The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

he Gqds, which are both entire and firm, and expand to the mystic inspection of intelligible spectacles, as Socrates says in the Phaedrus. For telcte precedes muesis, and muesis, epopteia. Hence we are initiated \jeleioumetha] in ascending, by the perfective Gods. But we view with closed eyes [i. e. with the pure soul itself, muoumetha] entire and stable appearances, through the connective Gods, with whom there is the intellectual wholeness, and the firm establishment of souls. And we become fixed in, and spectators of [epopteuomen] the intelligible watch tower, through the Gods who are the collectors of wholes. We speak indeed of all these things as with reference to the intelligible, but we obtain a different thing according to a different order. For the perfective Gods initiate us in the intelligible through themselves. And the collective monads are through themselves the leaders of the inspection of intelligibles. And there are indeed many

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ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK IV

steps of ascent, but all of them extend to the paternal port, and the paternal initiation, in which may the tdetarchs, who are the leaders of all good, likewise establish us, illuminating us not by words, but by deeds. May they also think us worthy of being filled with intelligible beauty under the mighty Jupiter, and perfectly free us from those evils about generation with which we are now surrounded as with a wall. May they likewise impart to us by illumination this most beautiful fruit of the present theory, which, following the divine Plato, we have sufficiently delivered to those who love the contemplation of truth.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Let us now therefore again follow Parmenides in another way, who after the intelligible triads generates the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual orders, and unfolds the continued progression of divine natures, through successive conclusions. For the connexion of the words, and their dependance on each other, imitates the indissoluble order of things, which always conjoins middles to extremes, and proceeds through middle genera to the last progressions of beings. This therefore we must survey prior to the several intellectual conceptions, how the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual triads, proceed analogous to the intelligible triads, that we may comprehend by a reasoning process the well-arranged order of things. There were three intelligible triads therefore, via. the one being, whole, and infinite multitude. And three intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual triads, have also presented themselves to our view, viz.

easoning process the well-arranged order of things. There were three intelligible triads therefore, via. the one being, whole, and infinite multitude. And three intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual triads, have also presented themselves to our view, viz. number, whole, and the perfect. Hence from the one being, number is derived ; from the intelligible whole, the whole that is in these; and from infinite multitude, the perfect. For the chap. xxvn.

OF PLATO.

infinite which is there was all-powerful, and all-perfect, comprehending indeed all tilings, but being itself incomprehensible. To the all-powerful therefore and all-perfect, the perfect is analogous, possessing a perfection which is intellectual, and secondary to the first effective and intelligible perfection. The whole also which is both intelligible and intellectual is allied to the intelligible whole, but it differs from it, so far as the latter possesses wholeness according to the one union of the one being ; but the one of the former appears to be itself by itself a whole, consisting of unical parts, and being appears to consist of many beings. These wholenesses therefore, being divided, differ from the wholeness which precedes according to union and is intelligible. For the wholenesses of this whole are parts of the intelligible wholeness.

In the third place therefore, we must consider number as analogous to the one being. For the one being is there indeed occultly, intelligibly, and paternally ; but here in conjunction with difference it generates number, which constitutes the separation of forms and reasons.' For difference itself first shines forth in this order, being power indeed, and the duad in intelligibles ; but here it is maternal, and a prolific fountain. For there power was collective of the one, and the one being ; on which account also it was ineffable, as existing occultly in the one and in hyparxis. But here difference separates indeed being and the one. After this likewise, it multiplies the one proceeding generatively, and calls forth being into second and third progressions ; breaking indeed being into many beings, and dividing the one into more partial unities. But according to each of these completing the decrements, the wholes remaining. Very properly therefore does Plato make the negations of the one from this. For here the many subsist, through difference which divides being and the one ; since the whole also which is denied of the one, is intellectual and not intelligible.

wholes remaining. Very properly therefore does Plato make the negations of the one from this. For here the many subsist, through difference which divides being and the one ; since the whole also which is denied of the one, is intellectual and not intelligible. The negation therefore says that the one is not a whole, so that the affirmation is, the one is a whole. This whole however is intellectual and not intelligible. Parmenides also denies the many as follows : " The one is not many ;" but the opposite

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' For Kyyvr it is necessary to reid toywr.

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to thfe is, the me » many. The multitude of intelligible*, however, does, not make the one to be many, but causes the one being to be many. And in short, every intelligible is characterized by the one being. For in the intelligible being and the one are complicated, and are eonnascent with each other ; and being is most unical. But when each of these proceeds into murtitnde, they me separated from each other, and evince a greater difference with respect to each other. Each of these also i» divided into multitude through the prolific nature of difference. From these things therefore, it is evident that the intelligible and intellectual orders, being analogous to the intelligible orders, proceed in conjunction

CHAPTER XXVIIT.

After this however, let us discuss each of them, beginning according* to nature. First, therefore, the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual number presents itself to our view; and which is connected with, multitude. For every number is multitude. But with respect to multitude, one kind subsists unitedly, and another kind with separation. Number, however, is separate multitude; for there is difference in it. For in the intelligible there was power, and not difference, and this power generated multitude, and conjoined it to the monads. Number therefore is in continuity with intelligible multitude ; and this is necessary. For the monad was there, and also the duad ; since whole also was there, and was always monadic; and becoming to be two, has no cessation. Hence the monad and the duad were there, which are the first and exempt principles of numbers. And in these multitude was unitedly ; since the monad which is the fountain of numbers, and the chap, xxvur.

OF PLATO.

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duad possess all multitude according to cause; the former paternally, but the latter maternally.