the world is denominated by Timccus, an animal endued with soul and intellect ; being called by him an animal according to its own nature, and the life pervading to it from soul, and which is distributed about it, but animated or endued with soul, according to the presence of a divine soul in it, and endued with intellect, according to intellectual domination. For the supply of life, the government of soul, and the participation of intellect connect and contain the whole of heaven.

If, however, this intellect is essentially intellect, since Timaeus indicating that the essence of intellect is the same with its intellection, denominates it divine ; for he says, that soul receiving a divine intellect led aa upright and wise life ; if, therefore, this be the case, it is necessary that the whole world should be suspended from its divinity, and that motion indeed should be present to this universe from soul, but that its perpetual permanency and sameness of subsistence should be derived from intellect, and that its one union, the conspiration in it and sympathy, and its all-perfect measure should originate from that unity,* from which intellect is uniform, soul is one,' every being is whole and perfect according to its own nature, and every thing secondary together with perfection 3the conspiration in it and sympathy, and its all-perfect measure should originate from that unity,* from which intellect is uniform, soul is one,' every being is whole and perfect according to its own nature, and every thing secondary together with perfection in its own proper nature, participates of another more excellent peculiarity, from an order which is always established above it. For that which is corporeal being alter-motive, derives from soul the representation of self-motive power, and is through it an animal. But soul being self-motive participates of a life according to intellect, and energizing according to time, possesses a neverrceasing energy, and an ever-vigilant life from its

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proximity to intellect. And intellect possessing its life in eternity, always subsisting essentially in energy/ and fixing all its stable intellection at once in intellect, is entirely deific through the cause prior to itself. For it has two-fold energies as Plotinus says, some as intellect, but others as being inebriated with nectar. And elsewhere he observes, that this intellect, by that which is prior to itself and is not intellect, is a god ; in the same manner as soul, by its summit which is above soul, is intellect; and as body, by the power which is prior to body, is soul.

All things therefore, as we have said, are suspended from the one through intellect and soul as media. And intellect indeed has the form of unity ; but soul has the form of intellect ; and the body of the world is vital. But every thing is conjoined with that which is prior to itself. And of the natures posterior to these, one in a more proximate, but the other in a more remote degree, enjoys that which is divine. And divinity, indeed* is prior to intellect, being primarily carried in an intellectual nature ; but intellect is most divine, as being deified prior to other things ; and soul is divine, so far as it requires an intellectual medium. But the body which participates of a soul of ttxis kind, so far as body indeed, is also itself divine ; for the illumination of divine* light pervades supernally as far as to the last dependencies ; yet it is not simply divine; but soul, by looking to intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine.

My reasoning is also the same about each of the whole spheres, and about the bodies they contain.