The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

onsists of two parts, viz. of the one and being, power existing as the collector of the parts. According to both these conceptions, therefore, the duad pertaining to the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uniform and occult hypostasis of the first triad.

Moreover, in the Timseus, Plato calls the third triad of intelligible?, animal itself, intelligible, all-perfect, and only-begotten. But in the Parmenides he denominates it infinite multitude, and a wholeness comprehensive of many parts. And in the Sophista he perpetually calh it the intelligible distributed into many beings. All these assertions, therefore, arc the progeny of one science, and tend to one intelligible truth. For when Tim* us calls this triad intelligible animal, he also asserts it to be all-perfect, and comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts, both according to one and according to parts. Hence nnimal itself is according to this a whole, comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts. And Parmenides, when he shows that the one being is all-perfect multitude, demonstrates that it is consubsistent with this order. For the infinite will be all-powerful and all-perfect, as wc have before observed, comprehending in itself an intelligible multitude of parts, which also it generates; tome of these being more total, but others more partial, and as Tiroaeus says, both according to one, and according to genera. Farther still, as he calls animal itself eternal and only-begotten, so Parraenidcs first attri- Proc. Vol. I. 2 £

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK III.

butes the ever and to be generated, to infinite multitude, when he says, " And thus, according to the same reasoning, whatever part is generated will always possess these two parts: for the one will always contain being, and being the one ; so that two things will necessarily always be generated, and no part will ever l>e one."

Who, therefore, so clearly reminds us of eternal animal, and the primogcnial triad, as Pannenides, first assuming in this order generation and the ever, and so continually using each of these ? The same thing, therefore, is both an all-perfect animal, and all-powerful intelligible multitude. For the first infinity being power, and every intelligible subsisting according to it, and receiving from it a division into parts, I think it proper to call it all-powerful ; thus avoiding the appellation of the infinite, which disturbs the multitude.

ultitude. For the first infinity being power, and every intelligible subsisting according to it, and receiving from it a division into parts, I think it proper to call it all-powerful ; thus avoiding the appellation of the infinite, which disturbs the multitude. That, however, which in these things is both difficult to understand, and for which Plato especially deserves to be admired, we must not omit, but demonstrate to the genuine lovers of truth. For intelligible animal comprehends four intelligible ideas, according to which it not only constitutes the genera of Gods, but also the more excellent kind of beings after the Gods, and also mortal animals themselves ; for generating it extends the idea of air- wandering, the idea of aquatic, and the idea of terrestrial animals, from the Gods as far as to mortal animals. Since animal itself, therefore, comprehends four ideas, and through the same paradigms produces totally divine, demoniacal and mortal animals,, this deservedly produces a doubt in those who love the contemplation of truth, how, the causes being the same, and the same primary paradigms preexisting, some of the natures which arc constituted are Gods, others daemons, and others mortal animals. For all these being generated with reference to one form, how is it possible they should not have the same form and nature ; since it is requisite that one idea should every where be generative of things that have a similar form ? For on this account we admit the hypothesis of ideas, in order that the intelligible genus of Gods may possess and contain prior to multitude monads productive of similar natures. This doubt,' therefore, being so difficult, some oue may solve it logically by saying, that all things which subsist according to one form

■ Instead of mnifu>h it is necessary to read b»<jji«;.

CHAP. XXVII.

OF PLATO.

p. 219

are not synoniinous, and that they do not similarly participate of their common cause, but some things primarily, and others ultimately. For each form is the leader of a certain scries, beginning supernally, and subsiding as fur as to the last of things. For according to the oracle, all things begin supernally to extend their admirable rays to the downward place. Hence it will not be wonderful that the same idea should preexist as the cause of Gods, daemons, and mortal animals, producing all things totally, and delivering the more partial separation of things to the demiurgic order, in the same manner as this order delivers the production of individuals to the junior Gods.

d preexist as the cause of Gods, daemons, and mortal animals, producing all things totally, and delivering the more partial separation of things to the demiurgic order, in the same manner as this order delivers the production of individuals to the junior Gods. For intelligibles are the causes of whole scries; but intellectuals of divisions according to common genera. Supermundane forms are the causes of specific differences ; but mundane of things which are now individuals. For they are causes which are moved, and are the leaders of mutation to their progeny.

If however it be requisite to survey the thing itself by itself, and how one intelligible form is the cause ' of Gods, and daemons and mortals, Parmenides alone is able to satisfy us about the parts which are contained in the intelligible multitude. For he characterizes some things according to being, but others according to the one. For the one being, indeed, is absorbed by the one, but being which is one is rather absorbed by being, and the one being, and being which is one, contain in themselves each of the intelligible animals. According to the one being, therefore, Parmenides constitutes the divine genera, together with an appropriate peculiarity. But according to being which is one, he constitutes the genera posterior to the Gods. And according to the one being indeed of being which is one, he constitutes the genera of daemons, but according to being which is one, the mortal genera. And again, according to the one being of the one being, he constitutes the first and highest genera of the Gods ; but according to the being which is one of it, the second genera, and which have an angelic order. And thus all things are full of Gods, angels, daemons, animals, and mortal natures. And you sec how the medium is preserved of the more excellent genera. For being which is one is the angelic boundary of the one being which produces the Gods. But the one bciag is the

V It teems requisite to supply the word «ino> after the words tj id rs^rav nâo;.

p. 220

demoniacal summit of being which is one, and which adorns secondary natures. As to the unions, however, of secondary natures, it is not immanifest that they approximate to multitude, and to the progression of the natures placed above them. Nor must you wonder if being w hich is one is the cause of angels, but the one being of daemons. Fof in one place, being which is one is a part of the one being, but in another the one being is a part of being which is one.