The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

s is still more venerable and essentially more transcendent than that of daemons; which divine souls we say are primarily self-motive, and are the fountains and principles of the life divided about bodies, and through which bodies obtain a renovated immortality. If, however, prior to these you conceive the Gods themselves, and the immortality in them, and how in the Banquet Diotima does not attribute an immortality of this kind even to daemons, but defines it to subsist in the Gods alone, such an immortality as this will appear to you to be separate, and exempt from the whole of things. For there eternity subsists, which is the fountain of all immortality, and through it all things live and possess life, some things indeed a perpetual life, but others a life dispersed into non-being. In short, therefore, that which is divine is immortal so far as it generates and comprehends in itself a perpetual life. For it is immortal, not as participating of life, but as the supplier of a divine life, and as deifying life itself, whether you are willing to call such a life intelligible, or by any other name.

In the next place let us direct our attention to the intelligible. It is denominated, therefore, in opposition to that which is sensible and which is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. For the intelligible is first unfolded into light in the most principal causes. For soul is indeed intelligible, is of this allotment, is exempt from sensibles, and obtains an essence separated from them. Prior to soul also intellect is intelligible; for we rather think it fit to arrange soul in the middle, than to connumerate it with the first essences. That likewise is denominated intelligible, which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes intelligence, and is itself by itself perfective of it, and which Timams arranges prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy, in the order of a paradigm. But beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is defined according to iCHAP.XXV1I. OF PLATO. 8.5 union itself, aud a divine hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of desire to intellect, as perfecting and comprehending intellect, and as the plenitude of being. In one way, therefore, we must denominate the intelligible as the hyparxis of the Gods ; in another way as true being and the first essence ; in another way as intellect and all intellectual life ; and in another way as soul and the psychical order. It is likewise necessary not to fashion the different natures of things conformably to names.

; in another way as true being and the first essence ; in another way as intellect and all intellectual life ; and in another way as soul and the psychical order. It is likewise necessary not to fashion the different natures of things conformably to names. Such, therefore, is the order of this triad; so that what is divine indeed is umningled and ranks as the first ; that which is immortal is the second ; and that which is intelligible the third. For the first of these is deified being ; the second is life subsisting according to the immortality of the Gods; and the third is intellect, which is denominated intelligible in consequence of being replete with union.

CHAPTER XXVII.

A fter this, it follows in the next place, that we should consider the uniform, the indissoluble, and that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence, from the same causes, and these as the precursors of, and pervading through all the divine orders. For the uniform, indeed, has the highest subsistence, is present with the divine monad, and appears to lie especially adapted to that which is primarily being,' and in which also every participable genus of unities ends. For the one is prior to these, as will be evident as we proceed. But the indissoluble is the second. For it comprehends and binds the extremes according to divine union ; since the dissoluble is such as it is through the want of connexion and of a power which collects multitude into one. And that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence is eternal, and is full of the perpetuity of the

' For t» o> it is necewarj to read ry om.

p. 86

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK 1.

Gods; from which also tl»e participation of immortality and eternal sameness is derived to other things. The uniform, therefore, pertains to the same thing as the divine ; but the indissoluble to the same thing as the immortal ; and that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence we must refer to the intelligible.

And do you not see how these are severally after a manner co-adapted to each other? For the first of tliesc, through the first unity which is participated by being is, as it is fit it should be, uniform. For if a God subsists according to the one, that which is divine will doubtless be uniform. But that which through one cause of life is immortal, is also similarly indissoluble.

ity which is participated by being is, as it is fit it should be, uniform. For if a God subsists according to the one, that which is divine will doubtless be uniform. But that which through one cause of life is immortal, is also similarly indissoluble. For life is the bond of dissoluble natures ; which also Timaeus indicating to us, opposes the dissoluble to the immortal: " for you are not immortal, says the demiurgus, yet you shall never be dissolved, nor be subject ' to the fataJity of death." Every thing mortal, therefore, is dissoluble ; but the immortal is indissoluble. That, however, which has a renovated immortality is for the same reason neither indissoluble, nor mortal. For being in the middle of both it is neither of the extremes, according to each opposition. But the third of these being established according to the plenitude of whole intelligible^ subsists at once and is invariably the same. For tlie intelligible is the cause of sameness and of eternal permanency; and intellect through this is entirely eternal. These triads, therefore, proceed from the first and most principal causes, in the same manner as we demonstrated of the before-mentioned triads. But these things, indeed, we shall consider hereafter.

These things, therefore, being discussed, let us direct our attention to the uobegottcn in divine natures, and unfold what we assert it to be. For we say that all [true] being is without generation, and Socrates demonstrates in the Phajdrus, that souls are unbegotten. Prior to these, also, the Gods themselves are established above generations and a subsistence according to time. How, therefore, shall we define the unbegotten when applied to a divine nature, and according to what reason ? Is it because divinity is exempt from all generation, uot only from that which subsists

' For yw-vif read tw£kt9«.

CHAP. XXVII.

OF PLATO.

p. 87

in the parts of time, such as wc assert the generation of material natures to be, nor from that only which is extended into the whole of time, such as Timseus demonstrates the generation of the celestial bodies to be, but also from the psychical generation ? Since Timseus denominates this to be unbegotten according to time, but to be the best of generated natures. And in short, a divine nature is exempt from all division and essential separation. For the progression of the Gods is always according to a union of secondary natures, which are uniformly established in the natures prior to them, the things producing containing in themselves the things produced.