The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

ing the first,, but alone the king of all things, nor asserting that some things are about him, as he says that second things are about that which is second, and third things about that which is third, but* he says, in short, that alt things are about him. And to the other kings, indeed, he introduces number and a divided kingdom ; but to the king of all things he neither attributes a part of number, nor a distribution of dominion opposite tothat of the others. Such a mode of words, therefore, neither connumerates the king of all things with the other kings* nor co-arranges him as the leader of a triad with the second and third power. For of a triad ic division the first monad, indeed, is the leader of first orders, and which are co-ordinate with itself ; but the second of second ; and the third of third orders. If, however, some one should apprehend that the first monad isthe leader of all things, so as to comprehend at once both second and third allotments ; yet the cause which subsists according to comprehension is different from that which similarly pervades to all things. And to the king of all things, indeed, all things are subject according to one reaV son and one order ; but to the first of the triad, things first are subjected according to the same order ; and it is necessary that things second and third should be subservient according to their communion with the remaining kings. Does not, therefore, what is here said by Plato remarkably celebrate the exempt nature of the first cause, and his un-coordinatioa with the other kingdoms of the Gods ? Since he says that this cause similarly reigtis over all things, that all things subsist about biro, and that for his sake essence and energy are inherent in all things.

If also Socrates in the Republic clearly' teaches that the sun reigns over the world analogous to the good, let no one dare to accuse this analogy as connumerating the good with the king of mundane natures. For unless* together with the similitude of secondary causes to the first principles, we think fit to preserve that exempt dominion [of the first chap. vm.

1 For x<u here, it it necessary to read aXXmi

* For <ro$at{, it is necessary to read

* In the original ^ is wanting after »u.

OF PLATO.

p. 131

cause] it will be impossible for us to evince that the super-mundane kings have their allotment analogous to the first cause, who subsists prior to the whole of things according to one transcendency.

after »u.

chap. vm.

OF PLATO.

p. 131

cause] it will be impossible for us to evince that the super-mundane kings have their allotment analogous to the first cause, who subsists prior to the whole of things according to one transcendency. But what occasion is there to be prolix ? For Plato indeed calls the first God king; but he does not think fit to give the others the same appellation, not only in the beginning of what he says about the first, but shortly after, he adds : " About the king himself and the natures of which I have spoken there is nothing of this kind." The first God, therefore, alone is called king. But he is called not only the king of things first, in the same manner as the second of things second, and the third of things third, but as the cause at once of all being and all beauty. Hence the first God precedes the other causes in an exempt and uniform manner, and according to a transcendency of the whole of things, and is neither celebrated by Plato as co-ordinated with them, nor as the leader of a triad.

That these things, however, are asserted by Plato about the first God we shall learn by recurring a little to the preceding words, which are as follow : " You say, that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the particulars respecting the first nature. I must speak to you, therefore, in enigmas, that in case the letter should be intercepted, either by .land or sea, he who reads it may not understand this part of its contents. All things are situated about the king of all ; and all things are for his sake ; and he is the cause of every thing beautiful." In these words, therefore, Plato proposing to purify our conceptions about the first principle through enigmas, celebrates the king of all tilings, and refers to him the cause of the whole of things beautiful and good. Who, therefore, is the king of all things, except the unical God who is exempt from all things, who produces all things from himself, and is the leader of all orders according to one cause ? Who is he that converts all ends to himself, and establishes them about himself? For if you call him, for whose sake all things subsist, the end of all ends, and the primogenial cause, you will not deviate from the truth concerning him.

ing to one cause ? Who is he that converts all ends to himself, and establishes them about himself? For if you call him, for whose sake all things subsist, the end of all ends, and the primogenial cause, you will not deviate from the truth concerning him. Who is he that is the cause of all beautiful things, shining upon them with divine light, and who encloses that which is deformed and without measure, and the most obscure of all things in the extremity of the universe?

p. 132

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK It,

If you are willing also from the words of Plato that follow the preceding, we will show that to be the recipient neither of language nor of knowledge is adapted to the first principle. For the words : " This your inquiry concerning the cause of all beautiful things is as of a nature endue I with a certain quality," are to be referred to this principle. For it is not possible to apprehend it intellectually, because it is unknown, nor to unfold it, because it is uncircumscribed ; but whatever you may say of it, you will speak as of a certain thing ; and you will speak indeed about it, but you will not speak it. For speaking of the things of which it is the cause, we are unable to say, or to apprehend through intelligence what it is. Here therefore, the addition of quality, and the busy energy of the soul, remove it from the goodness which is exempt from all things, by the redundancy of its conceptions about it. This likewise draws the soul down to kindred, connate, and multiform intelligiblcs, and prevents her from receiving that which is characterized by unity, and is occult in the participation of the good. And it is not only proper that the human soul should be purified from things co-ordinate with itself in the union and communion with that which is first, and that for this purpose it should leave all the multitude of itself behind, and exciting its own hyparxia, approach with closed eyes, as it is said, to the king of all things, and participate of his light, as much as this is lawful for it to accomplish ; but intellect also, which is prior to us, and all divine natures, by their highest unions, superessential torches, and first hyparxes are united to that which is first, and always participate of its exuberant fulness ; and this not so far as they are that which they are, but so far as they are exempt from things allied to themselves, and converge to the one principle of all.