The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

gainst our opponents, that the Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions it contains, will accomplish all you desire. For in this dialogue all the divine genera proceed inorder from the first cause, and evince their mutual connexion and dependence on each other. And those which are highest indeed, connate with the one, and of a primary nature, are allotted a unica), occult and simple form of hyparxis ; but such as are last, are multiplied, are distributed into many parts, and are exuberant in number, but inferior in power to such as are of a higher order ; and such as are middle, according to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but more simple than their.proper progeny. And in short, all the axioms of the theologic science, appear in perfection in this dialogue, and all the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connexion. So that this is nothing else than the. celebraled; generation of the Gods and the procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of wholes. The Parmenides, therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato, the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, the before mentioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the Gods,

CHAP. VIII.

OF PLATO.

and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. And it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to these dialogue*, and these again to the one and all-perfect theory of the Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit reasons assimilated to things, of which, according to the Platonic Timacus, they are interpreters, Such then is our answer to the objection which may be urged against us ; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the Parmenides ; just as the* Timams is acknowledged by all who are in the least degree intelligent, to' contain the whole science about nature.

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CHAPTER VIII.

I appear, however, by these means, to have excited for myself a twofold contest against those who attempt to investigate the writings of Plato ; and I see two sorts of persons, who will oppose what has been said. One of these does not think proper to explore any other design in the Parmenides, than exercise through opposite arguments, or to introduce in this dialogue a croud of arcane and intellectual dogmas, which are foreign from its intention.

ose what has been said. One of these does not think proper to explore any other design in the Parmenides, than exercise through opposite arguments, or to introduce in this dialogue a croud of arcane and intellectual dogmas, which are foreign from its intention. But the other sort, who are more venerable than these, and lovers of forms assert, that one of the hypotheses is about the first God, another about the second God, and the whole of an intellectual nature, and a third, about the natures posterior to this, whether they are the more excellent genera, or souls, or any other kind of beings. For the investigation of these particulars does not pertain to the present discourse.

These, therefore, distribute three of the hypotheses after this manner. But they do not think proper to busy themselves about the multitude of Gods, the intelligible, and the intellectual genera, the supermundane and mundane natures, or to unfold all these by division, or busily explorep. 12 them. For according to them, though Plato in the second hypothesis* treats about intellectual beings, yet the nature of intellect is one, simple and indivisible. Against both these therefore, must be contend, who entertains that opinion of the Parmenides, which we have before men* tioned. The contest however against these is not equal. But those who make the Parmenides a logical exercise, are again attacked by those, who embrace the divine mode of interpretation. And those who do upt, unfold the multitude of beings, and the orders of divine natures, are indeed, as Homer says, is every respect venerable and skilful menj but yet for the sake of the Platonic philosophy, we must doubt against them,' following in this our leader to the most holy and mystic truth. It is proper likewise to relate as far as contributes to our purpose, what appears to us to be the truth respecting the hypotheses of the Parmenides \ for thus perhaps by a reasoning process, we may embrace the whole theology of Plato.

CHAPTER IX.

, Ijr the first place then, let us consider those, who draw down the design of this dialogue from the truth of things to a logical exercise, and see whether they can possibly accord with the writings of Plato. It is therefore evident to every one, that Parmenides proposes to himself to deliver in reality the dialectic method, and that with this view he cursorily assumes it in a similar manner in each of the things which have a real being, as, in sameness, difference, similitude, dissimilitude, motion, and permanency, &c.

oposes to himself to deliver in reality the dialectic method, and that with this view he cursorily assumes it in a similar manner in each of the things which have a real being, as, in sameness, difference, similitude, dissimilitude, motion, and permanency, &c. ; exhorting at the same time, those who desire to discover the nature of each of these in an orderly method, to this exercise, as to a great contest. He likewise asserts that it was by no means an easy undertaking to him who was so much advanced in years, assimilates himself to the Ibycean horse, and presents us with every argument to prove that this method is a serious undertaking, and not a contest consisting in

CHAP. IX. OP PLATO. S3

mere words. How therefore, is it possible, that we can refer to empty arguments those conceptions ' about which the great Parmenides, evincing that they require much serious discussion, composed this discourse ? How likewise is it reasonable to suppose that an aged man would busy himself with mere verbal contests, and that he who loved to speculate the truth of things, would bestow so much study on this method,— he who considered every thing else, as having no real existence, and who ascended to the high watch-tower of being itself? Indeed, he who admits this must suppose that Parmenides is satirized by Plato in this dialogue, by thus representing him drawn down to juvenile contests, from the most intellectual visions of the soul.

But if you are willing, let us consider in addition to the above, what ***rmenidei ^ onuses, and on what subject engaging to speak, he entered on thb discussiOw- Wp., it potthen about being according to his doctrine, and the unity of all beiugsTtj WlUtliwwiondjnp; himself, his design was concealed from the vulgar, while he exhorts us to conSP^ipPMfc tude of beings into one undivided union ? If, therefore, this is the one being, or that which is the highest, and which is perfectly established above the reasons conversant with opinion, is it not absurd to confound dogmas about intelligibles with doxastic arguments? Tor indeed, such a form of discourse is not adapted to the hypothesis about true beings, nor does the intellection of unapparent and separate causes harmonise with dialectic exercises; but these differ from each other, so far as intellect is established above opinion, as Timaeus informs us, and not Timaeus only, but likewise the daemoniacal Aristotle, who, discoursing on a power of this kind, exhorts us to make our investigations, ueitber about things perfectly unapparent to us, nor about such as