The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

the summit of beings. Life however is the middle centre of being, which is denominated and is intelligible life. But intellect is the boundary of being, and is intelligible intellect. For in the intelligible there is intellect, and in intellect the intelligible. There however intellect subsists intelligibly, but in intellect, the intelligible subsists intellectually.

And essence indeed is that which is stable in being, and which is woven together with the first principles, and does not depart from the one. But life is that which proceeds from the principles, and is connascent with infinite power. And intellect is that which converts itself to the principles, conjoins the end with the beginning, and produces one intelligible circle. The first of beings therefore is that which is mingled from the first principles, and is triple, one thing which it contains subsisting in it essentially, another vitally, and another intellectually, but all things presubsisting in it essentially. I mean however by the first of beings essence. For essence itself is the summit of all beings, and is as it were the monad of the whole of things. In all things therefore, essence is the first. And in each thing that which is essential is the most ancient, as deriving its subsistence from the Vesta of beings. For the intelligible is especially this. Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, life is intelligence, and being is intelligible. If however every being is mingled, but essence is being itself, prior to all other things essence is that which subsists as mingled from the two principles proceeding from the one. Hence Socrates indicating how the mode of generation in the two principles differs from that of the mixture says, " that God has exhibited bound and

CHAP. IX.

OF PLATO.

p. 171

infinity." For they are unities deriving their subsistence from the one, and as it were luminous patcfactions from the imparticipable and first union. But with respect to producing a mixture, and mingling through the first principles, by how much to make is subordinate to the unfolding into light, and generation to pate/action, by so much is that which is mixed allotted a progression from tfie one, inferior to that of the two principles.

That which is mixed therefore, is intelligible essence, and subsists primarily from [the first] God, from whom infinity also and bound are derived. But it subsists secondarily from the principles posterior to the unical God, I mean from bound and infinity.

.

That which is mixed therefore, is intelligible essence, and subsists primarily from [the first] God, from whom infinity also and bound are derived. But it subsists secondarily from the principles posterior to the unical God, I mean from bound and infinity. For the fourth cause which is effective of the mixture is again God himself; since if any other cause should be admitted besides this, there will no longer be a fourth cause, but a fifth will be introduced. For the first cause was God, who unfolds into light the two principles. But after him are the two principles bound and infinity. And the mixture is the fourth thing. If therefore the cause of the mixture is different from the first divine cause, this cause will be the fifth and not the fourth thing, as Socrates says it is. Farther still, in addition to these things, if we say that God is especially the supplier of union to beings, and the mixture itself of the principles is a union into the hypostasis of being, God is also certainly the cause of this primarily. Moreover, Socrates in the Republic clearly evinces that the good is the cause of being and essence 1o intelligibles, in the same manner as the sun is to visible natures. Is it not therefore necessary, if that which is mixed is primarily being, to refer it to the first God, and to say that .it receives its progression from him ? If also the demiurgus in the Timauis, constitutes the essence of the soul itself by itself from an impartible and a partible essence, which is the same thing as to constitute it from bound and infinity ; for the soul according to bound is similar to the impartible, but according to infinity, to the partible essence;— if therefore the demiurgus mingles the essence of the soul from these, and again separately, from same and different, and if from these being now preexistent, he constitutes the whole soul, must we not much more say that the first God is the cause of the first essence ? That which is mixed therefore, proceeds, as tp. 172 we have said, from the first (Jod, and does not subsist from the principles alone posterior to the one, but proceeds also from these, and is triadic. And in the first place indeed, it participates from God of ineffable union, and the whole of its subsistence. But from bound, it receives hyparxis, and the uniform, and a stable peculiarity. . And from infinity, it receives power, and the occult power which is in itself, of all things.

ed, it participates from God of ineffable union, and the whole of its subsistence. But from bound, it receives hyparxis, and the uniform, and a stable peculiarity. . And from infinity, it receives power, and the occult power which is in itself, of all things. For in short, since it is one and not one, the one is inherent in it according to bound, but the , non-one according to infinity. The mixture however of both these, and its wholeness, arc derived from the first Cod. That which is mixed therefore, is a monad, because it participates of the one; and it is biformed, so far as it proceeds from the two principles ; but it is a triad, so far as iu every mixture, these three things are necessary according to Socrates, viz. beauty, truth, and symmetry. Concerning these things however, we shall speak again.

In what manner, however, essence is that which is first mixed, we shall now explain. For this is of all things the most difficult to discover, viz. what that is which is primarily being, as the Elcan guest also somewhere says ; for it is most dubious how being is not less than non-being. In what manner therefore essence subsists from bound and infinity must be shown. For if bound and infiuity are superessential, essence may appear to have its subsistence from non-essences. How therefore can non-essences produce essence ? Or is not this the case in all other things which subsist through the mixture of each other ? For that which is produced from things mingled together, is not the same with things that are not mingled. For neitheris soul the same with the genera, from which, bcingmingled together, the father generated it, nor is a happy life the same with the life which is according to intellect, or with the life which is according to pleasure, nor is the one in bodies the same with its elements. Hence it is not wonderful, if that which is primarily being, though it is neither bound nor infinity, subsists from both these, and is mixed, superessential natures themselves not being assumed in the mixture of it, but secondary progressions from thein coalescing into the subsistence of essence. Thus therefore being consists of these, as participating of both, possessing indeed the

CHAP. IX.

OF PLATO.

p. 173

uniform from bound, but the generative, and in short, occult multitude from infinity.