The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

y where denominates it, intelligible.

Nevertheless, because forms are first separated in it, and because it is all-perfect, it subsists in the third order of intelligibles. For neither that which is primarily, nor that which is secondarily being,1 is all-perfect. For the former is beyond all separation ; but the latter generates indeed, and is parturient with intelligibles, but is not yet the multitude of beings. If therefore neither of these is multitude, how can either of them be all-perfect multitude ? If however all-perfect multitude shines forth in the third triad of intelligibles, as wa9 a little before demonstrated, but animal itself is the first paradigm (for it is comprehensive of all intelligible animals, is an only-begotten paradigm, and is not conjoined with any other principle) it is necessary that animal itself should be established according to this order. For either there will not be an intelligible paradigm, (and in this case, how will sensibles be images of intelligibles? or how will the intelligible Gods be the fathers of the whole of things >) or tf there is, it is the third in intelligibles. For the natures which are prior to the triad in intelligibles, are not all-perfect ; since they are exempt from the division into multitude. But the natures posterior to it are not only-begotten. For they proceed together with others ; the male indeed, with the female, and those that are of a demiurgic together with those that are of a generative characteristic Nor are they the roost beautiful of intelligibles ; for beauty is in the intelligible. But animal itself is all-perfect, and at the same time only begotten. The first paradigm of beings therefore, is arranged in the third triad of intelligibles. Moreover, animal itself is eternal, as Timeeus himself says. For says he, "the nature of animal is eternal." And again, in another place he asserts, " that the paradigm is through all eternity being." If therefore it is eternal, it participates of eternity. And if that which participates is every where secondary to that which is participated, animal itself is secondary to eternity. And if it is through all eternity being, it is filled with the whole power of eternity. If this however be the case, it subsists proximately

' ro. Intelligible life, or life iuelf, or the fir* life.
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after eternity. For that which enjoys the whole of causes, is arranged proximately after them.

CHAPTER XVI.

subsists proximately

' ro. Intelligible life, or life iuelf, or the fir* life.
Proc. Vol. I. $ A

p. 186

after eternity. For that which enjoys the whole of causes, is arranged proximately after them.

CHAPTER XVI.

Moreover, if eternity has the same ratio to intelligible animal, which, time has to that which is sensible, but the universe proximately participates of time (for time was generated together with the uiyverse) it is certainly necessary that animal itself should primarily participate of eternity. Eternity therefore is beyond the first paradigm. For eternity indeed measures the existence of animal itself : but animal itself is measured and filled with perpetuity from it. To which may bemadded, that we assert eternity to be the cause of immortality to all things. Hence eternity is that which is primarily immortal. For as that which is primarily being is the cause of existence to all things, but that which is effective of form is itself prior to other forms, so that which is the cause of perpetuity and immortality, is itself primarily inunortal. The daemoniacal Aristotle also rightly- calls eternity immortal and divine, and that from whence the existence and life of all things are suspended. If however it is that which is primarily immortal, and not according to participation, but is as it were immortality and perpetuity, it will be life, possessing from itself the ever, and exuberantly scattering the power of perpetuity, and extending it to other things, so far as each is naturally adapted to receive it. For the immortal is in life, and subsists together with life. Hence Socrates in the Phredo," after many and beautiful demonstrations of the psychical immortality, says, " God therefore, my dear Cebes, and the form itself of life, are much more immortal." Hence, intelligible life, and the God who is connective of this life, primarily possess the immortal, and are the fountain of the whole of perpetuity. But

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CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 187

this is eternity. Eternity therefore has its subsistence in life, and will be established in the middle of the intelligible order.

Farther still, it is necessary to assert that intelligible eternity is one of these thiee things, viz. that it subsists either according to being, or according to life, or according to intelligible intellect. But being, as the Elean guest says, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved.

elligible eternity is one of these thiee things, viz. that it subsists either according to being, or according to life, or according to intelligible intellect. But being, as the Elean guest says, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved. For if being is being to all things, and essence is a thing of this kind, much more must this be the case with intelligible essence and that which is primarily being. For they are nothing eke than essence only. But being unfolds motion and permanency, and the other genera of beings, in the second and third progressions of itself. The first being therefore, as we have said, is at one and tlie same time exempt from motion and permanency. But eternity according to Timeeus abides in one. Hence also time imitates in its motion the intelligible permanency of eternity. Eternity therefore does not subsist according to that which is primarily being, nor yet according to intelligible intellect.' For neither is soul time, which is moved through the whole of time. And in short, in divine beings, that which is participated is every where established above that which participates. But the eternal participates of eternity, just as that which is temporal participates of time. Eternity therefore is prior to intelligible intellect, and posterior to being ; so that it is established in the middle of the intelligible breadth. And as animal itself is eternal, so likewise eternity is that which is always being. For as animal itself participates of eternity, so eternity participates of being, and is the cause of existence, of perpetual life, and intellection, and measures the essences, powers and energies of all things.

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ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK III.

CHAPTER XVII.

Stock, however, eternity subsists according to the middle centre of inteliigibles, and animal itself according to the extremity of them, and the most splendid of that which is intelligible, what is that which is the first of intclligibles, and how is it denominated by Timaeus? He says therelore of eternity, that while it abides in one, time proceeds according to number; and that by motion it adumbrates the permanency of eternity, but by number, its stable union. What therefore is that one, in which Timaeus says eternity abides ? For it is necessary either to say that it is the one of eternity, or the one which transcends all intelligibles, or the one of the first triad.