The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

contains ? Or if we unfold the natures subsisting between the first and last of things, why do we leave unknown the whole orders of those divine beings, which subsist between the one, and natures that are in any respect deified ? For all these particulars evince, that the whole discourse is defective, with respect to the science of things divine.

But still farther, Socrates, in the Phiiebus, calls upon those that love

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so

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK I.

the contemplation of beings, to use the dividing method, and always to explore the monads of total orders, and the duads, triads, or any other numbers proceeding from these. If this then is rightly determined, it is doubtless necessary that the Parmenides, which employs the whole dialectic method, and discourses about being which is characterized by the one, should neither speculate multitude about the one, nor remain in the one monad of beings, nor in short, introduce to the one which is above all beings, the whole multitude of first beings immediately, but should unfold, as in the first order, such beings as have an occult subsistence, and are allied to the one ; but as in the middle rank, those genera of the Gods which subsist according to progression, and which are more divided than the extremely united, but arc allotted a union more perfect, than such as have proceeded to the utmost ; and should unfold as in the last rank, such as subsist according to the last division of powers, and together with these, such as have a deified essence. If, therefore, the first of the hypotheses is about the one which is above all multitude, it is doubtless necessary that the hypothesis which follows this, should not unfold being itself in an indefinite and indistinct manner, but should deliver all the orders of beings. For the dividing method does not admit, that we should introduce the whole of multitude at once to the one, as Socrates tcsclics us in the Philebus.

Besides, we may evince the truth of what we assert from the very method of the demonstrations. For the first of the conclusions become immediately manifest from the least, most simple, most known, and as it were common conceptions. But those which are next in order to these, become apparent through a greater multitude of conceptions, and such as are more various, And the last conclusions are entirely the most composite.

least, most simple, most known, and as it were common conceptions. But those which are next in order to these, become apparent through a greater multitude of conceptions, and such as are more various, And the last conclusions are entirely the most composite. For he always uses the first conclusions, as subservient to the demonstration of those that follow,1 and presents us with an intellectual paradigm of the order observed in geometry, or other disciplines, in the connexion of these conclusions with each other. If, therefore, discourses bring with fliqm an image of the things of which they are interpreters, and if, as are

' For ixww, it is necessary to read x*p4mr.

Chap. xi.

of PLATO.

p. 31

the evolutions from demonstrations, such must the order necessarily be of the things exhibited, it appears to me to be necessary, that such things as derive their beginning from the most simple principles, must be in every respect of a more primary nature, and must be arranged as conjoined with the one ; but that such as are always multiplied, and suspended from various demonstrations, must have proceeded farther from the subsistence* of the one.

For the demonstrations which have two conclusions* must necessarily contain the conclusions prior to themselves ; but those which contain primary, spontaneous, and simple conceptions, are not necessarily united with such as are more composite, which are exhibited through more abundant media, and which are farther distant from the principle of beings. It appears therefore, that some of the conclusions are indicative of more divine orders, but others, of such as are more subordinate; some, of more united, and others, of more multiplied orders ; and again, some, of more uniform, and others, of more multiform progressions. For demonstrations are universally from causes, and things first. If, therefore, first are the causes of second conclusions, there is an order of causes, and things caused, in the multitude of the conclusions. For, indeed, to confound all tilings, and speculate them indefinitely in one, neither accords with the nature of things, nor the science of Plato.

CHAPTER XI.

Again, therefore, let us discuss this affair in another way, and view with the dianbetic power, where any thing futile is delivered. For let it be said, if you please, and we will first of all allow it, that the conclusions of this second hypothesis are about true being.

e, let us discuss this affair in another way, and view with the dianbetic power, where any thing futile is delivered. For let it be said, if you please, and we will first of all allow it, that the conclusions of this second hypothesis are about true being. But as this is multitude, and* not only one itself, like the one prior to beings ; for being is that

• For acmetoffmi, it U necessary to read wm»i«(.

p. 32

which is passive to the one, as the Elcan guest in theSophista informs us ; and as it is universally acknowledged by our opponents, who establish that which is first as the one, but intellect, as one many, soul, as one and many, and body, as many and one : — as therefore, this has been asserted a thousand times, I mean that in true being there is multitude together with union, whether will they say that these things harmonise with the whole of being, but not with its parts, or both with the whole and its parts ? And again, we ask them, whether they attribute all things to each part of being, or whether they ascribe different things to different parts ?

If, therefore, they are of opinion, that each particular should alone harmonize with the whole of being, being will consist of non-beings, that which is moved, of things immoveable, that which abides, of things deprived of permanency, and universally, all tilings will consist of their opposites, and we shall no longer agree with the discourse of Parmenides, who says that the parts of being characterized by the one, are in a certain respect wholes, and that each of them is one and being, in a manner similar to the whole. But if we attribute all things to each part, and there is nothing which we do not make all things, how can the summit of being, and that which is most eminently one, contain a wholeness, and an incomprehensible multitude of parts ? How can it at one and the same time contain the whole of number, figure, motion and permanency, and in short all forms and genera? For these differ from each other, and the hypothesis will assert things impossible. For things near to, will be similarly multiplied with things remote from the one, and that which is first, will not be a less multitude than that which is last ; nor again, will the last of things be a less one than the first, and things in the middle will have no difference with respect to division from the extremes.