The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

natures placed above them. Nor must you wonder if being w hich is one is the cause of angels, but the one being of daemons. Fof in one place, being which is one is a part of the one being, but in another the one being is a part of being which is one. And here, indeed, the union is essential, but there essence has the form of the one. For the summit of being which is one is a thing of this kind. Deservedly, therefore, is intelligible multitude all-powerful, and intelligible animal all-perfect, as being at once the cause of all things, and this as fur as to the last of things, Plato all but exclaiming, [in the words of the Ciialdfean Oracle,] " Thence a fiery whirlwind sweeping along, obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the same time into the cavities of the worlds." For the divine unities proceeding gradually, generate the multitude of all mundane natures. This triad, therefore, is the fountain and cause of all things : and from it all the life, and all the progression of the Gods, and the genera superior to us, and of mortal animals subsist. For it produces totally and uniformly all things, and binds to itself the whole principles of the divisible rivers of vivification, and the production of forms.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Again, therefore, let us recur from the divided theory of intelligible* to the all-perfect and one science of them, and let us say to ourselves, that this intelligible genus of the Gods is unically exempt from all the other divine orders, and is neither called intelligible as known by a partial intellect, nor as comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, nor yet as^preexisting in all-perfect intellect. For it transcends both totalp. 221 and partial intelligible*, and exists prior to all intellectual objects, being an imparticipable and divine intelligible. Hence, also, it is allotted the same transcendency with respect to all the intelligible orders, as the one with respect to every genus of the Gods. For this intelligible is imparticipable, and supernally fills the divine and intellectual orders. For if every intellect is intelligible to itself, it possesses this property through the intelligible Gods. For plenitude is derived to all tilings from thence. And thus the intelligible is at the same time exempt from intellect, existing itself by itself; and at-tbe same time the intelligible is not external to intellect.

is property through the intelligible Gods. For plenitude is derived to all tilings from thence. And thus the intelligible is at the same time exempt from intellect, existing itself by itself; and at-tbe same time the intelligible is not external to intellect. For there is an intelligible which is conjoined with intellect; the co-ordinate being derived from that which is exempt, the participated from that which is imparticipable, that which is inherent from that which is preexistent, and that which is multiplied from that which is uniform. Intelligible simplicity, therefore, must not be defined to be such as that which we are accustomed to assert of intelligibles. For in these the we becomes equal to multitude, and separation to the uniform sameness of essence. But intelligible simplicity is uniform, without separation and occult, excelling every divisible form of life, and intellectual multitude. Hence 1 do not place intelligible simplicity in the order of idea. For this form b partial, and is subordinate to intelligible union. But I consider it as the hypai xis of divine natures, and as generative of the whole of the good which is distributed to all divine natures, and in which the Gods themselves subsist. For the goodness of the Gods, is neither form nor habit, but the plenitude of divine self-sufficiency and divine power, according to which the Gods fill all things with good. In a much greater degree, therefore, are the intelligible Gods, because they are united tothe good, wholly full of superessential goodness, and being established in this, they contain in it the supreme hyparxis of themselves. Very properly, therefore, do we say that the intelligible Gods unfold the ineffable principle of all things, and his admirable transcendency and union; subsisting themselves indeed occultly, but comprehending multitude uniformly and unically ; reigning over the whole of things exemptly, and being uncoordinated with all the other Gods. For as the good illuminates all things with superessential light, and exhibits the Gods who are the fap. 222thers of all things, so likewise the intelligible genus of Gods, according to a similitude to the good, imparts from itself to all the secondary Gods, intelligible plenitude. Hence, according to each distribution of the Gods, there is an appropriate intelligible multitude, just as a monad analogous to the good exists prior to each of the divine orders. And this monad indeed is the preexistent leader of union to secondary natures. But in.

according to each distribution of the Gods, there is an appropriate intelligible multitude, just as a monad analogous to the good exists prior to each of the divine orders. And this monad indeed is the preexistent leader of union to secondary natures. But in. telligible multitude is the preexistent source of beauty, self-sufficiency, power, essence, and all intelligible goods. For the Gods antecedently and intelligibly comprehend all intellectual natures, and contain in themselves all ' things according to supreme union.

• Instead of rm xaf nwwiv, it it requisite to read varra xoJf tvtunv, and then the end of this book will be co mplete, and not defective is the Latin translatorPortus imagined it was.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

Let the discussion, therefore, of the intelligible Gods, unfolding the mystic doctrine of Plato concerning them be here terminated by us. But it entirely follows in the next place, that we should consider after the same manner the narration concerning the intellectual Gods. Since, however, of intellectuals some are both intelligible and intellectual, viz. such as according to the Oracle perceiving intellectually are at the same time intellectually perceived ; but others are intellectual only; — this being the case, beginning from those that are intellectual and at the same time intelligible, we will in the 6rst place determine what pertains to them in common, from which we shall render the doctrine concerning each order of them more perspicuous. Again, therefore, let us recal to our memory those things which we a little before demonstrated, viz. that there are three total monads which arc entirely beyond the Gods that arc divided according to parts, viz. essence, life arid intellect. And these prior to the partial participate of the superessential unities. Essence, however, is exempt from the rest. Life is allotted the middle order. But intellect converts the end of this triad to the beginning. -And all these are indeed intelligibly in essence; but intelligibly and intellectually in life; and intellec-

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• tually in intellect. And as secondary natures always participate of the natures placed above them, but these prior to participation presubsist themselves by themselves; and as in each order there are these three things, the cause of abiding, the cause of proceeding, and the cause of conversion, though intellect is more formalized according to conversion, but life according to progression, and essence according to permanency ; — this being the case, it is