The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

tlie one which is participated derives its subsistence from the im participate union. The one * therefore is not in these triads, but the one being and whole. But with respect to the all, it is evident that it is in the extremity of the intelligible order. For that which is in every respect perfect, and all intelligible multitude, have their subsistence in that extremity. But whole is in the middle centre, and in the bond of the intelligible breadth. For whole is adapted to have a subsistence prior to the all ; since the all is a whole, but whole is not necessarily all. For the all is divided multitude ; but that which contains multitude in itself, and which is not yet separated is whole. And this especially pertains to eternity. For eternity is the measure of all intelligible multitude, just as

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whole is the coherence and union of the all. But the one being is in the first triad. For the me is especially the peculiarity of this triad, as Timseus also has demonstrated. And being which is occultly and intelligibly being, and which is the cause of essence to all other things, primarily shines forth there. Again therefore, following the Eiean guest, three triads present themselves to our view ; the first indeed according to the one being ; the second according to whole ; and the third according to the all. To which also the demiurgus of the universe looking, adorns the sensible universe, defining the visible nature with reference to that intelligible all ; but time with reference to the intelligible wholeness. On which account also time is continued. And as the intelligible whole comprehends two parts, but contains the parl6 in one boundary, after the same manner, time also is bounded by the now, but by its twofold parts is infinite. These things therefore, we shall shortly after more fully discuss when we speak concerning the Parmenides. For the conceptions of the Blean guest are the pretekia of the mysteries of the Parmenides. Before however we turn to the Parmenides, let us discuss, if it is agreeable to you, the three triads from the beginning, collecting the conception of Plato from his assertions that are scattered in many places.

CHAPTER XXI.

There are three triads therefore, as we have frequently observed, and they are divided after this manner into bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. Hence there are triple intelligible bounds, triple inBnities, and triple mixtures.

n many places.

CHAPTER XXI.

There are three triads therefore, as we have frequently observed, and they are divided after this manner into bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. Hence there are triple intelligible bounds, triple inBnities, and triple mixtures. But of every intelligible triad, the bound in each is denominated father; the infinite, power; and that which is mixed, intellect. And let not any one apprehend that these names are foreign from the philosophy of Plato. For it will appear that he uses these appellations

CHAP XXI.

OF PLATO.

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in the before mentioned triads more than any one. For be denominate* the first God father and lord in his Epistles- It is evident however, that as the first God surpasses oven the paternal order, the first paternal is in the intelligible Gods. For these arc they that are most eminently allied to the one, and that intelligibly unfold his ineffable and unknown union. If therefore the first God is denominated one and father from the nature* that proximately proceed from him, — if this be the case, as the intelligible Gods are primarily unities, so likewise they are primarily fathers. For Plato gives names to the inefTable in a twofold respect, either from the summits of beings, or from all beings. For through these the transcendency of the one is known. Moreover, the Elean guest calls being that which is powerful and power. The first power therefore exists prior to being, and is united to the father ; but it particularly accords with being, which also it fills. Hence being as participating of power is denominated powerful; but as united to it, and producing all beings according to it, it is called power. If however both Plato himself, and his most genuine disciples, frequently call all [true] beings intellect (on which account, in many places they make three principles, the good, intellect and soul, denominating every [true] being intellect) you will also have the third in these intellect. But it is necessary not to be ignorant of the difference. For with respect to intellect, one kind is intellect as with reference to hyparxis. For when we denominate the unity in each triad intelligible, as the abject of desire to being, and as filling being, then we call that which ranks as the third in the triad intellect. For it is intelligible as essence and intellect, but not as the intellect of essence, but of father and deity. For every participated deity is intelligible, as being the plenitude of its participant.

all that which ranks as the third in the triad intellect. For it is intelligible as essence and intellect, but not as the intellect of essence, but of father and deity. For every participated deity is intelligible, as being the plenitude of its participant. But another kind is intellect which is the intellect of essence ; according to which we say that the being of the third triad, is the intellect of that which is primarily being. For this is essential intellect, being allotted its own essence by energising.' For all things are essentially in it, and both the more simple genera, and the primary paradigms ; for it is intelligible intellect. But the third kind is intellectual

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intellect, which subsists analogous to intelligible intellect, is conjoined with it, and is filled from it, possessing intellectually those things which are in the other intelligibly. And in short, it is necessary every where that such things as are first according to each series, should have the form of the things that are prior to them. Hence also they are called things first, and possess a certain transcendency of essence towards coordinate natures. Since therefore, that which is prior to intelligibles is God, the first intelligibles are Gods and unities. And since the intelligible is essential, the first intellects are essences. Since also intellect is every where according to its own nature intellectual, the first souls are intellectual. Because likewise, souls are the plenitudes of life, the first of bodies are most vital. And because the bodies that are perpetual are moved in a circle, the summits of material bodies are moved in conjunction with those bodies that are perpetual. This therefore is the cause why the unities are frequently called intelligibles, and beings intelligible intellects.

That Plato however knew this triad, I mean father, power and intellect, we shall learn by looking to the demiurgic order. For in this the triad is most remarkably apparent. Hence, on account of its union with the intelligible, it is filled with this triad, and possesses these things in a more divided manner than animal itself, or intelligible eternity.